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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Amidst the cross currents of events that influenced
the power centers of the world in the first half of the twentieth c·entury, the State of Israel was born in the year 1948.
The new nation was denied the privilege of trading with its
Middle E ast neighbors but succeeded in gaining succor from
distant friends , one of which was the United States of
America .

This treatise is concerned with the motives prompt-

ing U.S. government economic aid to the fledgling Mediterranean power, with the nature and magnitude of aid extended,
and with Israel's utilization of that aid.

The period under

review is 1949 to 1960, although the limits suggested by
these dates will be lifted as often as the need arises.
American experience with the business of bolstering
alien economies had not had a long history when Israel, soon
after gaining statehood, requested economic assistance.

For

decades, in fact, the American economy itself had been the
recipient of large sums of capital from European investors.
By 1913, three-fourths of the funds requir ed to b u ild our
railways had come from Great Britain, a country that provided
altogether

$4 billion for various U.S. ent erprises. 1

Then,

lwal ter Lip-pman, "Today and Tomorrow," Washington
Post , March 26, 1964, section A, p. 23.

1

2

with the outbrea k of World War I, nations engaged i n t he
struggle against Germany liquidated their

u.s .

hold ings and

borrowed, during the conflict and after, over $10 billi on
from the United States government.

These loans h elped to

finance purchases of supplies and equipment, and almost overnight America made the transit i on from a debtor to a creditor
nation. 2

Part of the assistance given consisted of various

forms of direct relief that began with the formation of t h e
Commission for the Relief of Belgium in the fall of 1914.
This Commission, headed by Herbert Hoover, served as the
buying and shipping organization for all relief supplies to
the occupied regions of Belgium and Northern France for the
entire duration of the war.

Supplies for the needy were

also furnished to the allied nations t hrough the United
States Food Administration from 1917 to the signing of the
Treaty of Versailles in 1919.

During the Reconstructi on

Period that followed, relief was extended to sixteen
countries.3
One of America's chief relief clients dur i ng t hi s
period was Soviet Russia.

Almost immediat e l y afte r its

declaration of war against Germany, Russia had begun to suffer
from want of food.

Short ages were not, at first, t h e result

2william Adams Brown, J r., and Redvers Opie, American
Foreign Assistance ( Wa shington, D. C.: The Brooking s Institution, 1953), pp. 1-J.
3Frank M. Surface and Ra ymond L . Bland, American Food
in the World War and Reconstruc t i on Period (P alo Alto, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1931), pp . 5-6, 80- 83.

3

of crop failure but rather the result of transportation bottlenecks and financial problems.

In the spring of 1921, however,

Russia was afflicted with a devastating drought, which rendered
a large portion of the nation's farmlands unproductive.

Within

a few months an estimated 25,000,000 people were facing famine,
and the situation was out of control.

Starving and diseased

refugees deserted the villages by the thousands ·and poured into
the cities.

At length, the Soviet Government, by way of Maxim

Gorky, appealed for help; and in the wake of an agreement
signed August 20, 1921, food and clothing were provided under
the supervision of the American Relief Administration.

4

In

point ?f tonnage, Russia was the largest recipient of relief
assistance during the Reconstruction Period, the dollar value
of which assistance was over $63 million.
Through the several relief activities of the American
government and its citizenry, aid extended to nations abroad
from 1914 to 1924 amounted to $5.2 billion. 5

Thus through

loans for the purchase of American goods and supplies and
through outright gifts, World War I and its aftermath provided
the United States with its first significant exposure to what
has since come to be called "foreign aid,"
America's next major excursion into foreign assistance
was a program called lend-lease that was instituted in 1941 a
4 Ibid., pp. 243-245.

5Ibid., p. 7.

4

few months before U .s. entry into the Second :forld War.

The

success of the Axis Powers in the early stages of the conflict
left Great Britain without effective allies to carry on the
fight.

Moreover Britain was witnessing the depletion of her

dollar resources and the destruction of her me rch ant marine
by the German navy.

Because Preside nt Rooseve lt and the

Congress felt t hat a German victory wou l d endanger the economic
and military security of the Uni ted States, they determined
'

that help, short of war, should be given to Great Brita in.
In time lend-lease assistance was extended to Great Britain
and several other countries in the form of equipment, supplies, and defense information. 6
An experiment in multi-lateral aid followed the launching of lend-lease.

In 1943 the principal allied nations in-

volved in World War II agreed to provide relief to war-torn
countries.

Alth ough it pre ceded formation of the United

Nations Organization, t he international a ge ncy created by
this four nation accord was designate d the United Nations
Relief and Rehabilitation Ad min i stra tion (UNRRA).
soon lost enthusiasm for t h e program, howeve r,

Amer i cans

vhen certain

East European g overnments accepte d r e l ief but de c l i ned to
report its disp os it ion.

The United States , which s upplied

70 percent of UNRRA 1 s f unds, d i scontinued contributions in

1947; and the institu t i on came to an end.

6u.s. Le gislative Reference Service, Library of
Congress, U.S. Forei n Aid Its Pur oses Seo e Administration, and Related I ormation Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1959), pp. 1-17.

5

Even during the UNRRA period the greater part of U,S,
aid was extended on a bilateral basis outside the UNRRA
framework and took the form of financing the countryts ex.po~table surplus.

Such bilateral relief, which was continued

after the demise of UNRRA until 1951 to Austria, China,
Greece, and Italy, is referred to as Post-UNRRA aid.

In

addition, from 1946 to 1951 America, as a subscriber to the
Geneva Convention, performed relief and rehabilitation work
in areas that its armed forces occupied.

This program was

called "Government and Relief in Occupied and Liberated
Areas

11

(

GARI OA ) • 7

About the time that the United States stopped supporting
UNRRA, a new foreign assistance program, instituted by
congressional enactment of the Greek-Turkish aid bill 1n May

1947, inaugurated the American policy of containment of Soviet
Russia.

Three months earlier, Britain had made the sudden

announcement that she no longer could provide economic and
military assistance to the two Mediterranean countries.

The

disturbing thing about this news was that Russia was demanding
of Turkey a share in the control of the Dardanelles, and
communist guerilla warfare was being waged in Greece.

It thus

appeared certain that a precipitous withdrawal of British
support would invite Russian domination of the whole area.
Being moved to action by these ominous developments, Congress

7Lorna Morley and Felix Morley, The Patchwork History
of Foreign Aid (Washington, D.C,:
ciation, 1961), pp. 12-14.

American Enterprise Asso-

6

approved a request from President Truman for $400 mil llon to
strengthen both countries. 8
Secre tary

f State Dean , che son, in defendi rg t he

Administration's request before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, said:
I need not emphasize to you what would. more than
likely be the effect on the nations in the Middle East of
a collapse in Greece and Turkey, and the installation of
totalitarian regimes there. Both from the point of view
of economics and morale, the effects upon countries to
the east would be enormous, es pecially if the failure in
Greece and Turkey should come about as the result of the
failure of this great democracy to come to their aid.
On
the other hand, I ask you to consider the effects on the ir
morale and their internal development should Greece and
Turkey receive a helping hand from the United States, the
country with which they closely associate the principles
of freedom.
It is not too much to say that the outcome
in Greece and Turkey will be watched with deep concern
throughout the v a st area from the Dardanelles to the
China Sea.9
Although $400 million was the amount approved by
Congress, a large quantity of surplus equipment from the
United States armed forces was provided the two countries at
a fraction of the original cost. 10

As a result of this

assistance and its imp lied message to Russia that the United
States might be willing to adopt sterner measures to maintain
the independence of Greece and Turkey, t he crisis soon
8An Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece a nd
Turkey, Statutes a t Large;-vo1. 61, 1947, pp . 103-105.
9u.s. Congress, House , Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Assistance to Greece and Turke y. Hearings on H. R. 2616,
80th Cong., .l st-sess., 1947 , p . 5.
l0 11 Turke y : Out p ost in ' Cold War,
World Report, July lb, 1940, p . 24 .

1"

U.S. News and

...,

p asse d.

Subse que nt a id to Gree c e and Turkey was incorporated

in the Marshall Plan.
While the Greek- 'r ur k is h Ass istance Act or 1947 was
st i ll being deb a ted in Congr es s, p lans were being laid fo r a
four-year design for the economic r ehabi litation of Europe.
This prqgram carne to b e known as the Euro pean Rec overy Program or Marshall Plan .

Europe had suffered disastrously from

the war, and American policy makers were fearful that the
economic downfall 01' Western Euro p e would lead to its
political colla9se and comm~nist subversion.

In res p onse to

this threat, Secretary of St a te Marshall used the occasion
of a commencement address at Harvard Univers i ty, June

1947, to announce the ge neral outline

5,

01· a program to solve

the economic ills of nations t h at would coop erate in a
regional self-help effort.

The pro p osal was taken under con-

sideration by Congr e ss and led to the p assage the following
apring of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, which was
part of the Foreign Assistance Act of that year. 11

In the

me&ntime Congress met in speci al session in November and
passed an emergency "interim aid" measure that authorized

$597 million to he lp Fr&nce, Italy, Austri a , and China to
get through the winter. 12

llThe Foreign Assis t a nce Act of 1948 embraced the
Economic Cooper a tion Act of 194b , the International Children's
Emergency Pund ,\ ssistance Act of 1948, the Greek-Tu r ki s h
Assi st ance Ac t of 1948 , and the China Aid Act of 1948.
12u.s . Legisl a tive Reference Service , Foreign Aid,
PP•

3.5-73.

8

The European Recovery Program required that benefiting
nations engage in joint economic planning and set up a continuing, organization for that purpose.

In response to this demand

a sixteen-nation Organization for European Economic Cooperation came into being in April 1948.

This group calculated the

joint needs of participating nations and recommended to the
United States the allocation of aid funds.

America's experi-

ence in this cooperative economic planning venture laid the
groundwork for yet other schemes that in the post-war years
were aimed at the economic unification of Western Europe.
Marshall Plan aid, was administered by the Economic
Cooperation Administration (ECA).

Assistance was extended

mainly in the form of grants of credit for the purchase of
American goods through private trade channels.

Such commodi-

ties were sold to citizens for local currency t ha t went into
counterpart funds equal to the value of the American grant.
Whereas

95

percent of such proceeds was avai lable to the

government of the recipient nation for recovery purposes,

5

percent was available to the United States for American

administrative expenses and for the stockpiling of raw
materials. 1 3
Marshall Plan countries r esponded positively and
quickly to the stimulus of American aid, and both industry
and agriculture soon were soaring above their prewar production levels.

It would be a mistake, however, to overestimate

1 3r1orley, Patchwork History, pp. 21-22.

the role of U.S. assistance in the economic recovery of
Europe, for Europe had the ' will, the know-h'ow, the 'managerial
talent, the labor force, and the markets ' merely waiting to be
tapped.

As appraised by the Legislative Reference Service of

the Library of Congress,
One of the clearest conclusions that emerges from
examination of the Marshall Plan is that the high achievements that were obtained came in large measure from the
initiative taken by the receiving countries rather than
from the billions of American grant aid. American dollar
aid was of critical importance, particularly in p~oviding
scarce materials at the right time and in creating the
bases for financial stability, but without wholehearted
European drivo for recovery this dollar a.id would have
been of little significance, for at no time was it more
than a small fraction of the g~oss national product of
most ,of the receiving states.LL+
·
The year following passage of the Economic Cooperation
Act of 1948 which launched the European Recovery Program, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed to forestall the possibility of a military takeover of western
Europe by Russia and her allies.

The United States' partici-

pation in the new alliance th~n called for passage of additional foreign aid legislation to provide military ·supplies.
The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 was the congressional answer to this need.
At the same time that the North At lantic Treaty was
being negotiated as a military defense against communist
expansion in Europe, American foreign policy framers were
seriously considering what they believed to be a further

p.

45.

14u.s. Legislative Reference Service, Foreign Aid,

10

economic defense against the appeal of communism in underdeveloped cauntr~es.

This device was the sharing of technical

knowledge and sk111 with needy nations on a bilateral basis
and also the giving of greater support to multilateral programs
of technical assistance.

Under the official but euphemistic

label of Technical Cooperation, this policy represented the
next step in the unfolding drama of America's economic efforts
in the "cold war,"

The new long range program, inaugurated

with the passage of the Act for International Development
June

5, 1950, was incorporated in the Foreign Economic Assis-

tance Act of 1950. 15

And because, when originally broached

to the American public, it happened to be the fourth point of
a statement on foreign policy by President Truman 1n his 1949
inaugural address, 1t came to be known popularly as the Point
Four program.

The new legislation now opened the doorway for

a considerable number of foreign governments to apply for
U.S. assistance .
The sudden outbreak of war in Korea in 1950 was regarded
by the "free world" as evidence that the communist camp
was still willing to resort to force to achieve its goals.
The new threat brought about a shift of emphasis in the
European Recovery Program from purely economic aid to military
support.

In December a spokesman for ECA made this change

clear with an announcement that commodities essential
15

.
Foreign Economic Assistance Act of
at Large, Vol. 64, 1950-1951, pp. 198-210.

1950,

Statutes

11

to rearmament woul d henceforth be g iven priority and that the
agency was turning to the tas k of bolstering Europe an defenses.

Eight months later Congress passed and the Pr e sident

signed into law the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which
brought programs of military, economic, and technical assistance (excepting only the Export-Import Bank) under the
Mutual Security Agency (MSA).

Not only was the goal of

security embodied in t he title of this new instrumentality
of the U.S. government, but it was also set forth as follows
in the Act itself:
No economic or technical assistance shall be supplied
to any other nation unless the President finds that the
supplying of such assistance will stre ngthen the security
of the United States and promote world peace, and unless
the recipient country has a gree d to join in promoting
international understa nding and good wi ll, and in maintaining r.•rorld peace, and to ta ke such ac ti on a s may be
mutu~lly1 ~greed upon to elimina te caus e s of i n ternational
tension.
It was with pa ssa ge of t h e :Mutua l Se curit y Act of 1951
that economic aid to the state of Israel e me r ge d into the
limelight.

It was then that Israel became a f u ll-fledged

beneficiary of American largesse.

This is not to say that

the young country h ad not already received sizeable hard currency loans--$135 million, to be exact--from t h e Export-

Import Bank in 1949 and 1950 and upwards of $23 million in
U.S. government ovmed surp lus agricultural connnodities by
way of private ch aritable relief agencies in 1950 and 1951.
1 6r-1utual Security Act of 1951, Sta t ute s at Large,
Vol. 65, sec. 511 (b), 1951, p. 381.

12

The new legislation, however, spe_cifically spelled out
Israel's eligibility to obtain grant funds, which amounted to

$63.5 million during the ensuing fiscal year.

U.S. technical

assistance also was extended fort.he first time to •Israel
under authorizat i on provi ded by th e 1951 le g islation. 17
From 1949 to 1960 the United States government pro,..tded Israel ~741.6 mill.ion in economic benefits or various
kinas .

Al t h ough this ri gure is · u ni>:n,.,ressiv0 ;hen compared

with the magnitude of aid ext ende d to a number of lsrger
countries, it s~ ould be noted that the

t,355 per capit a that

it repres ented18 exceeded the level of assistance provided
any other foreign reci pi e nt of American beneficence.

This

relatively generous outp ouring of economic aid calls for an
analysis in the next chapter of some of the influences that
prompted Washington to help. Israel along the road to economic
independence.

17The kinds of economic aid e xt ended to Isra el and
the annual monetary va lue of each kind are set forth in
Chapter I V.
16 calculated on the basis or population figures as
of December 31, 1959.

PART I
MOTIVATIONS, PROBLFJ:.1S, A.ND AID FORMS

CHAPTER II
MOTIVATIONS AND 013.JEC TIVES

OF U.S. AID TO I SRA3L
John D. Montgomery, in The Polit i cs of Foreign Aid,
observes that international politics are the raison d'etre
of foreign aid.

Whether the fundamental pur p ose be to stop

communist expansion or to develop healthy relations with receiving countries, aid programs are part of general political
strategy.

He also notes that domestic American politics have

a strong influence on foreign aid legislation:
American shipping interests, small businessmen,
farmers, and marine insurance compani'es are protected by ·
the law. Foreign aid legislation has also paid homage
to the sentiments of those opposing the seating of
Cornmunist China in ·the United Nations; those favoring
the political federation of Europe or a joint organization of Asian states, and those who hope that the competitive free enterprise system will. be used overseas . to
achieve the economic development for wh ich U.S. aid is
proffered • • • • 1
That a multiplicity of intere sts have been served by·
the United States assistance programs appl ies wi th particular
force to its aiq -to-Isr~el p olicy.

This policy has . be.e:q a

mixture of divers e motivations and aims tha t probably has not
always been completely logic al , consistent, or clesr even to
the policy makers themselves.
lJohn D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid
Frederick A. Praeger, 1962}, p. 5.

(New York:

14

15

Domestic Motivations
Sentimental and Humanitarian Interests
The Balfour Declaration of 1917 announced that the
British government viewed with favor the establishment of a
·Jewish home in Palestine.

The statement was approved in

advance of its publication by President Woodrow Wilson and
approved thereafter by five of his successors in the presidency.

Congress also, on June 20, 1922, gave a unanimous

bi-partisan endors ement to a joint resolution in behalf of
"aspirations of the Jewish people to rebuild their ancient
homeland."

Although roots of American good will toward

Zionism lie deep in America's past, it is sufficient to note
that these repeated governmental end orsements contributed to
a climate of public opinion favorable to t~e formation of a
Jewish state.
Sympathy for Zionist goals was strengthened enormously by the sense of outrage that burst upon the world by
the slaughter of nearly six million Jews in German occupied
Europe during World War II.

Compassion for these victims of

wilful destruction led many people in the Uni ted States to
subscribe to the yearnings of the survi vors for a home of
their own.

Mixed with compassion were also feelings of guilt

for the failure of their gove rnment and other governments to
provide a place of refuge for oppressed German Jews before
the outbrea k of war bloc ked t h eir esca pe.
One can but conjecture h ow t he course of ~ istory in

16

the Middle East might have been affected if Americans had
been better acquainted with the Arab people,

To many Ameri-

cans Arabs were vague, mysterious, romantic princes of the
desert existing in a world unrelated to reality,

Such inaccura te

imagery contributed to the fact that neither Arabs nor the
Arab case were ever very clearly understood by the American
people.

Furthermore, Jews in Palestine were seen as underdogs

in a contest with Arabs, which further provoked sympathy in
their behalf,

And after the State of Israel was formed, the

same feelings that had supported Jewish aspirations in Palestine continued to form a warm, emotional atmosphere in which
Congress and the Administration considered economic assistance
to the struggling young nation,

How much of a role such atti-

tudes played in the formation of American policy is, of course,
impossible to measure, but it can scarcely be doubted that they
had some influence,

Economic aid to Israel both coincided with

and gave expr ession to American sentimental and humanitarian
identification with the Zionist dream.
A Moral Obligation Formed by u.s. Endorsements
of Jewish Aspirations in Palestine
On December 19, 1945, Congress passed a resolution
advocating development of Palestine as a democratic commonwealth and favoring unrestricted Jewish immigration thereto,
A few months later President Truman publicly urged the admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine and, on July 2, 1946,
announced that the United States was willing to pay their

I'

transportation costs.
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October 4th of the same year he went

so far as to say, "Furthermore, should a workable solution
for Palestine be devised, I would be willing to recommend to
the Congress a plan for economic assistance for the development of that country. 11 2
American pressure on Britain led to the United
Nations' consideration of the whole Palestine question in

1947, and it was significa nt in bringing about the November 29
decision to partition the country into a Jewish state and an
Arab state.

Subsequently, the United States was the first

government to extend recognition to Israel when the Jews of
Palestine declared their independence May 14, 1948.

Through

these several steps and through American collaboration with
the British and French in the 1950 Tripartite Declaration,
which guaranteed Israel's borders, America helped to lay the
groundwork for the existence of the modern State of Israel.
Undeniably, U.S. policy contributed greatly to the infant
nation's existence.
Having committed itself in favor of Israel, the
United States Congress now found itself face d with some kind
of obligation to make that state succe ed .

I nt i mations of

this attitude were expresse d by v irt ta lly ever J witness who
1

testified in reference to aid ing Israel in the 1951 Mutual
Security hearings conducted by the Foreign Affairs Corn.~ittee.
211 President 1 s Statement on Palestine,u The New York

Times, October

5, 1946,

p. 2.
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House Minority Leader, Joseph W. Martin, stated it this way:
The plain fact is that American foreign policy gave
political support to the establishment to [sic) the State
of Israel for some years. But we did not back up this
political aid with the economic assistance this struggling State so urgently needs despite our close friendship with them and the significant role we played here
in Congress and at the United Nations to bring this State
into being.3
When Congress considered the possibility of helping
Israel in 1951, it did so in response to a note received from
the government of Israel requesting such help.

The document

is of interest here for the subtle and persuasive way that it
ties anticipated U .s. assistance to previou s American policy.

The following is the concluding portion of the note:
In the last three decades successive Presidents of
the United States have associated the American people, by
close bonds of sympathy and support, with the rebirth of
Israel as a modern embodiment of an ancient tradition
which bequeathed to the world some of the basic moral
ideals on which western civilization is founded. At
every decisive stage in Israel's recent development, the
efforts and sacrifices of Israel's people, and of Jewish
communities working for Israel's welfare, have received
notable support from the President, the Government, and
the Congress of the United States of America. American
representatives in the United Nations have carried this
policy into the highest international forum. Israel will
always feel the most profound gratitude for the memorable
steps taken by President Truman and the Government of the
United States in favor of the reestablishment of an independent Israel, its official recognit ion , and its formal
admission to the world cormnuni ty. In seeking the support
of the United States for its arcuous tas k of economic
develo pment and consolidation, and f or it s unprecedented
efforts in providing homes for so many within so short a
time, the Government of Israeli~ ad vocating the maintenance and extension of a tradi t iona l relationship

3u.s. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
The Mutual Security Program, Hearings on H. R. 5020 and R. R.
5113, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, p. 642.

19

f irmly establis ~-ied in the heart s of both 9eoples.4
The tactfully worded Israeli note does .ot explicitly
speak of a moral obligati on on the part of the United States
government to assist Israel .

It implies such an obligation,

h owever, by suggesting that the formation of the Jewish State
could scarcely have seen the ligh t of day wi thout the American eff ort and t ha t economic aid is a continuation of this
"tra itionnl r e lations h ip."

A further a ffirmation of this

thought i s the American Zionhit Council's equally polite
reminc er to Congress i n 1951 t hat "Aid to Israel means •

.

.

continua~ion of the Amer ican poli c y of fri enc'ship for the new
State wh1.ch 01.1r country he lped t o cre ate. 11 5
That an American obligat ion to re.ncer some assistance
to I srael exis te d i n t t e light of previou s commitments of the
U.S. government was pointed out by a State uepartment spokes-

man in 195J.

In conjunction with new hearings on the Mutual

Security Act, Arthur Z. Gartl iner told a Congressional committee that he felt the United States was committed

11

by acts of

this Congr ess going back to 1922, to the maintenance of the
State of I f:rae l. 116

Gardiner at this time was the State

Department's politico-economic advisor, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and Afr i can Affairs.

When a Congressman

4Ibid., p. 655. See " Text of Note Presented by the
Ambassador of Israel, Abba S. Eba n , to the Secretary of
S tate--Requ.est for Grant-in-Aid," Append ix c.

5Ib id ., p.

651.

Italics a r e nine.

6u .E' . Con gress, House, Committe e on Foreign Affairs,
Mutual Secur:i.ty Act Extension,_ Hearings on H.R. 5710, 83d
Cong., 1st sess., 1953, p. 82~.

later argued that aid money could be better spent at home
than in the Middle East, Gardiner replied that the United
States not only had commercial and strategic interests ir.
the area but that:
I also know that we are held to blame for this
seething problem of humanity.
Mr. Lecompte. Are we altogether to blame?
Mr. Gardiner. Well, I do not lmow whether we are or
not, sir, but I do know that it has been the decision of
the United States Government for at least 30 years to
establish a Jewish National Home in Israel and it is
partly the result of those decisions. You have introduced into the area another 800,000 people, and it is a
poor are a, and these people will not be able to make
their living unless t h ere are r e clamation and irrigation
projects.7
The following year Garciner was a gain a witness before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and again put
forth the State Department's point of view on aid to Israel:
Mr. Gardiner. We feel • • • that the United States
had a larger measure of responsibility in establishing
Israel in the first place, and we are committed to the
maintenance of the State of Israel and giving those
people who have been persecuted for so many years, by
others, a chance to reestablish themselves.
We are also committed to the proposition-Chairman Chiperfield. I wish you wouldn't use that
word "committed."
Mr. Gardiner. Tdell, in 1950 a statement was made by
the 0 nited States, French, and British Governments, which
has Eince been reaffirmed by the Secretary of State and
the Fre sident to the effect that we would take measures
witb.in and without the United Nations to prevent changes
in t he current boundaries except cha nges that came about
through negotiations.
So, if I may use the word, I will say that we are
commltted to maintaining but n ot necess a rily permitting
it to expand. tJ
7Ibid., n. 1036.

--

-

8u.s. Congress, House, Committ e e on Foreign Affairs,
Hear i n~s on the Mutual Securit Act of 195
83d Cong., 2nd
sess., 19~4 , pp. 0 - 0 •
1 ,
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Whether the 1950 commitment to maintain boundary
lines may be equated with a commitment to provide economic
support is debatable.

Nevertheless, when the several offi-

cial U.S. declarations in favor of Jewish aims in Palestine
are considered together, there can be no doubt but what they
served to create a sense of obligation on the part of many

American leaders to help Israel gain economic and political
viability.

Israel was regarded as owing its birth largely

to American paternity, and with paternity came the responsibility to help provide the necessities of survival.

This

sense of obligation appears to have been one of the constant
motivations of the U.S. a.id effort in the decade of the

1950 1 s.
Jewish Pressures in America
In an article entitled "Backgrounds of American
Policy Toward Zion," Selig Adler comments as follows on
Woodrow Wilson's response to the proposed Balfour Declaration :
Here was a chance to stand up for a su ppressed
nationality and to promote the Allied fortune at the same
time. Nor was Wilson blind to the domes t ic p olitical implications. Despite two s u cces s ive victor ie s , the
Democratic party was still in an es s ent i a l mi n ority and
Wilson had gained valuable Jewish support i n his snug
reelection. Over and above the se materi a l considerations,
Wilson had strong convict i on s on the subject. His early
academic writings , certainl ~r innoc ent of politic al ambition, reveal the old Chr i s t i an Americ a n respect for the
Jewish contribution to c iv ilization. A Ca lvinist by
heritage and temperament, Wilson found it agreeable to
picture himself as t h e agent of providence. "To think
that I, a son of the manse," he once s a id half aloud to
Stephen Wise, "should be able to help restore the Holy
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Land to its people!"9
A mixture of political motives with sentimental and
strategic con~iderations, such as alleged ly influenced
Wilson's support of the Balfour Declaration, probably has
been a factor in every major U.S. decision leading to
Israel's statehood.

This phenomenon is not unusual in a

society in which aspirants to public office customarily seek
to cultivate the good will of minority groups and in which
each such group is free to make its views felt.

Americans

of German extraction, for instance, in 1888 sought to influence their government to support Germany's stand on the
Samoan Island question in a controversy involving the United
States, England, and Germany.

Irish-Americans, on the other

hand, helped bring about the defeat of the Anglo-American
Arbitration Treaty of 1897.

Americans of Dutch ancestry

sough t to get the United States to intervene in the Boer War.
Catholics in America worked to keep Ameri ca from becoming
involved in the Spanish Civil Wa r.

American Jews after World

War I and more especially in the wake of Hitler's atrocities
during World War II actively sought U.S. support of a Jewish
commonwealth in Palestine. 10
An illustration of the influence exerted by Zionism
9selig Adler, "Backgrounds of American Policy Toward
Zion," in Israel: Its Role in Civilization, ed. by Moshe
Davis (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. 274.
1 ~adav Safran, The United States and Israel
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 277.
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may be drawn from the U.S. political arena immediately after
the Second World War.

On August Jl,

1945, Pres ident Truman

wrote Prime Minister Attlee proposing that 1 00,000 Jews be
admitted to Palestine at once to relie ve the suffering in
Europe.

Attlee declined to accept the proposition but sug-

gested, in turn, that an Anglo-American Commi ttee of InQuiry
be appointed to study the subject.

In April, 1946, the

Committee recommended adoption of the Truman proposal while
rejecting the partition of Palestine as a solution.

This

was an election year, and President Truman, seeking endorsemen t at the polls for Democratic candidates, declined to
wait for any further study of the matter but called for the
immediate admission to Palestine of 100,000 Jews.

In the

same declaration he announced himself in favor of a Jewish
state that would have control of its own immigration and
economic policies.

Two days later the Republican candidate ,

Dewey , not to be outdone, calle d for the admis1:ion of "not
100,000 but several hundre ds of thousands " of J ews into
Palestine. 11
After the formation of the State, Zionist influence
was instrumental in persuading the American Government,
together with Britain and France, to announce the 1950 Tripartite Declaration guaranteeing Israel's gains.

From this

time forth, however, in the political and diplomatic area
11Kermit Roosevelt, "The Partition of Palestine:
Lesson in Pressure Politics," The Middle East Journal,
January, 1948, pp . 10-12.

A

Jewish inf luence h as not b een cons p icuously successful.

J e w-

ish influence, f or exaMpl e , h a s n ever b e en sufficient to
cause the United States to enter any kind of alliance with
Israel.

It has not beeh strong enough to inru c e t h e State

Department to t ake steps to c ause !\r qb coun tr i'3 s to discontinue the boycott of Isra e l or to l if t t h e bloc 1rn de of the
Suez Canal to Isra eli sh ipp i :ig .

Neither di d it prevent the

American Government fr om init i ating a resolu tion in t he

.

Security Council condemning Israel's attack on 3gypt in 1956
or letting it be known t hat it wo11ld support the imvosition
of sanctions if she did not withdraw.

In the realm of eco-

nomic assistance, however, Jewish influence continued to
assert itself.

Isra e l came into being at a time wh en the

United States was embar king u pon a foreign economic policy
that was to mean massive a s s istance to friendl y nations
around the globe.

In t h is unprecedented moment of world

history a rich nation was emplo ying aid a s a
nique to ha lt the spre ad of world Communi sm .

11

cold war" techT~e door wa s

officially open t o any coun try to plead it f! c 9se f or e conomic
aid, and, in t he de c a de of the f if ti e~ , Israe l' s 1merican
Jewis h as well 11 s n on-Jewish f r iends sougr..t ever y .J p ortuni ty
to articulate her ne e ds .12

12safran , Israe l, pp . 279-280.

Foreign Policy Objectives
To Promote the Economic and Political Development
of a Western Oriented Middle East by Making
Israel a Pilot Plant of Such Development
In the sunnner of 1951 discussions of aid to Israel in
Congress reflected the widespread optimism that some peace
settlement between the Arab States and Israel was on its way.
Some advocates of assistance spoke enthusiastically of the
little state's future usefulness as an exa~ple of economic
progress and democracy in the Mic nle East.

In the process

she would help convince the peoples of the area that their
best interest lay with America and the free world.

Typical

of such expressions is the f ollowing by House Minorit:r Leader
Hartin:
The expanding industrial plant in Israel, steadily
growing in quantity and diversity of output, can make
that country the industrial workshop of the Near East.
By word and by deed, the young State of Israel has demonstrated its willingness to stand firmly and resolutely
· against the forces of tyranny and despotism. It can be
an outpost o American strength and influence in the
Middle East. 3

1

Although Congressmen realized that there were neither
trade nor diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab
States, the belief persisted that old fe a rs and prejudices
l

would vanish and an energetic Israel would spread abroad its
techniques for attaining the abundant life.

Then in due time

the Middle East and the West would work to get~er a s a team.

1 3u.s. Congress, House, Committ ee on Forei s n Affairs,
The Mutual Security Program, Hearings on H.R. 5020 and H.R.
5113, 82d Cong., 1st s e ss., 1951, p. 643.
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Martin's statement reflects something of the thought
earlier presented to t h e State Department in a note by the
then Israeli Ambassador Abba Eb '.:m .

One of the reasons that

America should grant aid to Israel, he argued, was that:
I~rael ha s establishe d a parJ.iRmentary democracy in
an area wh.ere democratic ide als and princ i ,. les ha ve not
yet struc k ceep roots • • . • The success of Israel's
efforts to combine political freedom wi th economi c progress will cert ainly affect the presti ge of democracy in
the crucial area of wh ich Israel is a part. Israel's
experience and achievement in soil cons e rvation, l a nd
development, irri gation, technological rese arch, industrial progress, as well as in cooperative organization
and social freedom, are intimately relevant to the most
acute problems which afflict such wide areas of the Near
East with conditions of backwardness and dearth. Thus,
any strengthening of Israel's efforts to achieve a high
degree of development must be regarded as a contribution
to the progress· and stapility of the entire Near East.
For, despite the transient political conflicts wh ich now
divide it, the Near East cannot in ti~ long run _f ail to
be a·f fec ted by progr~s si ve examples. 4'.l'he government of Israel would demonstrate to other
nations of the area how to ga in economic advancement within
a demoq~atic framework .

Presumably this would contribute to

a pro-western orientation of ~he re gi on.
It _ma y be symptorna tic of more realistic t hinking on
the part of members of C'ongr es s t hat ver,y, little appea r s in
publiehed Mutual Security hearings ' after ·1951 in support of
the hope that the Mid dle· Ea-st would advance politically and
'

'

'

I

'

,,

economically in the wake of Israel's example.

The following

exchange between Represen,t ative (subsequently Sena tor) Jacob
'

I

J. Javits of New York and Henry A. , Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern , South Asian and Af'rican
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Affairs, illustrates rather the opposite viewpoint.

It comes

from the 1954 Mutual Security hearings:
Mr. Jav·its. Now, Mr. Secretary, do you find that the
example of I sra el in connection with wages, industrial
development, engineer ing skill, representative government,
and western ideas generally is having an effect in the
Near East upon what is happening in the Arab States and
if so, what effect do you find?
Mr. Byroade . I think probably the most prominent
effect is re sentment of her neighbors against the progressive ways of t his new state that has entered the Middle
East.
Mr. Javits. Do you find them, themselves, moving in
the direction of greater modernism because of, let us
say, the challenge of competition from Israel to the
Arab States?
Mr. Byroade. No, I don't, because there is practically no intercourse between these States. The o~portuni ty to see whi::-.t one• s r:i.eighbor does isn • t there. 15
The goal of raising the living standards of the Middle
East by way of Israel and, in so doing, winning friends for
America, was a dream that Israel's supporters entertained
with diminishing fervor as the years passed.

Before the 1951

Mutual Security hearings were concluded, King Abdullah of
Jordan was assassinated by alleged opponents of his lenient
policy toward Israel.

More importantly, in the early fifties

the Middle East became inextricably enmeshed in the "cold
war" between East and West.

By the middle of the decade

Soviet Russia became the champion of the Arab nations and voted
with them in the United Nations Organization.

Russia also

condemned Israel as a tool of western imperialism and in
various ways seemingly sought to perpetuate the breach between
Israel and her neighbors.
1 5u.s. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Hearings on the Mutual Security Act of 1951,1,, R3d Cong., 2nd
sess., 1954, p. 227.

To Strengthen America.' s Pos.1. tion in the
Mi ddle East vis-a-vis Soviet Russia
and the Communist Bloc Nations
During the Mutual Security hearings or 1951 the
Korean War intens ified American suspicions c oncerning the
expansionist aims of Soviet Russia .

At that time the aver-

age American still recalled the long-delayed removal of
Soviet troops from Iran after World War II in violation of
treaty commitments.

The tardy withdrawal had been an ominous

reminder that Russia still possessed a keen interest in the
oil-rich Middle East and that she had never renounced her
historic quest, dating from the time of Peter the Great, for
all-year-round port facilities on the Persian Gulf.

Also

fresh in mind was the communist guerilla campaign in Greece
and the Russian d emand s on Turkey that had p romp ted U.S. aid
le g islation in favor of those countries in

1947.

Furthermore,

captured documents showed that the Germans had planned a campaign in the spring of
Persian Gulf.

1943

that would carry them to the

The German assessment of the strategic impor-

tance of the region also may have contributed to the post-war
determination of t h e ifost not to let it slip into Russian
hands.
American foreign ] Olicy planners, though , needed little help from outdated war plans to cause them to recognize
the tremendous v~lue of the area.

They were acutely aware

that if Russia gained control of the Middle E ast, she would
pose an immedi ate threat to Southeast Asia.

Of even greater

concern was the nightmarish thought that Russia, astr ide the
seas of oil that lie beneath Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi
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Arabia, would be in a position to deprive Western :i;:;urope of
the stuff t hat lubricates and provides the f uel for its
industrial economy~

Such deprivation would imp ose a dr a in on

European treasuries that would inevitably be felt in America.
At best, the deficit would be tr ansferred to the United
States treasury for financial assistance to purchase oil from
the Western Hemisphere.

At worst, American reserves would be

used fast enough to jeopardize hemispheric defense. 16

For

these reasons the Korean War l ent a sense of urgency to the
Congressional hearings on the Mutual Securi t ~r legislat i on
that were he l d i n the summe r of 195'1.
One of the wi tnes f' es to t e stif:. before the :,:touse Committee on Forei gn Affairs was _\.. A . 3erl e , Jr., former
Assistant Secretary of State.

Berle stre~ sec his conviction

that America was approaching the greatest cris is that it had
yet encountered and that the strain in the deteriorating
world situation was going to be centered in the Middle East.
Open hostilities in Korea had been stopped by armed force,
but two complementary moves were appearing.

One was in Iran,

where the oil nationalization issue was a wedge that the
communist Tudeh party, admi ni stered by a large staff at the
Russian embassy in Tehran, hoped to use as a means of subverting organized government.

The other move was in Burma.

Berle saw the se as a two-pronged move t o flank India on both
16Harry Bearse Slli s, Cha ll enge in the Mid~ le East:
Communist Influence and American Policy (New York: Ronald
Prees, 1960), • 126.
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the East and the West.

He noted that the combination of

these moves would go a long way toward denying the Indian
Ocean to western naval power and that seizure of the Persian
Gulf would mean that fleets sailing the Indian Ocean would
have to bunker with oil in the Dutch East Indies or all the
way back to Venezuela.

He maintained that little more than

two years remained before peace would be replaced with force.
He also said it was his impression that the Soviet plan
envisioned a challenge in Western Europe last because Russia
would expect military resistance th.ere but that the Middle
East was wide open to conquest.

The Soviet aim, he affirmed,

very probably was to shut off Western "?.urope from its raw
materials and bring it to its knees ec ono~ically without
invasion. 1 7
House Minority Leader Joseph W. Marti n , Jr., testified
before the Committee that he believed that aiding Israel
would make the Middle East more secure and, by extension,
strengthen the position of the United States in the region.
As he viewed the situation, there was danger that the area
would become a vacuum into which totalitarian f orc es would
flow unchecked.

As for Israel's role in the vulnerable

area's defense, Martin said:
They live in a ten~e and troubled area; they know
that they are on the frontier of danger. They are prepared for any eventua lity. The young army of Israel,
1 7u.s. Congress, House, Committee on Fore i n Affairs,
The Mutual Security Program, Hearings on H.R. 5020 and R.R.
5113, 82d Cong ., let sess., 1951, pp. f,2 i - 625, 636.
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with more than 200,000 men and women, is one of the
strongest forces for the survival of freedom in the Near
East • • • • It can be an outpost of American strength
and influence in the Middle East. There is no doubt in
my mind §hat to help Israel is to make America more
secure. 1
The testimony of military representatives before the

House Connnittee on Fore i gn Affairs emph asized that in case
of conflict between Sast and 1:-Je st, the Mi dd le East must be
defende d mainly because of its oil resources.

Th e following

is an extract from the re ma rks of Admiral Fore st Sherma n:
In addition to these large r e sources of oil, the area
p ossesses a h i gh de gree of str at egic importance because
of its geographical situation. Thi s are a i nvolves three
continents a nd controls critical land, sea, a nd air communications. If war should come, the free natio ns must
be able to control t h ese communica t ions and deny t h em to
the enemy. In addition, this area, under a llied control
would provide the b a ses for offensive opera t ions by wh ich
we could strike directly and quickly at the heart of the
enemy.
Today, we plan to defend Western Europe in case of
attack. The pra cticability of execution of such plans is
increasing each day as the free nations augment their
total military potential. As our strength in Western
Europe increases, it becomes more practic a ble to plan for
a defense of the Middle East wh ich will insure, as a
mini:rau.m, a continuous f low of oil to the w·estern World
from that area and a denial of this oil to the enemy~l9
George C. McGhee, wh o was then Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Ea st ern, South Asian, and Af rican Affairs,
affirmed that both the strateg ic i mp or t a nce of the Mi ddle
East and t he Soviet Union ' s int ent i on of d ominating the area
were abunda nt ly clear.

This goal, :he exp l a in'9 d , was ex-

pres s l y stated in negot i a t ion s be tween Germa ny and Ru s sia in
1940 a nd wa s also evi dent in Ru ss i a ' s e f f ort s t o sti r up
18 Ibid., p. 643.

19Ibid., p. 769 .
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trouble t h ere.

McGh ee favored t h e pending legislation and

declared it to be in the interest of the United States to
strengthen the orientation of the Middle East nations toward
the United States and to encourage the Arab States and Israel
to cooperate in resisting Russia.

He recognized, however,

that the armed forces of the various countries of the Middle
East, in case of war, could not be expected to do more at the
outset than to maintain internal security and offer token
resistance to invasion by a modern army.

Some of them,

though, if properly equipped and trained, could help defend
their territories and protect l i nes of communication and
vital installations. 20
These ~am~les are !uffici~nt to i n~ica~e thst in 1951
the matter of strengthening t h e U .s. p ~s:L tion in t he Middle
East (ana Israel a s pa rt of the Mid0le Ea st ) vis-o-vis Soviet
Russia loomed large in considerations of economic assistance
to Israel.

Government witnesses generally agreed that

Israel, in collaboration with other states of the area, m~st
be made strong enough to assist in the area's defense.

The

nature of the effort that might be expected from Israel,
though, was not understood by all alike.

Some thought that

Israel's army was itself a major factor to be considered.
The prepondera•nt view, however, and t h e one that received
the greatest emphasis in ensuing years, wa s that neither
Israel nor any other Mi dd le Eastern country cou ld be thought
20I b id., pp. 742-7~- 3.
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of a.s more than a domes tic police force.
In the course of the 1953 Mutual Security hearings,
the question was specifically put to General Matthew B.
Ridgway, who &t the time was Supreme Allied Com.~ander, Europe,
as to whether the military was "counting at all on the
trained, equipped troops" in Israel.
answer was simply, "No."·21

General Ridgway's

A similar question was asked of

Henry A. Byroade, who had succeeded McGhee as Assistant
Secretary of State f"or Nea,r Ea.stern, South Asian, and African
Affairs.

Byroade's reply was,

11

I t h ink you have here a good

little force, but it is not susceptible to use in the defense
of the area as a whole except as the war gets down toward
their area. 1122
In the 1954 hearings, Major General George

c.

Stewart

further clarified the nature of Israel's anticipated contribution to the defense of the Middle East in case of war.

His

interrogator was Representative Javits:

Mr. Javits. One last ~uestion on that: Have we
ever evaluated Israel a.s an a.sset to us in terms of airfields, workshop--because there is an active i ndustrial
complex in Israel big for this area--have we made any
military evaluation of what Is r ael can me an t o us in the
defense of the Near East, as a base?
General Stewart. Yes, sir.
Last year when the military- aid program was first
proposed for this area, we r eques te d and got an estimate
21u.s. Congress, House, Com.~ittee on Forei gn Affairs ,
Mutual Securit Act Extension, Heari ngs on R.R. 5710, 83d
Cong., st sess.,
3, p.
22Ibid., p . 1041.
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from the Joint Ch iefs of Sta ff of H~l9. t we shou l c'J rl o in
t h is a rea.
(Discussion off the record.)
General Stewart. In connection with certain proposals to procure, in our offshore procure:nent program,
we have been given considerable information as to the
manuf'acturing capabilities of this area. I would say
that if we were attempting to support considerable
forces in that area, that the rnan'U!acturing facilities
in Israel would be most valuable. 2 3
Hearings on foreign aid in later years reemphasized
that economic aid to Israel was designed to strengthen the
American position in the Middle East a gainst possible·Russian
moves but strictly from the standpoint of a supply base.
To Decrease Instability in an Area
Vital to U.S. Interests
One of the conce p ts t hat has undergir~e d Ame rican

foreign economic policy since the close of ~fo rl d ':!ar II is
that foreign aid i~ capable of helping to alleviate domestic
discord and, indirec t l y , internsti onal discord also.

To this

thought should be added that one of the suppositions of American supporters of the U.S. partition resolut ion in 1947 was
that Arab opposition to the Jewish State would disappear once
its existence was a fait accompli.

When this supposition

proved a miscalculat i on and, instead, when new bases of
discord entered the Middle ~ast pi c ture, economic aid
appeared to be the very medicine to cure the spreading sick ness.
2 .3u.s. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,

Hearin son the Mutual Securit
sess.,
3 .

Ac t of 195h. , CIJd Cong ., 2nd

35

As early as September 19, 1946, Loy W. Henderson,
Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs
of the Department of State, said, in an address delivered in
Los Angeles, that the main objective of the United States in
the Middle East was "to prevent riva lries and conflicts of
interest in t h at area from de veloping into open h ostilities
whic h eventually might lead to a t hi r n world war.
affirmed that,

11

11

He further

without foreign assistance, these gover11I11ents

in their weakened condi tion encounter difficu lties in taking
effective measures to remove the very causes of dis content. 11 24
While testifying before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs again in 1952, Arthur I. Gardiner expressed the same
aim in different words:

"I believe I have stated the view

correctly of the Department of State and the executive branch
in believing that our primary object is stability in this
region • • • • "

The avenue to stability, he continued, was

"the establishment of a sound Israel (and) the maintenance,
or bettering perhaps, of sound Arab economi es in the hope
that the conflict between the two forces will cesse. 112 5
The elimination of unrest in the Mid dle East through
economic assista nce meant that both the Israel and Arab
economies must be strengthened.

The Arab countries must be

aided in their development both to interest t h em in seeking

p.

85.

24"Documents," Middle East Journal, J anuary, 1947,

25u.s. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Ai'fairs,
Mutual Securit Act E...~ tension, Hearings on H.R. 7005, 82d
Cong., 2d sess., 19~2, p . 79 .
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economic rather than military solutions to the i r problems and
to enable them to absorb Arab refugees displaced by the 1948
fighting.

Israel, on the other hand, must be helped because

a weak and unstable Israel would present a constant t emptation to her enemies to r e sort to armed force to bring about
her downf'all.

Such an atte r1p t was a ni ghtma r e to contemplate

in an area wher e i n lay important U.S. com.r.ierci a l o i l interests
and strate gic air ba ses.

Such a military u nd erta:d ng almost

surely would involve either a Korean type conf lict, wi th
Soviet Russia covertly a i ding the Arab contestants, or open
involvement of both East and West.

In contrast wi th the

dangers inherent in Israeli weakness, American policy planners
believed that a strong Israel would discourage desi gns aimed
at her downfall and, in time, win acceptance as a fullfledged member of the Middle East community.

Thus, wh ile

working for the "mainte nanc e , or bettering perhap s 11 of the
Arab economies, the Un ited States government gave h igh priority to the building of a sound Israeli economy.
Th e ur gency of i nvesting :noney and effort i nto overall Middle Ea st developme nt a s a me ans of c alm~ng t roubled
waters was reaff irmed by Gardiner in 1953 in the fo llowing
stateme nt:
I f you like, t h is is a giveaway pro gr am . Call it as
many bad names as you wa nt , but • • • let u s consider what
our interes t s are, and whe ther it is not i n our i nterest
to speed u p this dev elopment of wh ich we h ave spoken in
this reg i on . I can a s s ure you that they will move faster
with this tangible express i on of American interest than
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it will otherwis ~6
on a powder keg.

I think we all agree we are sitting

Secretary of State Dulles also made it clear to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs that he felt that the attempt
to reduce friction in the area through economic development
programs took priority even over immediate attempts to build
the Middle East as a defensive bulwark against Soviet Russia.
We believe that t h at area can best be treated as a
whole and that it is not very realistic to think of building a defense with that area against possible Soviet aggression, let us say,as long as the area is torn by conflict and indeed a technical state of war within itself.
We hope that with the discretion which would be
allowed us if this le g islation is passed in the form proposed, to initiate a program for the entire ar ea which
would include among other things the prospe ct of a peace
between Israel and the Arab States, and that that would
provide a foundation upon which a more dependable defense
structure could be erected than under present conditions.27
As indicated earlier, the United States goverrunent
hoped that foreign aid would help it to gain the upper hand
in the Middle East in the Hcold war" against Soviet Russia.
That, however, was something of a long range goal.

The

immediate and pressing and down-to-earth aim was to employ
economic aid to keep the situation from getting out of hand.
Unless aid could bring about stability in the explosive
region, it was pointless to re gard such aid as a weapon
that the United States could wield t o che ck the menace from
the North.
2 6u.s. Congress, Hou se, Commi t t ee on ? or e i gn Affairs,
Mutual Security Act Extens i on , He ar ings on H. B. 5710, 83d
Cong., 1st sess., 1953, p. 833.
2 7Ibid., p. 180.
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Throughout the p eriod under consideration, the American objective of re du cing Middle East tensions by making
Israel economically sound--wh ile not neglecting her neighbors
--remained essentially unchanged.

CHAPTER III

PROBLEMS AND TRENDS OF THE ISRAZL ECONOMY
Innnigration and Population
The official policy of

11

Ingathering of the Exiles"

was one of the primary objectives of the government of Israel
during the period under consideration.

A recognition of this

fact is fundamental to an understa nding of the coun try's
economic problems and trends.

The principle of unrestricted

Jewish irnrnigration was enunciated in the Decl-8.ration of
Independence Ma y ll-1--, l 9ll8, the day that Israel gained statehood.

Two years later the Law of Return further stipulated

tha·t every Jew had the right to come to Israel and that an
immigrant visa would be given to every Jew who wished to
settle in the country, excepting only persons who might be
a threat to public health and security.
The main financial and organizational respon sibility
for transporting and absorbing im.~igrants who were financially unable to pay t h eir own way was assur1ed by the Jewi sh
Agency and the American Joint Distribution Cormni ttee,
assisted by the Government of Israel.

These groups dis-

patched representatives to Jewish comriruniti es in foreign
countries to encourage i:m.:m.igration, assembled immigrants,
prepared transit camps abroad and reception centers in
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Israel, and arranged for the immigrants' medical care and
transportation costs. 1
By September of 1948 the "Ingathering of the Exiles"
was in full swing as displaced persons camps in Germany,

Austria, and Italy be gan to empty their masses into the
immigration "pipeline.,,.

During the winter t h at .followed,

Jewish internees in Cyprus were ad ;ni tted.

Abou t t he same

time t he Jewish community in Bulgaria bega n its movement to
the infant state.

Others came from Yugoslavia and Turkey.

During 1949 and 1950, through operation "Magic Carpet, 11

40,000 Yemenite Jews were transported to Israel.

In 1951

an additional 124,000 immigrants arrived from Iraq and
another 27,000 from Iran.
Morocco, and Algeria.

Others came from Libya, Tunisia,

The same year 100,000 Polish Jews

began their move to the new state.

The years 1948 to 1951

marked the flood tide of immigration. 2

(Table 1.)

An examination of the immigration trend from 1952 to

1954 reveals an abrupt decline from 174,014 immigrants
reported in 1951 to 23,408 arrivals in 1952 .

This decline

was the result of emigration restrictions a d ooted by countries of eastern Europe ana also the resu lt of I sr a el's

difficulties i n economically absorbi ng th e vaet number of
newcomers.

The latter problem l ed to a new program of

lMoshe Sicron, Im.v:iigration to Israel, 1948-195)
( Jerusalem: The Falk Project for Economic Research in Is'r ael
and the Central Bureau of Statistics, 1957), p . 33.
2 Ibid., pp. 33-34-

selective immigration by the Jewish Agency that applied to
Jews unable to finance their own immigration.

Pursuant to

the new policy, the Jewish Agency no longer paid for persons
suffering from physic a l or mental disabilities or occupational shortcomings that would make them a liability to the
State.

Emphasis was now given to candidates under the age

of thirty-five who were willing to pledge themselves to work
in agriculture for two years.

Out of humane considerations,

however, Jews living in areas of personal peril were assisted
regardless of a ge or o the r qua lific 8.tions .

The net effect

was a reduction both in the number of old people migrating
to Israel and in the size of family unit s moving in.3
A

further decline followed in 1953, when only 10,388

immigrants entered the country and 11,923 residents departed,
making for a migration balance of minus 3.8 percent.

This

phenomenon of emigration surpassing irnrnigra.tion has occurred
but once since Israel's achievement of statehood.
The period from 1955 to 1957 showed a considerable
revival of im.~igration.

The political situation i n French

North Africa, mainly in Morocco but also in Tunisia and
Algeria, largely accounted for the increase.

In 1956 North

Africa~s cqmprised 90 pe rcent of all immigrants.

In 1957

'politic al ais turbances in Hungary, coupled w1 th the untenable position of many Jews in Egypt· ~nd French North Africa
following the Suez Campai gn of 1956, helped boost the year's
3Ibid., pp. 35, 122.
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immigration tide to 71 ,100.

Then from 1958 to 1960 immigra-

tion remained relatively stable, averaging around 25,000 a
year.4
Altogether 971,115 immigrants reached Israel between
May 15, 1948, and the end of calendar year 1960.
same period there were 99,414 emigrants.

During the

(From 1908 to 1924

one-third of a l l immigrants to the United States left the
United States.)

Net immigration, therefore--irnrnigrants less

emigrants--wnounted to 871,701.

(Table 1.)

From a popula-

tion of 809,633, estimated as of May 15, 1948, Israel grew
to 2,150,358 by the end of 1960, which means that it increased more than two and one-half times.

Of this remarkable

thirteen-year growth, immigration accounted for 65 percent
and natural increase for
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perc0nt.5

To view the phenomenon in another light, the peak
year for immigration in the United States came in 1907 with
a rate of 15 immigrants per thousand residents already in
the country.

In contrast with this highest American level

the immigration rate in Israel ranged from 266 per thousand
Jewish inhabitants in 1949 to a low of 13 per t housand in
1960. 6
Necessarily the gi g antic problems c re a ted by the
4Ibid., p . 121.
5Ibid., pp. 32, 41.
6Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel 1962
(Jerusalem: Centrai Bure au of St a tistic s , 1962), p.

97.
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newcomers either meant that Israel nrust h alt i mmi gration or
find the ec-:momic means to sustain the immi grants.

Israelis

were determined n ot only to sustain the immigrant-~ but also
to sustain them on approximately the economic level to which
European Jewry was accustomed.

This feat was made possible,

in part, by the utilization of properties left behind by an
estimated 700,000 Arabs who fled the area of Palestine that
became Israel.

It would not be correct to assume, though,

that deserted Arab homes provided the dwelling places for an
equivalent number of Jewish immigrants, as many of these
dwellings were inadequate by Jewish standards.

Nevertheless

the problem of housing 871,701 immigrants for the period
1948 to 1960 was made less difficult by the availability of
properties left by the Arab refugees.

A total of 58,000

dwelling units were adapted for use, as a lso we re 11,000
shops and thousands of acre s of deserted farmlana. 7
Immi gration brought t o Israel a vast increase of
manpower that, properly trained and employe d , could contribute greatly to the upbuilding of the country.

In so

doing, however, it caused an immediate inflationary drain
on the resources of the economy to mee t the consumption and
investment requir ements incident to immigrant absorption.
The "Ingathering of the Exiles" was essentially a noneconomic goal that complicated and transcended economic g oals.

7Alex Rubner, Economy of Israel (New York:
1960), pp. 33, 67.

Praeger,

TABLE 1
IMMIGRATION AND POPULATION
Emigrants

Net
Immigration

Natural
Increase

Total
Increase

340,895

1,493

339,402

24,836

364,238

1,173,871

.

169,720

7,979

161,741

34,482

196,223

1,370,094

.

174,014

6,605

167,409

40,322

207,731

1,577,825

23,408

12,377

11,031

40,663

51,694

1,629, 519

10,388

11,923

-1,535

41,433

39,890

1,669,417

17,485

6,539

10,946

37,451

48,397

1,717,8~.

36,327

5,174

31,153

40 ,108

71,261

1,789,075

54 ,996

11,898

43,09 8

40,217

83 ,315

1,872,390

71,100

9,034

62,066

41,498

103,564

1,975,954

26,093

11,404

14,689

41 ,029

55,718

2,031,672

23,045

8,580

14,465

42 , 548

57,013

2,088,685

23,644

6,408

17,236

44 , 1.i-37

61, 673

2,150,358

971,115

99,414

871,701

!~69' 024

_1,3!~0, 725

2,150,358

Immigrants
May 15, 1948
to
Dec.JI, 1949

..
1951 . . .
1952 . . .
1953. . .
1954 . . .
1955. . .
1956 • . .
1950.

.
.
.
•

.
1957. • • .
1958. . • .
1959 . . . •
1960 • . . .
1948-1960
Source:

.

Israel, Stati s tical Abstract of Israel 1962, p. 32.

Population at
End of Year
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The Requ iremen ts of National Security
Another drain on the Israel economy du ring the 1950's
resulted !'rom the "state of' war" between J ews and Arabs.
This drain consisted, first of all, of military expenditures
that officially amounted to about 29 percent of the government's budget annually .

The 29 percent figure, however, does

not take into consideration an artificially low exchange rate
of imports of military equipment nor include certain classified expenditures t h at the government refrained from identifying in its published reports. 8
The cost of nation al defense went beyond direct
military spending to i nclude the uneconomic diversion of
manpower resources prompted by t h e unstable international
situation.

Young men and women alike were e ligible for

military service at the a ge of 18.

Men were conscripted for

a period of two and a h a lf ye a rs and wome n f or two yea rs.
Thereafter men had a reserve obli gation till a ge
women till age

34.
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a nd

S ome soldiers were assi gned to work on

!'arms during their period of active duty, but i n mos t i nstances such work was on land that had not ye t be come fully
productive.
Defense consideration s also led t o t he establishment
of a network of border settlements .

These set t l ements were

designed as sentinels t o n ote suspi c i ous h os tile mili t ary
8Nadav Safran, The Unit ed S tates and Isra el
(Cambridge: Harva rd Universi t y Pre ss, 1963), pp . 1 82- 206.
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action and, in case of trouble, to delay invaders long
enough for army units to arrive at the danger zones.

Inevit-

ably, many such border communities were located on economically substandard land.
Industries also were often established at a considerable distance from markets and sources of supply in order to
be less vulnerable to enemy a.ir attack and in order to provide employment to occupants of defense settlements.
Although the dispersion of industry may have been a military
necessity, roads, power, and water frequently had to be
brought to isolated plants at great expense.

'

Some enter-

prises were heavily subsidized by the government because
they provided facilities and personnel training that could
be useful to the country in time of war.
Although it is not possible to assess Israel's total
defense costs, it is certa in that direct military expendi-

tures, the diversion of manpower from more economically productive to less economically productive pursuits, , and the ·
uneconomic location of many industries absorb'ed ' some little
part of the nation's total resources. 9
Employment and Unemployment
In

1954

the Central Bureau of Statistics began making

annual (subsequently quarterly ) labor force surveys.

These

reports enabled the Bureau to determine comp os ition of the

9rbid.
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labor force, the annu al average level of emploYJnent and the
seasonal nature ther·eof.

The surveys, coupled with estimates

for the earlier years, lead us to assume that the highest
unemployment rate in Israel occurred in 1950 when 11.5 percent of the labor force was out of work. 10

By 1960 it had

dropped to 4.6 percent. 11
This favorable picture nmst be qualj_fied by the fact
that the unemployment figures do not take into accoun.t the
number of people who desired full-time work but were engaged
only part-time.

The 1956 survey indicated that this group

constituted about one-third of the part-time workers.

An-

other qualifying consideration is that an otherwise unemployed person who happened to be performing his mandatory
30 days' annual reserve duty was reported employed.
matter, the surveys considered

11

For that

employed 11 any person aged

fourteen and above who had worked for a single hour for pay
or profit during the week preceding the survey.

Moreover,

persons on government relief, so long as they had worked
during the week under investigation, were also included among
the employed.

The number of such relief worke rs steadily

increased from an estimated 3.2 thous and in 1 950 t o 16.7
thousand in 1958.

It is also the opini on of some that the

10non Patinkin, "The Israel Economy: The First Decade," The Falk Pro·ect for Economic Research in Israel,
Fourth Re ort: 19 7 and 1958 (Jerusalem: The Falk Project
for Economic Research in Israel, 1961), p. 31.
llstatistical Abstract of Israel 1962, pp. 380-381.
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very high percentage of Israel's labor force engaged in government and public institutions also represented a form of
work relief or "disguised unemployment. 1112
for instance, the Histadrut

In some cases,

did not permit employers to

release employees for whom there was no work. 1 3

These fac-

tors together tend to darken the otherwise bright picture of
employment in Israel.
As might be expecte d , unemployment was higher among
the less educated and those who lacked specific job skills
than it was among the better educated and trained.

And by

virtue of the fact that immigrants from Asia a nd Africa came
equipped with less education and fewer job s kills useful to
Israel's emerging western style economy, a larger proportion
of them were out of work t h an were those from Europe and
America.

Also fewer women from Asia and Africa were employed

than were those from Europe and America.
Another phenomenon pertinent to the labor pi cture is
that approximatel y 30 percent of the labor force was engaged
in services, 1 4 which is genera ll y regarde d by economists as
a higher percentage than a developing country can afford.
In the opinion of many observers, Israel had much
larger untapped labor resources than appeared on the surface.
Don Patinkin affirms that ''the integrat ion of most of the
12Patink i n, "The Israel Economy," pp. 32-35.
13Rubner, Economy, p. 73.
1 4statistical Abstract of Israel 1962, pp . 388-389.
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increased population into its productive labor force has
been one of the significant accomplishments of the Israel
economy. 1115

Nevertheless, he concludes that the unemployment

problem was serious both in extent and depth.
Wages, Prices, and the Cost of Living
Several years before the formation of the State of
Israel, the Histadrut

(th e General Feoeration of Jewish

Labor) and the Manufacturers .i\. ssociation agree c. that trages
would be adjusted according to the cost-of-living index.

In

the decade of the 1950 1 s this procedure, with modifications,
was employed.

As prices rose the cost of living bonus was

raised accordingly.
cations.

But the program had unexpected compli-

The resultant advance in wages led to increased

spending and, in the absence of a corresponding increase in
the supply of goods and services, to further price increases.
One by-product of rising prices was that a great deal of
production which should have gone into export to garner
sorely needed foreign exchange was diverted into the more
lucrative domestic market.

And price rise s led to further

wage increa2es in an inflationa ry sp ira l.
Between 1949 and 1952 the Israel governreent instituted a variety of price and phys ic a l (ra tion ing ) controls
designed to fre e ze prices and, in turn, wages, u ntil increased production cou l d bring a natural b a l nnc e between the
15Pa tinkin, "The Israel Economy," p.

42.
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forces of supply and demand that would stabilize prices and
offset inflation.

In retrospect, however, Israeli economists

believe that this era of controls was a failure.

The casual

observer is doubtless impressed to learn that by 1951 an
Israeli worker had to labor but

42

minutes for ten eggs

while his Polish counterpart had to work 260 minutes.

The

same year one kilogram of meat cost only 60 minutes of labor
in Israel and 315 minutes in Italy.

In truth, however, both

eggs and meat, financed by foreign aid, were being imported
in considerable quantity and sold at artificially depressed
prices.

Further, these artificial controls brought various

distortions in the price structure that led to such uneconomic practices as subsidized bread being fed to poultry
because it was cheaper than uncontrolled feed grains-cheaper, that is, to the chicken farmer, but more expensive
to the economy as a whole.

Such unrealistic prices caused

many foreign imports to be used wastefully.

In a variety of

ways they also caused domestic effort to be diverted to

uneconomical forms of production.

Controls, moreover,

brought in their wake the introduction of price equalization
funds in various trades.

The more efficient producers and

importers were required to contribute to these funds to compensate the less efficient producers whose costs were above
the government imposed selling price. 16
Finally, price controls merely proved a means of
16Rubner, Economy, pp. 62-66.
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suppressing the outward manifestation of inflation without
solving the basic problems that caused it.

A large segment

of unspent purchasing power supported a black market where
rationed goods were sold at prices up to ten times the officially endorsed price.

Some manufacturers lowered the qual-

ity of goods supplie d to the price controlled market while
disposing of their better quality 6 oods on the black
market. 17

In time the flourishing black market convinced

government leaders that the anticipated objectives of the
controls program were unattainable.

In 195 2 a New Economic

Policy was adopted and most of the control s ca me to an end.
Apart from price and physicnl controls another
factor that nistorted the picture of rising living costs in
Israel was government manipulation of the price ind.ex.

In

fact, a special department of the Ministry- of Finance was
given the assignment of determining the best way to accomplish it.

As an example of this intriguing function, in

19.57 the government asked farmers to reduce the price of

eggs to help keep the index down, but the farmers• cooperation was ne gligible.

The governraent forthwith approved the

import of twenty million egg s to i ncrease the market supply
and also instituted temporary rationing of eggs to hold back
the demand.

This double-barreled approach was successful,

and the price index soon r efle cted the desired impact. 18
1 7Ibid., p.

65.

18 Ibid., p . 54.

Because the govern.~ ent did not include i n its periodically published price index, data based on black market
prices and because of the aforementioned manipulation of the
index, the price inde x admi ttedly loses some of its validity.
Despite its limitations, however, especially in the earlier
years, the Consumer Price Index nad i"lits 11 t hat from 1950 to
1

1960 prices incre ase d more t h an 300 percent.

(Table 2.)

TABLE 2
CONSUMER PRICE I NDEX

Year

Annual Average

Percent Increase
over Preceding Year

1950

100.0

..

19.51

lll.j. .1

14.1

1952

180 .0

57.8

1953

230.6

28.1

1954

258 . 8

12.2

1955

274.1

5.9

1956

291.8

6.5

1957

310.6

6 .4

1958

321. 2

3.4

1959

325.9

1.5

1960

333.4

2.3

Source:

I srael, Bank of Israel Annual Rep ort 1961
(Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post, "1'9'52), p. 69 .
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Devaluation
During the period und er review, the persi stently
rising prices necessitated a series of g overnment currency
devaluations that by 1960 had lowered the p ound in relation
to the dollar to about one-seventh of its l a te 19i~9 value.
In the absence of such recurring de pr e c iations Israeli goods
would have priced themselves out of the world 111.n rlrnt .
With statehood the Israeli exchange rate stood at

.248 to the dollar, denoting that one I L Kas roughly the
equivalent of four U . S . dollars, although the rate at which
most transactions were completed was .333.

The first deval-

uation occurred in September, 1949, following England's
currency devaluat ion , and established a new rate of .357 to
the dollar.

In Fe bruary, 1952, three official exchange

rates were announce d .
1.000.

rr hese rates were • 357, . 714, and

A t h ird devaluation crune in January, 1 951~, with

three more new rate s:

1.000, 1.300, and 1.800.

Subse-

quently a fourth devaluatio..:n , begun adminis tratively in 1955,
discontinued the two lower rates of 1.000 and 1.300 and set

1. 800 as the single official ra te .

Al t houg:1 t h is remained

the official rate until 1962, the forei gn-curre ncy controls
administration al lowed vari ations fro1. 1 it in s o many
0

instances that the average rate by 1958 was 2.750. 1 9
With the exception of the 1949 devaluation , in each
case the currency devaluation was merely official reco gnition
19Ibid., p. 22.
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of what had already oc curre d .

As domestic prices increased,

many prospective foreign purch asers of Israeli goods or
investors in Israeli enterpris e s noted that t h eir doll ars
were being valued in pounds of shrink ing purchasing power.
Naturally, if prices were t oo h ig..11., dollars would not buy
Israeli goods or inv e s t in Israeli enterprises, and Israel's
capability of earning dollars would d isa pp ear.

As a safe-

guard against such lost dollar i n c o~c, t h ere f ore, the government repeatedl y offered t pec ia 1 t er·ns u ntil the average
exchange rate, which might also be c onsidered the re a l
exchange rate, kept step, in some degree, wi th risi ng prices.
Hence, whenever an off icially announced devalua tion wa s :::nade,
it was little more than a declaration that the real rate was
now the official rate. 2

°

Kotwithstanding repeated efforts

of the government, by the end of 1960 neither successive
devaluations nor any othe r techn i qu e had arr e st e d t h e
economy's i n~lationary trends.
Gross National Product
According to the study of Don Pati nkin, made under
the auspices of the Falk Project f or :Sconomic Research in
Israel, Israe l's gross nationa l procluc t in cur r ent prices in

1958 was more t h an 700 perc ent l a r ge r t h an i t wa s i n 1950.
But wh en a d jus tments are made for infl ati on and i ncreased
population and w}.1en the res ul t is expr es sec_ in pe r ca :pi ta
20 I bid., p . 131.
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terms and constant prices , the figure is

50 percent. 21 These

figures are, nonetheless, impressive, particularly since no
per capita growth was made at all from 1950 to 1953.
Patinkin calculates the efficiency of the economy-the relationship between outputs per unj_t of input--and
concludes that whereas roughly two-thirds of the total growth
in. national product could be credited to corresponding inputs
of capital and le.bor, the remaining one-third ,,mst be attributed to increased efficiency of the Israel economy.

He also

sugges t s that less inve stment would possibl ~:- have led to a
better selection of projects and even greater efficiency.
Nevertheless, Israel's gross national product growth rate
from 1950 to 1958 was very rapid. 22
When compared with the rates of growth in real gross
national product in twenty-eight selected countries from

1950 to 1958, Patinkin notes that Israel placed sixth with
a per capita annual groHth rate of

5.2

percent.

And the

period from 1958 to 1961 averaged about 10 percent a year. 23
Unfortunately, at the same time t here was a

46

percent rise

in per capita private consumption and a 23 pe rc e nt rise in
general government consumption, and, withal, 2 .9 percent less
21Patinkin, "The Israel Economy," pp. 4-5, 60.
22 Ibid., pp. 73, 76, 78.
23Moshe Ater, "Israel Economy: Trends and Features,"
The Jerusalem Post Economic Annual 1962/63 (Jerusalem: The
Jerusalem Post , 1962), p. 43.
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domestic i nvestment capital accumulated per pe rson in 1958
than there was in 1950. 24
_ Israel's Import Sur plus a nd
How It Has Financed
Every country imports goods and services from other
countries to obtain necessary foreign components for its
investments and to satisfy the consumption re quirements of
its people.

Imports, however, must be paid for, and usually

this means paid for in the currency of the country supplying
them.

The primary source of earned foreign currency is ex-

ports, and Israel's income from exports lagged far beh ind the
cost of her imports.

In fact, the de gree of Israel's depend-

ence upon her import surplus was the highest in the world.
It is not difficult to understand why Israel's
leaders were not willing to cut d own imports a nd thus bring
them into line with exports.

A s e ve r e curta ilment of imports

would have bee n p olitically unpopular a nd also would have
reduced the quantity of capital good s nee ded for the country's vast development program.

Neverthele s s, Israel made a

substantial showing in her efforts to close the trade gap
during the period under review, not so much by r e ducing per
capita imports a s b y incre a s i n g per cap i t a exports.
The forei gn trade t rend f rom 1950 to 1960 was, indeed,
impressive.

During t his per i od , as t he population ne arly

doubled, impor ts nearl y doub l ed als o; bu t, be c ause of a very
24P atinkin , "Th e Is r ael Economy ,tt pp . 60, 70.
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great increas e i n exports, the trade deficit declined from

$209 per capita to $134, a substantial 36 pe rc ent r e duct i on.
(T able 3.)

Furthermore, in contrast to the 1950 export

earnings, which were only 11.7 percent of import co s ts, the

1960 export earning s rose to 42.6 percent of t he import bill.

TABLE 3
BALANCE OF FOREIGN TRADE

Year

Trade Deficit
Per Capita

Exports as
Percent of
Imports

1950

209

11.7

1952

174

13.5

1954

119

30.0

1955

140

26.6

1956

147

28.4

1957

152

32.4

1958

llJ.l

33.0

1959

122

41.3

1960

134

42.6

Source:

Israel, Statistical Abstract of
Israei 1962 , p. 332.

Notwithstanding the fact tha t Israel's imports continued to exceed the value of its exports, the country's
leaders were remarkably successful in obtaini ng cap ital from
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abroad to pay for the surplus.

?rom 1949 to 1960 this sur-

plus reached a magnitude of $3,637 million, 2 5 but Israel's
capital imports during the same period amounted to $3,791
million.

(Table

4.)

First in importance among the sources of foreign
purchasing power, over and above export income , were donations and loans from world Jewry.

These i ncluded transfers

by the United Jewish App eal and oth er fund r aisinG organizations and also rev enue from Independence and Development
bonds.

The United Jewish Appeal, orga nized before the state

was formed, reached its greatest heights in t h e perilous
years of 1948 and 1949 when Jews throughout the world rallied to save Israel from ruin.

Then in 1951 the Israel

government instituted the sale of bonds abroad, mainly among
Jews in the United States.

The Independence Issue wa s

offered fro m 1951 to 1954, and the First Development Issue
was sold from 1955 to 1959 .
was floated in 1959.

The Second Development Issue

Funds from UJA and these bond sales

accounted for ~ril, 346 mi llion in foreign currency from 1949
to 1960 and constituted a source of capital t h at was unique
among developing nations. 2 6
The second major avenue of ca pital imp orts was also
2 5rublic
Research Pro·ect
Israel, by Chaim

1963), p. 6

26 Ibid., pp. 23 , 26-27.
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TABLE

4

ISRAEL'S CAPITAL INPORTS, CY 1949-1960
( In 1-'Iillions of Dollars)
Amount

Capital Imports

$3 ,791

Total • •
Donations and loans from world Jewry

.....

United Jewish Appeal and similar
institutions . . • . . . . . . . .
Independence and Development Loane .

1,346
958
388

Capital imports from West Germany.

904

Reparations . . . . . . . . .
Personal Restitution payments

574

U.S. government assistance
Export-Import Bank loans . . .
. •
Mutual Security Program grants . . . . . . •
Mutual Security Program loans . • . . . . •
Development Loan Fund loans • . . . . . . .
Technical Cooperation/Technical Assistance
Public Law 480 Title I food surpluses • . •
Public Law 480 Title III food surpluses . •
Informational Media Guaranty • • . .

330

742

163
256

42
40

15

162

52

11

Gifts and transfers by private persons
and immigrants . . . . . . . . • . . . .
Private foreign investments • .
Other long term and medium term loans .

Sources:

Public International Development Financing,
p. 8. Figure s for United States eovernment
aid are based on U. S. fiscal years 1949-1960
(see Table 10) and are derived from Office
of U.S. AID Representative Financial-Report
as of December 31, f952, p. 1.
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unprecedented.

This extraordinary source was German repara-

tions and restitut~on payments.

Because of the role of the

German government in the attempted annihilation of the
Jewish population of Western Europe and its wholesale confiscation of Jewish property, the government of Israel and
the Jewish Agency negotiated with the federal government of
West Germany for indemnity. 2 7

These negotiations had the

approval of the three occupying powers, the United States,
France, and Great Britain.

A Reparations Agreement,.signed

in September, 1952, stipulated that the Deutschmark equivalent of $714 million was to be paid to the government of
Israel between 1953 and 1964, 15 percent of which was to be
distributed to the American Joint Distribution Committee,
the Committee for Jewish Claims from Germany, and other
Jewish institutions abroad.
ferred to the Jewish Agency.

Another 18 percent was transThese reparations were utilized

to finance, almost exclusively, the import of West German
ships, machinery, industrial and agricultural products, fuel,
and services.

In 1954 the government of West Germany also

began to extend personal restitution payments to Israeli
residents who had incurred losses during World War II.

By

1960 the combined transfers in repar ations and personal
.
28
restitutions amounted to $904 mill ion.
When added to
2 7critics of America's aid-to-Israel policy have
sometimes alleged that U.S. post-war claims against Germany
were scaled down to compensate Germany for such indemnity.
28Public International Development Financing, pp.
38-40.
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donations and loans from world Jewry, these special sources
of foreign funds constituted

59

percent o.f the total capital

imports .figure of $3,791 million.
Third in magnitude among Israel's sources of capital
from abroad, in addition to its export income , was U.S.
government assistance.

This assistance reached Israel in a

variety of .forms and, during the period 1949 to 1960,
accounted for $742 million, whi ch was 20 percent o.f the
total.
Fourth in order of importance to the Israel economy
were personal remittanceg.

These included .funds brought by

immigrants into the country, transfers of gifts, business
transfers, transfers in the form of legacies, and Israeli
bonds.

These amounted to the not inconsiderable figure of

$349 million or 9 percent of all capital imports.
A fifth source of foreign capital that also contributed significantly to the .financing of the import surplus
was private foreign investments.

Through this avenue

$280 million--7 percent--reached Israel.
A sixth source was various loans .from European
governments and from cormnercial banks and long-term credits
from suppliers abroad.
was $170 million, or

The total from this combined source

5 perc ent.

Interest on forei gn loans and crectits, as also payment of dividends on forei gn investments, increased throughout the period and constitute d about 1.8 pe rcent of the net
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national income .

Capital imports, however, helped to create

resources out of wh ich such interest and divi dends cou ld be
paid. 29
In retrospect, Israel worked in a "high development
fever" throughout the period under review.

Immigration and

the requirements of national security, however, formed a
drain on the economy.
were high.

Unemployment was widespread.

Prices

Domestic inve s t ment funds accumulated slowly.JO

As a result of these several problems, the country depended
heavily upon an import surplus and upon imports of capital
from abroad to finance it.

29 Ibid., p . 16.
30see also "Investment As s i sta nce, 11 Chap ter VII.

·cHAPTEH "IV

FORMS AND AMOUNTS OF U .s. AID
Official dollar aid to Israel from 1949 to 1960
totaled $741.6 million. 1

This economic help to ok the form

of loans, grants, agricultural surpluses, and technical
assistance and was administered by a variety of American
agencies.

In addition, IL 477.8 million in U.S. owned or

controlled Israel currency also aided the economy.
Export-Import Bank Dollar Loans 2
When Israel gained statehood May 14, 1948 , it was
immediately apparent to the young nation' s lea ders that
domestic resources were far from adequate to provice for t he
rapidly growing population.

Israel, in fact, was on the

ve1~ge of ec onomic collapse when early in 1949 the Export-

lsee Table 10 on p. 9Ji-. The ~~741.6 million f:igu.re
is exclusive of $1 million in rrJlitary aid, which is outside
the purview of this study. Statistics and Reports Division,
Agency for International Development, U.S. Foreign Assistance and Assistance from International Urranizations,
Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 19 -June 30,
1961 (Revised), p. 50.
2Loan data herein are derived from Export-Import
Bank reports to Congress from 1949 to 1960 .
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Import Bank (Eximbank) of Washington3 agreed to the establishment of $100 million for credits to fin3nce the export
to Israel of U.S. equipment, materials, and services.

These

imports were intended to assist the government of Israel
launch an overall program leading to the country's balanced
economic development.

Credits were to bear interest at

3 1/2 percent per annum and were fifteen-year loans repayable
in twenty-four semiannual installments beginning three years
after date of each credit agreement.

(Table

5.)

The first credit, amounting to $35 million under this
earmarked sum of $100 million, was approved January 19, 1949,
for the purchase of agricultural equipment and machinery.
These supplies were to help increase the country's food resources as rapidly as possible in order to feed the masses
of immigrants flowing into the country.

To this end the

$35 million were employed to equip 8,000 new farms, rehabilitate upwards of 16,000 old farms and 6,000 citrus groves, and
to obtain irrigation facilities to bring water to 42,000
acres of new farm land.

The Bank's share in the financing

was an estimated one-third of the total cost.
To help improve the country's transportation facilities several credits, all dated March 9 of that year, were
3The Export-Import Bank of Washington was established
by act of Congress in 1934 for the purpose of making dollar
loans repayable in dollars to foreign governments and businesses for the purchase of American products. Such loans
were to be granted only when private capital was not available
on reasonable terms.
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granted in the amount of $9 .5 million.

This sum financed

the purchase of AI11erican chassis for buses and heavy trucks
that were to be assembled in I srael, which equipment was expe cted to increase by 20 percent the highway transportation
potential of the country .

It also financed the purchase of

a seagoing frei gh t er from an American fi r m by the government
of Israel for r esale to a dome~tic steams h ip line.

This

vessel, Eximbank officials were persuaded, would not be only
a source of foreign exchange income to Israe l but would be a
means of conservine some U.S. dollars otherwise expended for
shipping costs.

Purchases from the $9 .5 million further

included three Diesel-electric locomotives and equipment for
the establishment of an air maintenance base at Lydda airport.

The latter was expected to save foreign exchange by

enabling Israeli personnel to make repairs on domestic
aircraft and to earn foreign exchange t h rough emergency
repair service t o foreign lines.
Eximbank loans from the orj_ g inally approved
$100 million provided $25 million to alleviate overcrowded
concliti ons in the Haifa and Tel Aviv area by construction of
15, 000 housing units and to builc. 230 miles of urba n streets
and 150 miles of i n terurban roads.

It als o helped some

twenty-eight communities extend their sewage-dis posal and
water-supply systems.
March 23, 1949, marks the date that a credit in the
amount of $5 million was extended to the government of Israel
to finance about 18 perc ent of the cost of American equipment

66

for a teleconnnunications program, the remainder being
financed mainly by foreign and domestic private capital.
Port development, principally at Haifa, was the object of two other credits out of the $100 million authorized.
These two credits, dated September 7, 1949, accounted for

$5.5

million and were granted to build wharves, transit

sheds, and a terminal building.

They helped finance the

purchase of such equipment from American sources as cranes,
derricks, barges, dredges, and pumps.
Another credit, extended October 26, 1949, amounted
to $20 million for industrial development in textiles, food
processing, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, metals, and building
materials.

The several credits enumerated to this point

together account for the full $100 million authorized.
In 1950 the government of Israel obtained a new
authorization from the Export-Import Ba'nk of $35 million to
assist in financing further agricultural development and
settlement in Israel.

This request was part of a several-

pronged economic development effort by Israel's leaders.
These efforts included initiating the Israel Bond Drive,
opening negotiations for a German compensa tion agreement,
fund raising efforts of the United Jewish Appeal, and seeking
economic aid grants and technical assistance from the United
States government.4
4Abba Eban, 11 How It Began," Jerusalem Post, Special
Supplement Marking the Conclusion of the Work of the United
States Operations Mission in Israel, July 4, 1962, p. vii.
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Abba Eban, then Israel's ambassador to the United
States, provides the following sidelight on the response
that he received in Washington as he now bore tidings of his
country's need for help:
I explained these anxieties frankly to President
Truman in a conversation in September, 1950. The first
White House reaction was one of surprise. There was a,
conventional belief in American opinion that a Jewish
State might encounter hard going in the strange fields
of diplomacy and defense, but would find all barriers
falline before it in the familiar domain of economic
action. At President Weizman ts request an "2:xport·-Import
Bank credit of $100m. had been approved in 1949. Even
this ·was being exhausted, and my fir~t task was to
negotiate a "replenishment." This effort was success.ful
and a new credit ot $J5m. w~s approved for announcement
in December, 1950./
The announcement was released by the Bank only after
a careful review of the economic progress that had been
achieved by Israel since the $100 million authorization had
been made at the beginning of 1949.

The new $35 million

credit was ext ended to pay for imports of U.S. products .for
.farm settlements, the expansion of irrigation facilities
designed to bring new farms under cultivation, and the erection of a fertilizer plant. 6

At this juncture, Eban notes,

"One of the Israel Embassy's sophisticated economic consultants predicted that this was the only assistan ce that Israel
could realistic a lly expect. 11 7
5Ibid.
6For accounting purposes the $35 million credit
granted in 1950 is retroactively listed by the Eximbank in
combination with the earlier $35 million loan for related
usages, January 19, 194.9. See Table 5 on page 70.
7Eban, "How It Began, 11 p. vii.
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Most of the products i mp orted through fin anc i ng pro vided by the combined lo ans of $135 million were purchas ed
in 1950 and 19.51 when the Isra e l pound was offici ally valued
at $2.80.

Its unrealistically high value in rel at ion to the

dollar meant that importers who purchased Ame ric an goods with
dollars made ava ilable to them at t he of f ici al ex change r ate
were able to enjoy laree profits whe n t hey resol d the goods
on the domestic ma r ~_e t.
very efficiently.

As a result, the lo a ns were not used

Also there were cases in which i mp or t e d

machinery rerrill ined i a le and other c ases where it turned out
to be inadequate for l ack of a sufficiently thorough examination prior to purchase. 8
In 1955 the government of Israel entered into negotiations with the Export -Import Bank for an additional

$7.5 million loan for irrig ation projects.

Although the r e -

quest was prepar ed and documented by the Ec onomic Advisory
Staff of the Prime Minister 's Office, a r e search team sent
out by the Bank felt obliged to take issue with the Israeli
estimate of t he :r.ia gnitude of the water resou rces available.
The Bank te am 's calculation, wh ich was l a ter confirI"led by
ad d itional h yd rological res earch, was considerabl y lower
than the Israeli asS? e ssment. 9

Not until Fe bruary 20, 1958,

was a new loan agreemen t reached, at which time the amount
8publi c I nternationa l Developme nt Finan c ing, a
Re search Proj e ct of the Columb i a Un i versi t y 0 chool of Law ,
Report No . 5: l_., ublic Int ernn ti ona l Deve lo -ment .i.i'i nancin · in
Isr ae l, by Chaim Ben- Shach ar New York : Columbia University, 1963), p. Jl.
9 Ibid. , p. JL~.
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approved was $24.2 million.

The interest rate of

5 1/4 per-

cent was an increase over the 3 1/2 percent rate on the
earlier loans and represented Bank officials' assessment of
Israel's improved ability to meet its foreign exchange

obligations.
In October, 1958, a short-term

5 percent loan of

$350 thousand was granted for the purchase of an atomic
reactor for industrial research, a U.S. sale that was in
line with American policy to make such reactors available to
friendly powers.

At the time that it was authorized a loan

in the amount of $3 million was also made to the American
Israel Paper Mills, Ltd., at Hadera, and guaranteed by the
Industrial Development Bank of Israel.

Its purpose was the

purchase of American equipment for a paper mill and pulp
plant.

The interest rate was

5 1/2 percent.

The magnitude of dollar loans disbursed by the
Export-Import Bank to Israel during the entire 1949-1960
period was $162.5 million. 10

All were fifteen-year loans

with the exception of the credit for the atomic reactor.
Interest rates ranged from 3 1/2 percent on t he earliest
loans to

5 1/2 percent on the latest.

Ab out three-fourths

of the $162.5 million were utilize d directly or indirectly
lOBesides making dollar loans to Israel out of its
own funds the Export-Import Bank was the channel through
which "Cooley Amendment" loans from Public Law 480 Title I
surplus commodity sales and other loans from the International Cooperation Administration benefited the economy.
Export-Import Bank of Washington, Re~ort to the Co~ress for
the Twelve Months ending June 30, 19 O, pp. 22, 16~172, 200.
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TABLE

5

EXPORT-IMPORT BA11K DOLLAR LOANS TO ISRAEL
( In Thousands of Dolla·r s)
Fisca-1
Year

Loan
Recipient

U.S. Products
Financed

Credits Authorized
Amount
Date

1949

State of
Israel

Agricultural
equipment and
machinery

1-19-49

$70,000

1949

ti

Transportation

3-9-49

1949

II

Housing
materials

3-16-49

·25,000

1949

It

Telecommunications
equipment

3-23-49

5,000

1950

ti

Port
development

9-7-49

5,465

1950

II

Industrial
development

10-26-49

20,000

1958

II

Expansion of
water supply,
dis tr i bu tion
f ac i lities, and
agricultural
development

2-20-58

24,200

1959

"

Research
atomic reactor

10- 8-58

350

Equ ipment for
paper mill and
pulp pla nt

10- 8- 58

3,000

1959

American
Israel
Paper
Mills, Ltd.
(Ind.Development Bank of
Israel)

9,535

Total
Source:

$162,550
Office of U .s . AID Re
Re;eort as of December

•
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for food production and housing for the expanding immigrant
population.

By the end of the period substantial loan repay-

ments had already been made.

As of June 30, 1960, the sum of

,

$58.4 million in principal and $36.5 million in interest had
been repaid.

And the fact that payments were on schedule

helped maintain the continued good will of the Bank. 11
Mutual Security Program Grants and Loans
Although Export-Import Bank loans in 1949 marked the
beginning of official American assistance to Israel, the main
stream of U.S. aid from 1949 to 1960 came under the Mutual
Security Program, meaning those agencies and methods incorporated in the Mutual Security Acts of 1951 and 1954 and
amendments thereto.

Assistance provid ed under such legisla-

tive authority consisted of grants and loans in the form of

dollar credits to foreign governments for the purchase of
connnodity imports.

Technical Assistance and (later) the

Development Loan Fund also came under the canopy of the.
Mutual Security Program but will be treated separately.
The first U.S. grant to Israel was made i n the fiscal
year 1952, in response to Israel's application for

$150 million. 12 The amount extended was $63.5 million.

It

11An official of the Export-Import Ba~k informed the
writer in a personal interview in 1964, "We like to do business with the Israelis. They come with their plans well prepared. They talk like businessmen. They know what they want;
and they meet their obligations on schedule."
12see "Text of Note Presented by the Ambassador of
Isra,el, Abbai. S. Eban, to the Secretary of State--Request for
Grant-in-Aid," Appendix C.
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is apparent that Congress was maintaining a weather eye to
poss ible political repercussions when it made this grant
because the statute not only provided that $50 million of it
were to go for "specific refugee relief and resettlement
projects in Israel" but that another $50 million were to be
contributed to the United Nations for the U.N. Palestine
Refugee Act of 1950, which is to say, for Palestine Arab
refugees. 13
All but $5.l million of the first American grant of
$63.5 million were spent on the satisfaction of essential
human needs under the categories of relief and resettlement.
{Table 6.)

More than half the total amount--$35.1 million--

was used for the purchase of such basic foods as wheat and

flour, sugar, and skim milk powder.

In addition $7.4 million

went for the purchase of agricultural supplies, including
fodder, seeds, fertilizer, and plant protection minerals.
Altogether $42.5 million or 67 percent of the whole grant
were directly or indirectly devoted to increasing the ·country's food supply, part of this amount being used to redeem
short-term debts previously obtained to finance food
purchases.
Fuel constituted the next major category of the
first grant.

More than $9 million, approximately

25 percent

of Israel's ruel import for the year, were expended in this
direction.

The fact that the country's population had

13Mutual Security Act of 1951, Statutes at Large,
Vol. 65, sec. 205, 1951, p. 375.
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TABLE 6
BREAKDOWN OF FIRST GRANT-IN-AID
(In Thousands of Dollars)

Purpose
A.

Relief
l.
2.

3.
4.
B.

Total

.
..
......

$35,112
7,439
4,045
9 0.55
J

Resettlement

5. Housing

6.

1.
8.

9.
C.

.
.
......
..
.

Basic foods • •
• • • • •
Fodder, seeds, etc.
• • • .•
Raw materials
Fuel.
•

.

•

. • .• .. .. .. .• . .
..
.• .• ...
.........
..• ...

Farm buildings
Farm equipment
Spare parts
Medical supplies

.

2,401
J.48
• •

200
•

•

Development
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.

16.
Total •
Source:

Food storage •
Livestock
Transportation
Power
•
Irrigation
Industry
•
Fishing

. . .

...
... .
..
.
.
....

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.•
..
.
.•

.•
.
.
.•
.

..
.
.
.•
.

..
.•
.•
.

.•
.
.•
.
.

..
.
.
.
.
.

.. . .. ... . ... ..

• •
• •
• •

2,800

2, 150
150
$63,500

Grant-in-Aid Offi ce , Jerusalem, July, 1953.
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doubled since 1948 and that large-scale development of wa,t er
and power and construction of homes and roads was under way
made petroleum imports essential.
The remaining $9 million of the first grant were used
£or the purchase of textile raw materials and leather

{$4 million), construction material for immigrant housing and
farm buildings {$2.6 million), spare parts ($.2 million),
expansion of electric power facilities ($2.8 million), irri- _
gation ($2.2 million), and development of the local fishing
industry ($.2 million).

Altogether the $63.5 million grant

constituted about one-fourth of Israel's foreign income in
fiscal year 1952.14
In 1953 the magnitude of grant aid surpassed the

1952 level.

In fact, the second grant was the la~gest that

the United States ever extended to Israel, the whole amount
being designated by Congress for the welfare of immigrant
refugees. 1 5

The sum was $70,228,000 16 and accounted for

35.6 percent of Israel's foreign income that year.

The part

devoted to relief and resettlement projects was $2· million
less than it was the year before, but $8 .7 million more
were programmed for development proje cts.

(Table 7.)

14"Letter Exchange Starts New Grant-in-Aid Program,"
Information Service Special Release, November 25, 1953,
p. 4. AID file data.

u.s.

i5Mutual Securit
Vol. 66, sec. 20,192,

Act of 19 2
2.

Statutes at Lare,

16subsequent deobligations reduced this figure to
$70,061,000.
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TABLE

7

BREAKDOWN OF SECOND GRANT-IN-AID
(In Thousands of Dollars)

Purpose
A.

Relief
l.

2.

3.

4.
B.

Total

.

..
..
.
. . . . . .. . . . . .

Basic foods
•
• • •
Fodder, seeds, etc. • • •
~
Raw materials • •
• • • • •
Fuel •

$22,887
6,291
4,939
12,974

Resettlement

5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

.

..
.
. ..

Housing
• •
Farm buildings
Farm equipment
Spare parts
•
Medical supplies

.
.
..
.

.
..•
.

.
..•
.

.
.
.
.•

.

.•

5,632
100

.• .•
.• .

1,612
910
1,098

Food storage
•
Livestock
• • •
Transportation •
•
• •
Power
• • • • • • • •
• •
Irrigation • • •
•
•
•
Industry
•
•
•
Fishing •

...
...
.
.
.
.
...

196
325
2,078
2,660
5,124

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$70,228

c.

DeveloEment
10.
11.
12.

13.

14.
15.

16.

Source:

.

...
....
.
. . . ..
.....

.
.
.
..
..

3,222

180

Grant-in-Aid Office, Jerusalem (Revised), April,

1954.
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In fiscal year 1954 the U.S.-Israel grant level decreased to

$52.5

million.

A novel aspect of the year's aid

obligation was the condition that part of it be used to buy
surplus American farm products.

This stipulation reflects

the .fact that Congress was becoming increasingly aware .o.f
huge agricultural surpluses which were accumulating in the
wake of its price support program and insisted that more
attention be focused by the U.S. aid agency on the disposal
o.f

these surpluses on foreign markets.

pressure $1.2 million of the

1954

In response to this

grant were specifically

earmarked for the purchase of surplus commodities.

The same

year a major piece of legislation, originating with the
United States Department of Agriculture, was passed by
Congress that was directly aimed at the disposal of farm
surpluses on a large scale.

Although this statute, known

as Public Law 480, was not passed by Congress in the name of
foreign a.ssistance legislation, eventually it was destined
to replace America's grant program.
Another highly important development in the laws
a.f.fecting subsequent U.S. foreign aid also occurred in

1954.

A strong tide of public and Congressional sentiment had come
to favor putting some Mutual Securi ty Program "Development
Assistance" on a loan basis r a ther than on the basis of
outright grants.

This attitude was incorporated in the

Mutual Security Act of

1954.

Loans were repayable in local

currency, and those made to the government of Israel matured

77

in forty years.

The interest rate was

4 percent, except that

loans granted in 1956 and 1957 specified

4 percent if repaid

in Israel pounds but only 3 percent if repaid in dollars.
In 1955 and 1956 Development Assistance to Israel was
almost evenly divided between grants and loans.

In 195$

$19.7 million were granted and $20 million were loaned to
Israel, $17.7 million of which credits were used for the purchase of agricultural surpluses in addition to those commodities that Israel obtained for local currency under Public
Law 480 Title I.

Then in 1956 approximately $13 million were

granted and $12.5 million loaned.

Of this combined grant and

loan a total of $15.1 million were employed for the purchase
of commodities labeled surplus by the

u.s.

Department of

Agriculture, $5.1 million coming from the grant portion and
$10 million from the loan.
In 1957 Israel was granted $15 million to buy
American farm surpluses, and from this time forth all grants
were made solely for such surplus commodity purchases under
the heading of "Special Assistance."

Also in 1957 a

$10 million loan was given to help meet its dollar needs for
other raw materials, for products conducive to agricultural
expansion, and for fuel.
Other Special Assistance grants in the modest amount
of $7.5 million a year followed in 1958, 1959, and 1960 for
non Title I food surpluses, each grant carrying with it the
new requirement that the government of Israel also purchase
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out of its own r e serves of foreign currenc y an add i tional

$7.5 million of farm surplus commodi ties.

By 1960 these

foreign currency reserves were sufficiently large that certain
members of Congress began to demand a cessation of grants to
Israel altogether.

The fact that 1960 was a presidential

election year accounted for continuation of the program for
another year, but in 1961 it was terminated. 1 7
Thus from a high of over $70 million in 1953, dollar
grant aid to Israel diminished to an annual level of

$7.5 million by the end of the period and became part of a
multiple approach of the United States government to the
problem of cutting down America's agricultura l overabundance.
These Mutual Security Program gra nts, coupled with loans,
exclusive of the Development Loan Fund , reached a magnitude
of $298.7 million from their inception to t he close of fiscal
year 1960.

Over h alf of this entire sum was u sed for the

purchase from the United S tates of basic foods for consumption and for other commodities necessary to the promotion of
agricultural production in Israel.

Table 8 provide s a pic-

ture of the purposes served by this assistan c e .
Development Loan Fund Loans
The Mutual Security Act of 195 7 set up a new government lending a gency, i ndepend ent of the International
Cooperation Administration, wi th funds that were not subject
1 7Publ ic Interna t i onal Devel opme n t Financing, p. 34.

TABLE 8
USES OF MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM GRANTS AND LOANS BY SECTOR
EXCLUDING DEVELOPMENT LOANS
(In Thousands of Dollars)
Sector

FY-52

FY-53

$35,112

$22 ,543

Agricultural
production

10,088

. .

9,056

Basic food

Fuel .

Raw materials
for local
consumption.

Total

$11,647

$ 8,889

$5,763

$5,B;o

$7,500

$119,162

2,533

1,490

6,108

1,732

1,650

12,972

2,416

3,129

1-1-,226

2,097

1,356

3,453

619

559

2,304

$16,379

8,803

3,205

13,136

.
4,044

Power &:
industria l
development.

2,800

Transportation
Housing

Sourc e:

FY-60

35,609
44,935

--.J

A~icul tura l &:
irrigational
investment

.

FY-59

$5,479

1,126

Raw materials
for export •

'r otal

FY-58

FY-56

Maintenance
and repairs.
Health and
sanitation .

FY-57

FY-55

FY-54

..

7,721

4,904

21,870

2,526

485

23,978

10,399

6,085

379

22,360

2,806

1,486

3,969

2,862

721

654

6,042

3,203

7,419

9,504

5,497

2,400

5,869

$63,500

$70,061

11,061
1,462

5,699
8,269

$52,524

$39,680

$25 ,449

$24,991

$7,495

Office of USAID Re:eresentgtive Financial Jieport as of June 30, 1962, p. 2.

$7,500

$7,500

$298,700

'°
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to fiscal year limitations.
Fund.

This was the Development Loan

Its purpose was to extend long range loans to non-

governmental as well as governmental borrowers for economically sound development projects where such projects could
not otherwise qualify for loans from private or public .lending sources.

As with Mutual Security Program loans, which

were now discontinued, DLF loans were to be administered so
as to support and encourage private investment and could be
repaid in local currency into what amounted to a revolving
fund for relending. 18

Interest rates and other terms of

repayment were determined on a case-by-case basis in the
various receiving countries, the theory being tha-t rates on
profit-earning projects could exceed those on s-uch economic
overhead projects as roads, brid ges, harbors, communication
facilities, and so forth. 1 9

Loans to Israel pursuant to the

new legislation were offered for periods of ten to twenty
years.

In fiscal year 1958 a DLF loan was extended to the
government of Israel in the amount of $15 million and for
period of fifteen years at

a.

5 1/4 percent interest to finance

18The Development Loan Fund functioned as a U.S.
g overnment corporation until November 3, 1961, at which time
it was merged with the Agency f or International Development
by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Under AID, dollar
loans were repayable in dollars instead of loc~l currencies,
and repayments were no longer available for relending.

1 9u.s. Legislative Reference Service, Library of
Congress, U.S. Forei n Aid Its Pur oses Seo e Administration, and Related Information Wash ngton, D • . : Government
Printing Office, 1959), p. 74.
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the purchases of American equipment for electric power generation and distribution; road and railroad materials; machinery
and supplies for the production of textiles; food, cement,
and tires; equipment and steel for _p ipe manufacturing and
agricultural uses; construction for farm buildings and for
mining.

The State Department press release that announced

the loan was careful to point out that a substantial part of
the supplies being financed by this first DLF loan to Israel
would go to private business.20
In order to gain DLF loans, Israel's Foreign Currency
Division of the Ministry of Finance, in collaboration with
the Budget Division, was obliged to seek out specific projects and prepare detailed data for American examination and
approval.

Both governmental departments found this task

very time consuming and difficult partly because DLF did not
accept individual loan applications for amounts below
$100 thousand, whereas most Israeli projects required less
than that quantity of American money.

The solution arrived

at by government and DLF officials was that the Fund should
ma.ke some capital available to the Industrial Devel opment
Bank, out of which that institution could make loans to
various industrial enterprises as n eede d . 21
adoption of this arrangement , in 1959 a

1958.
p.

35.

Following the

$5 mi llion ten-year

2 0nepartment of State Press Release No. 278,- May 20,
21 Public International Development Financing,
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l9an, carrying a

5

percent interest rate, was granted to

IpBI for relending to small business firms through mediwn
and long-term loans.

These loans were intended to provide

the foreign exchange necessary to help such enterprises
finance American imports of essential materials and eq~ipment.22
In 1960 a second ten-year foreign exchange credit in
the amount of $5 million was made available to the same government related bank and at the s arne interest rate as the
previous loan.

Also in 1960, $15 mi llion were loaned to the

government of Israel for the import of irrigation equipment
and services in connection with the construction of a system
for the movement of water from Western Galilee and Samaria
to the South.

The interest charges on this twenty-year

economic overhead loan were 3 1/2 percent.

By the close of

U.S. fiscal year 1960 Israel had been the recipient of
Development Loan Fund dollar loans in the amount of

$40 million. 23
Technical Assistance
A very small part ($15.3 million) of all U.S. aid to
Israel was extended under the label of Technical Assistance,
Technical Cooperation, or Point Four.

1959.

This program sent

22Department of State Press Release No. 323, May 12,

23orrice of U.S. AID Re~resentative, Financial
Report as of June 30, 1962, p • .
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American experts to Israel to advise the government on ways
ijnd means of achieving agreed upon economic objectives.

It

also financed the dollar costs of demonstration equipment
and the training of selected Israeli personnel abroad under
t he Par t i c ipant Training Program.

Technical Assistan ce

dollars generated no loc al currenc y owned or controlled by
the United States, a s was the c a se with grants.

Neither

did the dollars expe nd ed have to be repaid.
Because Israel's great n ee d in t he e a rl y 1950 1 s was
for foods ana fodders, it ·wi ll b e recalled t hat grant aid ,
which was f irst extended to Israel in 1952 , was directed
toward financing imports of agricultural commoditie s .

During

this per i od Technical Assistance, which was also first
applied to I srael in 1952, was devoted mainly to agr icultural
projects, supporting and reinforcing the grant program.

By

1957 the Technical Assistance emphasis had shifted somewhat
to indus t r y, while its role in agriculture largely focused
on the promotion of a university system to supervise and
have charge of research, edu c ation , an d ex tens i on work .

Be-

sid e s aiding agriculture and industry the Te chnic al Assistance/Cooperation Program cont ributed t o such o ther fields as
public administration , publ i c health, t r ansportation, housing, and e duc a tion. 24 The Technica l As sistance Pro gram will
be considered i n grea ter aeta il i n Chapter VI.
24Henry Chalfant, "Diffe r ent Name s , Many-Si de d
St or y," Jerusalem Post, Special Su ppleme nt Marking the Conclusi on of the Work of the United States Opera t ions Mission
in I s r a e l, July 4, 1962, p. iv.
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Agricultural Surplus Assistance
under Public Law 480 Title I
The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
of 1954 (Public Law 480, Eighty-Third Congress) was passed
quite independently of the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

Its

chief aim was to speed up the disposal of politically embarrassing and economically costly farm surpluses that could not
be sold through normal connnercial channels at home or abroad.
Title I authorized the President to negotiate agreements
with friendly nations for the sale of surplus commodities
for foreign currencies and to use such currencies for various
purposes, including grants and loans .

Only incidentally did

Congress think of Title I as a foreign aid program.

At

least, supporters emphasized its benefits to America and
said little about its benefits to nations abroad.

In rela-

tion to Israel, however, it soon became the main expression
of the U.S. assistance effort and by the close of 1961
replaced grant aid altogether. 2 5
Because Title I aid is the subject of a separate
chapter, it is sufficient to say here that shipments from
1955 to 1960 averaged $27 million a year and that a distinct
break in the level came with the temporary cutback to
25Public Law 480 included also Titles II, III, and
IV. Title II authorized free distribution of surplus commodities for famine or emergency relief. Title III dealt
with contributions of foodstuffs through voluntary agencies.
Title IV, which was added in 1959, provided for long-term
supply and dollar credit sales. By the close of the period
under review neither Title II nor IV had been applied to
Israel.
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$10.5 million in 1957 following the Sue~ crisis.

By 1960

shipments reached a cumulative total of $162.J million, most
of which represented purchases in three food categories:
wheat, feed grain, and edible fats and oil.
Agricultural Surplus Assistance under
Public Law 4dO Title III and
Prior Authori~ations
Section 416 of the Agricultural Act of 1949 authorized the Commodity Credit Corporation to make donati~ns of
surplus agricultural products to various public and private
welfare agencies for the benefit of needy persons at home
and abroad.

In 1954 the Act was superseded by an even more

liberal Title III section of Public Law 480.

The new law

authorized the CCC to pay for the processing, pac kaging,
handling, and transportation of commodities donated up to
the time of delivery to relief agencies for domestic distribution or to shipside in the case of distribution
abroad. 26
By the close of fiscal year 1960 America had contributed to Israel through welfare organizations (CARE,
Hadassah, 2 7 and Malben) a total of $52.2 mi llion in
2 6u.s. Congress, House, Activi ties Under Public Law
480, H. Doc. No. 62, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955, p. 3.
2 7For an insight into the operations of Hadassah in
respect to Title III commodities, see Appendix D.

86
commodities, which constituted 18 percent of all U.S. surplus commodity aid extended to that country.

These charit-

able contributions incurred no obligation to repay in any
form.

They were outright gifts. 28
Table 9 indicates the dollar value of surplus agri-

cultural commodities made available to Israel under Title III
and Section 416 of the Agricultural Act of 1949 and compares
it with the value of foods and fibers furnished under Title I.
It also provides a comparison with the dollar value of other
surpluses financed by Mutual Security grants and loans under
Section 550 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and Section
402 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

It should be borne

in mind that these figures pertain only to the value of
comrnodities officiallrs_lassified as surplus by the U.S.
government i _n connection with the domestic price support
program.

No attempt is made here to discuss Israel's pur-

chases of American agricultural products through normal
commercial channels.
Indicative of the growing emphasis on agricultural
surpluses in the aid program is the fact that only 12 percent
28 Title III also allowed private U.S. firms, under
contract with the Commodity Credit Corporation, to barter
surplus commodities for strategic and other materials and
supplies. Under this authority American companies exchanged
$16 million in agricultural products with Israeli firms.
Such business transactions, however, are categorized as
trade instead of aid by the United States government and so
are not included in this study. U.S. Congress, House, The
Twelfth Semiannual Re ort on Activities Carried on Under
Public Law
0
d Con ress as Amended, H. Doc. No. 449,
th Cong., 2d sess., 19 0, p. 3 .
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TABLE 9

DOLLAR VALUE OF AID EXTENDED THROUGH SURPLUS
AGRICULTO'RAL COMMODITIES (ALL PROGRAMS)
( In Thousands of Dolla•r s)
Mutual Security Program

Fiscal

(Sections
Grants

Year

550 and 402)
Loans

Title I
Sales

1950

• •

1951
•

Title III
Donations

..

. .

. .

1949

Public Law 480

. .

$ 1,200a

$1,200

21,504a

21,504

..

1952

..
..

1953
1954

Total

$1,197

1955

044a

044

20,655a

21,862

$17,684

$12,696

378

30,758

10,000

27,632

1,646

44,337

1956

5,059

1957

14,997

• •

10,538

2,291

27,826

1958

7,495

..

39,232

2,253

48,980

1959

7,500

36,360

1,706

45,566

1960

7,500

35,845

518

43,863

$27,684

$162,303

$52,205

$285,940

10

57

18

100

Total

$43,748

Percent
of
Total

Source:

. .

Based on Office of U.S. AID Re.J:.resentative
Financial Report as of December Jl, 1962, p. 1.

avalue of U.S. food contributions to voluntary agencies
under Section 416 of the Agricultural Act of 1949.

,
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($44.6 million) of American government aid to Israel during
the first half of the period was provided in the form of food
surpluses, but during the second half, 65 percent ($241.3 million) comprised assistance of this charac t er.

Throughout the

entire period, farm surplus commodity aid re a ched a magtJ.itude
of $285.9 million or 38.5 percent of the total aid-to-Israel
figure of $741.6 million.
Informational Media Guaranty
From fiscal year 1953 to 1960 the United States devoted $10.5 million to a program that enabled Israeli importers to purchase American books, periodicals, films, maps, and
such with Israeli pounds. 29

This program, called the

2 9American firms part icipating in the IMG-Israel program during fiscal year 1960 were the followi ng:

Reader's Digest Associati on , Inc. ( all langua ges).
Curtis Publishing Co. (only magazines) . . • . • • .
Time, Inc. (Time, only subscriptions; Life, subscriptions a n d newstanas a s per former IMG

$15,000
8,000

contract)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. ..
44,500
Newsweek, Inc. . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
. .
5,000
The New York Herald Tribune, Inc.
. ••••
10,000
The New York Times Co. . .
. . • .
. ...•
4,000
New World Club (Aufbau) • • . . . • • . • . . . . •
1,500
Jewish Daily Forward • . . . . . . . • . • . • . . •
1,000
The Day Publishing Co • • . • • • • . . • • • . .
10,000
Hearst Corporation (only ma~a z ines) • • . . . . . •
1,000
McGraw-Hill Publishing Co. (only subscripti ons,
mostly technical journals) • •• • • • • . • . •
30,000
Moore-Cottrell Subscription Agencies • • • • • . • •
88,ooo
Museum Publications, Inc. (only subscriptions) . • •
10,000
Hanson-Bennett Subscription Agency . . . . . • . . •
10,000
Van Riemsdyek Book Service, I nc. (only subs cri ptions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12,000
Pocket Books (Bantam, N.A.L., Pocket, Dell,
Ballantine, Avon) • • . . .
. • • . . . • •
50,000
Total • • • • . • . • • . . . . • . . . • • . • • • $300,000
The principa l periodic a l and newspaper subscriptions
and newsstand sales brought in under the con tr a cts with the
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Informational Media Guaranty (IMG) was originally instituted
under authority of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948.
Later it came under the legislative auspices of the United
States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as
.Amended.

And whereas it first was administered by the Mutual

Security Administration, it was shifted to the Department of
State in 1952 and transferred to the U.S. Information Agency
August 1, 1953.
Under authority emanating from agreements between the
United States government and participating countries, the
United States Information Agency entered into contracts with
American exporters of approved books and other information
media to guarantee dollars in exchange for otherwise unconvertible foreign currency resulting from the sales of their
publications in those countries.

For this coverage the

applicant exporter paid to USIA in advance 1 percent of the
a.mount that he anticipated selling abroad during the ensuing
twelve months or 1 percent of whatever portion of that amount
for which he desired dollars in lieu of foreign currency.JO
The primary intent of the IMG program was t he
above firms are: Seventeen, Harpers , Glamour, Good Housekeeping, Cosmopolitan, Life, Time, Herald Tribune, Saturday
Evening Post, Ladies Home Journal, American Home, Coronet,
New Yorker, Science and Mechanics, Forum, Progressive Architecture, and National Geographic. U.S. Congress, Senate,
A Report on United States Foreign _Operations by Honorable
Allen J. Ellender, United States Senator from Louisiana,
S. Doc. No. 2.0 , 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1960, p. 598.
30 11 Informational Media Guaranty Program Briefing
Paper." United States Information Agency (n.d.).
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dissemination of knowledge of America and the cultivation of
a pro-western orientation abroad.

Although this program,

therefore, was on the margin of the American foreign assistance effort, it still enabled Israel to purchase one segment
of American production without dipping into its limited
dollar supply and so comes under the notice of this study.
A Chronological Review of Major Programs
In fiscal years 1949 and 1950, U.S. aid to Israel
commenced with Export-Import Bank loans of $135 million for
agricultural equipment, housing, industrial expansion, and
for port development in Haifa and Jaffa.
In 1951 assistance to Israel consisted strictly of
allocations of foodstuffs to voluntary agencies in the
amount of $21.5 million.
In 19.52 Israel became a full-fledged beneficiary of
America's foreign aid program when it was granted

$63.5

million primarily for refugee relief and resettlement.

The

same year saw the beginning in that country of the Technical
Assistance Program.
In 1953 Israel received a $70 million grant, which
like the one the year before was utilized mainly for feeding
and housing innnigrants.

The year also marked the extension

of the Informational Media Guaranty Program to Israel, which
greatly facilitated the import of American films, books, and
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other publications by permitting American exporters to convert Israel pounds into dollars.
In 1954 America granted Israel

$52.5

million mainly

for fuel, agricultural production and investment, and for
basic foods.

Another $20.7 million in agricultural surpluses

were donated by the American government to voluntary relief

agencies and channeled to Israel's sick and hungry.

This was

also the year that Congress, sensitive to the farm surpluses
being amassed through its price support program, passed the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954
(Public Law 480).
In 1955 there was a marked decline in the grant
level to $19.7 million.
the difference.

However, two new programs made up

The first was a long-term loan of

$20 million, repayable in local currency, under amended
Mutual Security legislation.

The second was the local cur-

rency sale of $12.7 million worth of surplus agricultural
commodities under Public Law 480 Title I.
In 1956 the Mutual Security Program grant dropped
again, this time to $13 million, and the Mutual Security
Program loan level also decreased to $12.5 milli on.

The

slack in both was ta ken up by a corresponding increase in
commodity sales under Title I to $27.7 million.

Quite

clearly the Mutual Security grant-loan program was being
reduced in favor of Title I commodity sales.

The

$53 million total of the three programs to gether, it may
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also be noted, was a continuation of the approximate level
of the same three programs in 1955 ($52.4 million) and of
the grant program alone in 1954 ($52.5 million).
In 1957 a $10 million loan, repayable in local cur-

rency, was extended to Israel for the purchase of nonsurplus
agricultural products, raw materials, and fuel; and a grant
of

$15 million was made for the acquisition of surplus

commodities.

The most noticeable variation in the 1957

level of aid was a drastic drop in Title I S3les from

$27.7 million in 1956 to $10.5 million.

This decline re-

flected a deliberate U.S. slowdown of a gric ultural surplus
shipments in the wake of the Suez crisis.
In 1958 a grant to Israel of $7.5 million for the
purchase of surplus agricultural products was more than
offset by the dramatic post-Suez crisis rise in Title I
sales to $39.2 million.

To these figures we add an Export-

Import Bank loan of $24.2 million for irrigation development
and a Development Loan Fund loan of $15 million for industrial and agricultural development.

When the cost of Tech-

nical Assistance, the Informational Media Guaranty Program,
and Title III food donations are included , we note that the

1958 aid level rose to the highest peak since 1949, totalling $90.4 million.
In 1959 Export-Import Bank lonns in t h e amount of

$3.4 million financed the purch as e of an atomic energy
reactor and equipment for a paper mill and pulp plant.

A
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grant for farm surpluses of $7.5 million was joined by
Title I local currency food sales in the magnitude of

$36.4 million and Title III food gifts of $1.7 million.

The

foregoing assis~ance was enlarged by a DLF loan of $5 million
to the Industrial Development Bank of Israel for relending
to small businesses.
During 1960, the final year of the period under consideration, Israel received the customary $7·. 5 million grant
for agricultural surpluses, $35.8 million worth of additional
foodstuffs under Title I and $.5 million under Title III.
When, to the foregoing, we include expenditures
obligated in support of Technical Assistance and Informational
Media Guaranty, the grand total for all kinds of economic aid
during the twelve-year period is $741.6 million.

(See

Table 10.)
The Role of Local Currency
Two categories of local currency accumulated through
the American aid programs.

These were:

(1) counterpart

accounts owned by the host country, and (2) U.S.-owned
foreign currency accounts acquired by the United States from
sales of surplus agricultural commodities.
Israel, like other countries benefiting by grants
under the Mutual Security Program, was required to deposit
in one of its own domestic banking institutions the local
currency paid by domestic purchasers of commodities acquired
with the dollars granted.
Counterpart Fund.

This account was called the

Although counterpart accumulations were

TABLE 10
COMPOSITION OF TOTAL U.S. DOLLAR ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL
(In Thousands of Dollars)

Fiscal
Year

ExportImport
Bank
Loans

1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

109,535
25,465

Total
Percent
of
Total

..

•
•

Mutual Security Program
DevelMutual
opment
Mutual
Security Security Loan
Program
Fund
Program
Grants
Loans
Loans

.•
..
• .

..
..
..
.•
.•
.•

162,550

63,500
70,061
52,524
19,680
12 ,951
14,997
7,495
1,500
7,500
256, 208

42,492

22

34.5

5.7

..
• •
.•
.•
• .

24,200
3,350

..

Source:

20,000
12 , ~_98
9,994

.•
..
..

.• ••
..
.•
.. ..
. ..
•

Public Law 480
Title I
Surplus Title III
Tech.
Coop.
Agricul- Grants to
Tech.
Voluntary
ture
Assist. Sales
Agencies
• •
• •

.

•

15,000
5,000
20,000

934
2,531
1,679
1, 62lt1,670
1,905
1,645
1,798
1,563

40,000

15 ,349 8

5.4

2

.•
.•
.•
..
.•
..

12,696
27,632
10,538
39,232
36,360
35,845
162,303b
21.9

..

Inrormationa.l
Media

Guaranty

.•
.
.• .
.•

Total

044
20,665
378
1,646
2,291
2,253
1,706
518

900
2,100
2,000
2,600
1, 500
600
500
300

109,5i5
26,6 5
21,504
64,43i
13,53
76,968
56,378
58,997
41,225
90,425
56,21i
65,72

52,205

10,500

741,607

1,200
21,.504

.

•

7

1.4

Based on Office of U.S. AID Re resentative Financial Re ort as of
, 19 2, p. 1.
December

arncluding administrative costs of $2.0 million.
bActual shipments. Sales agreements amounted to $168.5 million.

100

'°
+=""
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wholly owned by the recipient country, expenditures from
them could be made only with the concurrence of the United
States.

This American requirement was based on the assump-

tion that the currency thus reserved could make a further
contribution to economic stability if used to stimulate certain sectors of the economy and that decisions respecting
its use would somehow be made more wisely in consultation
with the United States than without it.3 1

Out of the

Counterpart Fund grants and loans were made agreeable to
both governments; and that part t hat was loaned and afterwards repaid was returned by Israel to the Counterpart Fund
with interest.
U.S. ovmed foreign currency accounts, in contrast to
counterpart funds, were formed from sales for surplus agricultural products under provisions of the Mutual Security
Act (Section

550

of t he amended 1951 Act and Section 402 of

the amended 1954 Act) and under provisions of Public Law 480
Title I.

The foreign currency proceeds of Mutual Security

Act sales, commonly referred to as Section 402 funds, were
available for further Mutual Securi ty Program purposes
agreeable to the purchasing country.

The domestic currency

acquired through Title I sales were available for a number
of purposes, includ ing grant s and loans for economic development and for other strictly U.S. uses, the general
31Robert E. Asher, Grants, Loans, and Local Currencies, Their Role in Forei~n Aid {Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 19 1), pp. 7-10.
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purposes being specified at the time the sales agreement was
signed.3 2

U.S. owned local currencies in Israel also in-

cluded loan repayments from Title I loans as well as from
MSP and DLF doliar loans, together with interest charges on
all such loans, and interest on bank deposits.
From the standpoint of the economic development of
the country, U.S. owned local currency accounts were indistinguishable from country owned counterpart funds.

As

explained by Asher:
The differences between foreign-owned counterpart
accounts and United States-owned P.L. 480 local currencies, though legally and politically important, are
largely a matter of historical accident and are not of
innnediate economic importance. Counterpart funds had
their birth in programs designed to aid friendly countries that were in need. Since such countries could no
longer spend foreign exchange for the commodities they
required, the United States did not ask for payment.
It gave the com..modities {including a very substantial
volume of agricultural commodities) as foreign aid and
asked the recipient government to neposit in an account
of its ovm the equivalent cost of its currency. P.L.
480 funds had their birth in programs designed to dispose of surplus agricultural commodities, despite the
fact that dollar payment could not reasonably be expected. Giving the commodities away seemed politically
less palatable than selling them for foreign currencies
that would belong to the United States and lending, or
even granting, the ~urrencies to the country that had
made the purchase.3J
Public Law 480 Title III authorized commodity grants
to voluntary welfare agencies and, although calculated as
dollar aid, did not call for corresponding deposits of local
320ffice of Statistics and Reports, International
Cooperation Administration, Counterpart Funds and ICA Foreign
Currency Accounts. Data as of June 30, 1961, p. lv.
3>Asher, Grants, pp. 11-12.
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currency, either as counterpart or U.S. owned accounts.
Neither did Export-Import Bank loans.

Likewise the Technical

Assistance Program generated no domestic funds.

While it is

-

true that each year•s Technical Cooperation Agreement committed the government of Israel to pay the local currency
1

costs of projects jointly sponsored, such payments were not
considered local currency generations.

Nor were Israel

pounds so considered t h at were garnered by the American
government through the Informational Media redemption policy,
inasmuch as the currency acqu ired was removed from further
programming for economic aid.

The other forms of assistance

already enumerated, however, did generate U.S. owned or
controlled local currency and when disbursed for country
development were reported as expenditures within the framework of the Development Budget.
During the years 1952 to 1960, inclusive, assistance
to the economy of Israel emanating from U.S. owned and controlled local currency reached a magnitude of IL 477. 8 million and accounted for one-fifth of the Development Budget.
This sum, the equivalent of $265.5 million at the official
exchange rate prevailing at the end of the peri od ($1 =
IL 1.80), was distributed on a project basis in the fields
and amounts sh own in Table 11.
Approximately 42 percent of the IL 477.8 million was
devoted to agricultural projects and 32 pe rcent to industry.
A smaller amount, 10 percent, went largely to housing
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TABLE 11
CONTRI BtrrrIO NS OF COUNTERPART AND u .s. OWNED LOCAL

CURRENCY IN EXPENDITURES OF THE DEVELOPMENT BUDGET
{Israel's Fiscal Ye ars 1952-1960)
IL Million
Budget Total

U.S. Partic.ipation

Agriculture . . . •

698.7

201.4

Industry and mining ••

514.8

152.1

Housing, schools, and
community development .

527.6

46.0

Transportation and
public works (road s)

235.0

_52.J

Posts . . . ••

52.9

12.J

Loans to local
governments • .

_51.8

13.7

Areas or non U . S .
participation
.
Total .
Percent of total

Source:

..
. . .
.. .

212.5

2,293.3
1 00

Off ice of Controller, USOM/I srae l.
file data.

477.8
20.83
AID
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projects, while transportation and road building together
accounted for another 11 percent.

Development Budget ex-

penditures in which the United States did not participate
included oil li?es, the Jordan canal, unemployment relief,
fortifications, purchase of the Palestine Electric Company
by the government of Israel, and miscellaneous funds and
projects.

PART I I

SO:ME EVALUATIONS

CHAPTER V
PUBLIC LAW 480 TITLE I ASSISTANCE
Introduction and Background
The problem of farm surpluses in the United States in
the 1950's was the product of a combination of factors.

One

of these factors was the expansion of agricultural production
to meet demands incident to World War II.

A second was the

postwar recovery of foreign agriculture that contributed significantly to a 30 percent decline in the export of American
farm products from 1951 to 1953.

A

third contributor to the

dilemma was a rigid price support program that led to huge
stockpiles of agricultural commodities and spiraling storage
costs. 1
Public Law 480 was enacted July 10, 1954, after long
deliberation by Congress of various bills dealing with the
problems created by surpluses.
of Title I were:

Two of the principal features

(1) it permitted foreign governments to pay

for surplus agricultural commodities in their own currency
and thus freed their dollars for other purchases or obligations, and (2) the major part of the local currencies received

lu.s. Congress, House, Activities Under Public Law
~ , 83d Congress, H. Doc. No. 62, 84th Cong., 1st sess.,

I9"5'5,

p.

4.
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by the United States under the program was returned in the
form of loans and grants for specifically approved development projects. 2

In the case of Israel, 83 percent of the

pounds acquired from Title I sales was made available to the
Israel economy.
The main purposes of the Title I program, as set
forth in the legislation, were the following:
1.

To promote the economic stability of American

agriculture,
2.

To expand international trade in American agri-

cultural commodities,
3.

To facilitate economic development of recipient

4.

To pay U.S. obligations abroad, and

5.

To further U.S. foreign policy.3

nations,

In negotiating sales agreements, the President of the
United States was admonished by the Act to take reasonable
precautions to safeguard the level of regular commercial
marketings of agricultural commodities and to assure that the
sale of surpluses would not unduly disrupt world prices.

He

also was called upon to do all he could t o gain commitments

2By 1960 Title II (Famine Relief) and Title IV (Long
Term Supply Contracts) had not been applied to Israel. Title
III (Donations to Voluntary Agencies) is briefly discussed in
Chapter IV.
Act
, pp.
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from participating countries aimed at preventing resale or
transshipment· to other countries. 4
Under provisions of the 1954 Act and its later amendments, the President was authorized to use the foreign currencies accruing from commodity sales for such purposes as
helping to develop new markets for American farm products;
stockpiling strategic materials; financing the translation,
publication, and distribution of American books and periodicals; supporting scientific activities; assisting American
schools and universities abroad; and for supplying American
tourists with local currency in exchange for dollars.5
Public Law 480 declared that when negotiating the
sale of farm surplus es under the provisions of Title I, the

President was to "take appropriate steps to assure that private trade channels are used to the maximum extent practicable."

It also authorized the Commodity Credit Corporation

to make the surpluses available for sale to private exporters
in America and also to help them finance the transaction;
then the United States government was to be reimbursed by
local currenc y deposited to its account in the importer's
country. 6

Thus American private enterprise was very nru.ch

part of the original Title I program.

No t until the Law had

been in effect three years, however, did Congress attempt to

4Ibid.
6Ibid.
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define the degree to which private enterprise in the recipient country was to participate in the local currency proceeds
of the commodity sales.

In the meantime, sentiment in

Congress in favor of formulating such a definition was growing.

The first four semiannual reports by the President on

the progress of Public Law 480 say nothing to indicate special efforts being made by the Law's administrators to foster
private companies abroad.

The fifth report, covering the

period from July 1 to December 31, 1956, however, informs
Congress and the Arherican public that foreign governments
were being encouraged to use some of these funds for relending to private business. 7

The sixth report is much more

explicit:
Relending to private enterprise.--The United States
is actively striving to reach agreement with purchasing
governments that a portion of the loan funds be set aside
for relending to private enterprise. During fiscal year
1957 negotiations on this point were conducted concurrently with negotiations of the sales agreements. As a
result, at least $150 million equivalent, or a minimum
of 25 percent of the loan funds which will become available from fiscal year 1957 sales agreements, will be used
for relending to private enterprise in 16 countries, including Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
Greece, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Pakistan, Pe ru,
Philippines, Spain, Thailand, and Turkey. The amounts
to be reserved for this purpose are usually specified in
the sales agreement: less frequently, foreign governments may agree to channel unspegified a.mounts of the
loan funds to private borrowers.
7u.s. Congress, House, Fifth Semiannual Report on
Activities Under Public Law 80, 83d Con ress, as Amended,
H. Doc. No. O,
th Cong., 1st sess., 19 7, p. 9.
8u.s. Congress, House, Sixth Semiannual Report on
Activities Under Public Law 80 83d Con ress as Amended,
H. Doc. No. 212,
th Cong., 1st sess., 19 7, p. 1.
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August 13, 19.57, the President signed new legislation
requiring that upwards of

25 percent of forei gn currencies

generated under each Title I agreement be made available for
loans to private firms.

These firms could be U.S. companies

or their branch affiliates or else companies with no American
ties whose functions merely served to expand markets for
United States agricultural products abroad.

Applications

were to be Eubmitted directly to the Export-Import Bank in
Washington or else to the American embassy abroad and were
to be agreeable to the government of the country in question.
This legislative enactment was the so-called "Cooley Amendment."
A week after the President approved this alteration
of Title I, an ICA press release carried the announcement
that administration policy directives made it necessary for
aid missions and U.S. embassies overseas to explo:renew ways
to channel loans to private enterprises.

It also affirmed

that:
This emphasis is in accordance with the general
policy of the U.S. Government to further private investment in friendly countries and to encourage private
enterprise to complement, supplement or replace economic
and technical assistance under the Mutual Security Program and other U.S. Programs.
In negotiating both surplus connnodity sales and loan
agreements, U.S. officials are increasingly stressing the
desirability of devoting a portion of the loan funds to
re-lending to private enterprise, including both domestic
entrepreneurs, Americans or nationals of other
countries.'-J
9rnternational Cooperation Advance Press Re lease No.
207, August 20, 1956.
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U.S. -Israel Sales Agreements under
the Title I Program
A few months after Public Law 480 went into effect,
the government of Israel made its first request for assistanc e under the new program.

In a note dated December 13,

1954, it proposed the purch ase of approximately $15 million
worth of connnodities.

It also called attention to the possi-

bility that drought could very well face the country with a
cr itical deficiency of foodstuffs and stressed the need for
a six months' reserve of certain com..modities.

The note

emphasized that the inadequacy of the supply of basic foods,
f odders, and industrial raw materials in the country was a
consequence of the shortage of foreign currency.

The U.S. response to Israel's proposal was an agreement the following April,lO supplemented by another in
June, 11 for the purchase of surplus commodities valued at

$13.5 million.

Purchases were to be financed by the U.S.

government, and the local currency generated thereby was to
be deposited to the credit of the United States government
1 0u.s. Department of State, Unite d States Treaties
and Other International Agreements, Vol. 6, p t. 1. "Agricultural Commodities Agreement Betwee n the Uni ted States of
America and Israel under Title I of t he Agri cultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act. " TIAS No. 3228, April 29,
1955, pp. 813-817.

llu.s. Department of State, Uni ted States Treaties
a nd Other International Agreements, vol. 6, pt. 1. "Supplementary Agreement to Agricultural Commoditie s Agreement
Between the United States of America and I srael under Title I
of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act."
TIAS No. 3261, June 15, 1955, pp. 1173-75.
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in the Bank of Israel. . It was also agreed that the funds
resulting from the transaction would be used as follows:

The

Israal pound equivalent of $5 .8 million was to be employed by
the United States for the development of new rnarkets for
American agricultural comrnodities, for international educational exchange, and for miscellaneous expenditures in
Israel.

The Israel pound equivalent of the remaining

$7.7 million would be used for loans to the goverrunent of
Israel to promote the economic development of the country in
ways that would be decided later by the two governments.

It

was also agreed, in harmony with provisions of Public Law

480, tha:t the government of Israel would take all possible
steps to prevent imported surpluses from being exported to
other countries (unless approved by the United States) and
to assure that they would in nowise "result in increased
availability of these or like commodities to nations unfriendly to the United States."

A further aspect of this

first sales agreement was the understanding that products
supplied to Israel would not displace usual U.S. marketings
of these commodities.

Finally, it was agreed that both gov-

ernments would try to develop and expand the demand for
agricultural products and seek to provide commercial conditions in which private traders could operate effectively.
Although important changes were incorporated, subsequent agreements adhered to the basic pattern established by
the first one.

Beginning with the agreement of September 11,

108

1956, and continuing thereafter, each contract also made
clear that the purchase of surplus commodities for local currency was dependent upon the purchase of specified additional
quantities of the same connnodities for dollars.12

Further-

more, the agreements defined amounts of such com.~odities that
Israel could export and recoillillended types of U.S.-commodityabsorbing enterprises for which the American government would
be most likely to approve local currency loans.

Clearly, the

American government was seeking to salvage more from its
surplus disposal program than it had at first.
Another significant alteration, also beginning with
the sales agreement of September 11, 1956, was the practice
of defining specifically the portion of the local currency
proceeds that the government of Israel must loan to private
business.

This fea~1re was not limited to the agreements

with Israel; as noted earlier, it was a reflection of
Washington policy that began to make itself felt in the second half of 1956 in respect to Title I recipients everywhere.
In the aforesaid agreement, Israel consented to loan private
enterprise the local currency equivalent of $1 . 5 million,
about 19 percent of the $8 million that the Israel government

12u.s. Department of State, United States Treaties
and Other International Agreements, Vol. 7, pt. J. "Agricultural Commodities Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Israel Under
Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act, as Amended. 11 TIAS No. 3635, September 11, 1956, pp.
2469-76.
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was scheduled to receive in U.S. loans from sales proceeds. 1 3
The next major sales contract was signed November 7,

1957, which was only two months after the "Cooley Amendment"
had been passed.

Consistent with the spirit of that legis-

lation, it earmarked about

25 percent of the sales proceeds

for loans to private companies.

These loans were to be ex-

tended by the Export-Import Bank of Washington with the concurrence of the Ministry of Finance.

The following is quoted

from the November agreement:
Such loans will be made to United States business
firms and branches, subsidiaries, or affiliates of such
firms in Israel for business development and trade expansion in Israel and to United States firms, and Israeli
firms , for the establishment of facilities for aiding in
the utilization, distribution or otherwise increasing the
consumptiQp of and markets for United States agricultural
products • .14
A

move of a different sort to promote free enterprise

was agreed upon August 28, 1958.

This sales agreement

amended the contracts of the preceding years to allow the
r elease of unspent funds in the U.S. uses account of each
of them.

The result was that IL 20 million (the equivalent

13customarily, at least two sales agreements were
signed each U.S. fiscal year. In 1957, however, due to the
interruption resulting from the Suez camp aign, sales were
limited to the single agreement of September 11, 1956, in the
amount of $10.7 million, except for a freight adjustment the
following April that permitted Israel to purchase a small
amount of additional wheat.

14u.s. Department of State, United States Treaties
and Other International Agreements, Vol. 8, pt. 2. "Agricultural Commodities Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Goverrunent of Israel Under
Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act. 11 TIAS No. 3945, November 7, 19.57, pp. 2205-12. See
Appendix E.
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of $11,111,111) were earmarked for lending to the government
of Israel "for the specific purchase of an equivalent amount
of preferred non-voting shares of the Israel Industrial
Institution Ltd., 11 later designated the Industrial Development Bank Limited.

T'ne loan agreement per se was signed six

weeks later and was entered into with the understanding that
the government of Israel would relinquish a substantial part
of its interest in the voting stock of the bank.

This step

had been urged upon the government by Americans who regarded
it as a means of giving the bank greater freedom of economic
action and of encouraging participation of private
investors. 1 5
One other noteworthy new element a ppears in the sales
agr eement of January 7, 1960.

For the first time a portion

of local currency sales proceeds was to be set aside for the
use of grants to the government of Israel.

The sum thus

earmarked was the Israel pound equivalent of $4.2 million for
pro j e cts to be agreed upon but ttwith emphasis on non selfliquidating projects particularly in health and education.ttl6
Sales agreements with Israel for the six-year period
l5see "Promo tion of an Industrial Development Bank," in
Chapter VII.
1 6u.s. Department of State, United States Treaties
and Other International Agreements, Vol. 11, p t. 1. "Agricultural Commodities Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Israel Under
Title I of the A~ricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act, as Amended.' TIAS No. L~401, January 7, 1S60 , pp.

8-15.
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totaled $168.5 million.

This figure includes costs of

$16.9 million financed by the Commodity Credit Corporation
for shipment of half the tonnage on U.S. flag vessels. 1 7

The

commodities included in the agreements are listed in Table 12.

TABLE 12
DOLLAR VALUE OF COMMODITIES I NCLUDED IN PUBLIC LAW
TITLE I SALES AGREEMENTS WITH ISRAEL

480

(In Millions of Dollars)
Commodities

Amount

. $ 50.4

Wheat and flour
Feed and grains

54.7

Rice . . . . . .

Cotton • • . .
Tobacco . • .
. ...
Dairy products • . . • •
Fats and oils • . . . . •
Other

.

.

1.3
5.6

1.0

16.2
11.7

. . . . . . . . . .

10.7

Export market value • . .
Ocean transportation.

• • • • $151 . 6

16. 9

. . . . . . . • $168.5

Total
Source:

. . . •

U.S. Congress, House, The Thirteenth Semiannual Re ort on
H. Doc. No .131,
p.

48.

Also during the six-year period the Israel pounds
accruing to the credit of the United State s for U.S. dollar
1 7nue to the differe ntial between the export market
price and the amount paid domestic producers for pricesupported connnodities, the total cost to the United States
government was $233.3 million. U.S. Congress, House, Tne
Thirteenth Semiannual Re ort on Activities Carried on Under
Con ress
Amen
. Doc. o. 1 ,
sess., 1
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financing of the sale and shipment of Title I commodities
were obligated in the agreements according to the uses set
forth in Table 13.

TABLE 13
OBLIGATED USES OF ISRAEL POUNDS ACCRUING TO THE
CREDIT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FROM
PUBLIC LAW 480 TITLE I COMMODITY SALES
(In Millions of Dollars)
Amount

Uses
For loans to private enterprise (Cooley
Amendment) under subsection 104(e) • • •

$ 2.5.8

For grants to the government of Israel
for economic development under
subsection 104(e) • • • . •

4.2

For loans to the government of Israel
under subsection 104(g) • . • • . . . •

111 • .5

For U.S. government uses
Total •
Source:

...

. .

.

27.0

. . . . . . . . . .

$168 • .5

U.S. Congress, House, The Thirteenth
Semiannual Re art on Activities Carried
on Under Public Law
0, 3d Co ress,
as Amended, H. Doc. No. 131, 7th Cong.,
1st sess., 1961, p. 68.

Some Effects of Title I Local Curre ncy
In an effort to determine the impac t of the Title I
program, the United States Department of Agriculture has
sponsored a series of studies.

In most cases the analysis

was undertaken by professional economic research grou, s in
the various recipient countri es.

The first of these con-

tracted studies was one made of the Israel program by
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economists of the Bank of Israel under the l ea dersh ip of Dr.
Fanny Ginor. 18

The ensuing exposition is based on some

effects of the program indicated in the Ba nk of Israel study.
Effect on Investments
By the close of December, 1960, to which point the
Ginor report extends, the $168.5 million in surplus commodity
sales had generated U.S. deposits in the Bank of Israel
amounting to IL 287.3 million.

The United States had•not yet

released to the Israel goverranent the

$4.2 million local cur-

rency grant specified in the January 7, 1960 sales agreement,

but it had released to the Israel government loans aggregating
IL

155

million.

This amount, which included the IL 20 million

from the U.S. uses portion, had been disbursed, in turn, by
the goverranent of Israel in the form of both loans and grants
for projects selected by the Office of Econ omic Assistance in
the Ministry of Finance in collaboration with USOM.

These

funds were channeled through the Development Budget and constit u t ed one of its reported sources of revenue.
The United States govermnent also relea s ed IL

25.2

mil-

lion by way of the Export-Import Bank and its Israel agent,
18Fanny Ginor, Uses of Agricultural Surpluses, Analand Assessment of the Economic Effect of the U.S. Public
Law
O Title I Pro ram in Israel Jerusalem: Bank of
Israel, 19 3. Assisting Dr. Ginor and staff was Dr. Alfred
E. Kahn, Department of Econ omics of Cornell University, who
served in the capac i ty of consultant. The report, comprising
467 pages and 3it8 tables and diagrams, was first published
in Jerusalem in mimeographed form in October, 1961, and in
printed form in 1963.
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the Industrial Development Bank of Israel, for "Cooley Amendment11 loans.

'These loans, which were later incorporated in

the Development Budget, were disbursed to twenty-five private
enterprises comprising eight grain elevators, two construction companies, and fifteen industrial firms, all of which
were expected to help increase the S3le of U.S. agricultural
conunodi ties.
The combined IL 180.2 million invest:>.n ent capi~al,
coming from the aforementioned loans to the governn1ent of
Israel and from "Cooley Amendment" loans to private enterprise, constituted

3.5

percent of the country's total invest-

ments during the years 1955 to 1960.

The capital thus made

available by Title I commodity sales was largely employed in
industry ( IL 99 million) and in agriculture ( IL

54 million) . 1 9

The remainder was distributed in transportation, housing, and
services.
The Ginor study estimates that the investment capital
made possible by Title I funds was responsible for

5

percent

of the additional net domestic product during the six-year
period.
Effect on the Balance of Payments
Because the cornnodities were purchased with local
currency, their import had no unfavorable impact on the
country's balance of payments situation.

On the contrary, a

1 9For an analysis of the use of part of the loan
.funds that went to the industrial sector, see Appendix A.
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slightly favorable effect wa s realized through goods produced
by Title I investments that served both to increase exports
and to replace imports.
The Ginor study assumes that the

5 percent increase

in gross national product attributable to t he Title I Program
may be said to have contributed
exports and

5 percent to t he increase of

5 percent to t h e net replacement of imp orts.

These percentages amount to $10.4 million and $1.5 million,
respectively.

To determine the effect of t hese amounts on

the balance of payments deficit, the import content of exports must first be deducted.

By 1960, the import content of

total exports was 41 percent.

When applied to exports stem-

ming from Title I investments, the $10.4 million credited to
the Title I program shrinks to $6.l million, which is the
estimated domestically produced portion.

And

when the

$1.5 million rep lacement of imp orts--wh ich me ans the elimination, in turn, of $1.5 million of f oreign currency·
requirements--is ad ded to the $6.1 million, the net resul t
is $7.6 million.

This figure re presents t he estimated

amount of forei gn currency earnings t h at t he product of
Title I investments wa s either bri ngi n g or sav ing t he economy
each year by the end of the period.

In oth er words, it was

the annual permanent contri bu ti on made by t he Title I program
to the improvement of Israel's balance of payme nts posi tion
by 1960.
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' Effect on Employment
Title I investments created temporary employment
directly in the construction or expansion of industrial
plants, irrigation projects, and power facilities, and in
other enterprises supplying goods and services to the new
:facilities.

They also provided permanent employment directly

in the new plants and factories after they got into operation
and in certain enterprises, such as farm and irrigat~on projects, that were able to expand on the basis of the additional
products made available.
As we continue to use the Bank of Israel study as our
guide, we note that the IL 180 million investment created
temporary employment for an average annual

4,454 additional

wage and salary earners and 743 additional self-employed, a
total of 5,197 a year.

Moreover, the net product made pos-

sible by the capital invested provided permanent employment
for 1,802 additional wage and salary earners and for 818
additional self-employed, and created 2,620 permanent new
jobs.

The grand total of temporarily and permanently em-

ployed persons averaged 7,817 annually during the six-year
period.
force.

This number constituted about 2 percent of the labor
Also, the average daily number of registered unem-

ployed wa~ reduced by percentages ranging from 19 percent in
1955 to an impressive
the Title I program.

53 percent in 1960--all the result of
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Utilization of Title I Commodities
Most of the Title I commodities were imported by the
government of Israel through the Food Import Division of the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry and sold to wh olesalers for
resale through customary marketing proce'd ures throughout the
country.

However, certain commodities, such as feed grains,

cotton, and tobacco, were shipped from the United States
directly to commercial firms.

In terms of monetary value,

about 60 percent of all commodities was used directl~ for
human consumption.

A second group intended for agricultural

development and thus indirectly for human consumption, consisted of feed grains for livestock and poultry and formed

36 percent of the wh ole.

Less than

5 percent was employed in

industrial production.
During the 1955-1960 period Israel's population
showed conspicuous increases in food consumption.

Although

most of the increases were due to the general growth of the
economy, it is significant that per capita food consumption
rose only slightly in years when the share of Title I imports
in food consumption was small and rose very rapidly when the
share was large.

In 1957, for example, when repercussions of

the Sinai campaign brought a reduction of United States shipments of agricultural surpluses, Title I imports provided
only 3.3 percent of the country's food requirements, and per
capita food consumption declined by 0.9 percent.

In 1958,

though, when Title I imports accounted for a record share of
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7.1 percent in food consumption, food consumption showed an
increase of

7.8 percent over the previous year.

This in-

crease came about mainly through accelerated agricultural
production made possible by Title I feed grain imports.

By

thus aiding domestic production, the Title I Program influenced the level of food consumption beyond its direct contribution to the nation's food supply.
The effect of the Title I Program on the quantitative
production and consumption of meat products (including milk)
and eggs was considerable.

To a lesser extent it led to

increased oil and fat consumption.

It also had an impact on

the qualitative improvement of the daily diet of the population because the connnodities imported were, for the most part,
inexpensive and nutritious staple items.

Title I commodities,

furthermore, made possible somewhat higher levels of industrial production and consumption.

In addition, they contrib-

uted significantly to the maintenance of adequate stockpiles
of essential foodstuffs and, in some measure, to the government's decision to eliminate rationing.
The Program in Retrospect
The problem of agricultural surplus es in America in
the early 1950 1 s brought into being an important legislative
adjunct to the Mutual Security Program in the form of Public
Law 480 Title I.

This late arrival in the family of U.S.

foreign aid programs gradually absorbed Mutua l Security
commodity aid and accounted for 40 percent of total U.S.
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economic assistance to Israel during tho years 1955 to 1960.
Title I sales agreements underwent modification and became
progressively more stringent during this period, but the
basic pattern of agricultural surpluses being sold for local
currency and the local currency then being directed to
Israel's economic development remained unchanged.
The Title I program was an anti-inflationary means of
increasing supplies of basic foods and fibers in Israel and
markedly improving the protein deficient diet of the population.

At the same time, it enabled the government to con-

serve foreign exchange for its other import needs.

Pounds

accruing from commodity sales raised the level of investment
and employment, improved the balance of payments, and in
various other ways assisted the economy.
Dr. Alfred E. Kahn, consultant to Dr. Ginor in the
Bank of Israel assessment of the program, states:
The Title I program is obviously far from the ideal
agricultural or comraercial policy for the United States.
But from the standpoint of Israel, the aid it provides
has been almost as good as free dollars. And the preponderantly important effect has been a significant contribution to the stabilization, g~3wth and ultimate
viability of the Israeli economy.
Not only did the program benefit Israel, but it also
served some useful purposes for the United States.

Although

based on a debatable domestic price support program, it
20Alfred E. Kahn, "Agricultural Aid and Economic
Development: the Case of Israel," The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, LXXVI (Nov. 1962), 591.
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helped decrease mounting U.S. surplus stocks.

And it did so

in a politically more acceptable manner than Mutual Security
Program dollar grants were able to do.

Moreover, because it

stiDIUlated habits of increased consumption of imported
American agricultural products and led to increased investment in enterprises conducive to furth er imports, it laid
the groundwork for a broadened Israe l market for United
States products.

It also opened the doorway to increasing

participation of private American capital in Israel's
economic growth, an eff ect which foreshadowed eventual reduction of the level of U.S. aid.

Through these s e veral

products and bi-products of the program, the United States
stood to gain at least a fractional return on its Title I
investment.

•

CHAPTER VI
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
Introduction and Background
Almost 98 percent of the $741.6 million in United
States government aid extended to Israel in the decade of the
fifties was provided in the form of grants, loans, agricultural surpluses, and a small currency conversion program that
facilitated the purchase of American publications. 1

Dollar-

wise the remaining 2 percent, which financed the Technical
Assistance/Technical Cooperation/Point Four Program, appears
of little consequence.

Nevertheless, it enabled 198 American

experts and technicians to be sent to Israel to assist various
enterprises with their "know-how" and enabled
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Israelis to

go to the United States to engage in studies related to
Israel's economic development.

This 2 percent also supplied

pilot plants in Israel with demonstration equi pment.

The sum

of $15.3 million that this 2 percent represents was obligated
in support of 173 projects, 152 of whic h we r e completed by
the close of fiscal year 1960, 2 while 21 were still active.
1 see Table 10, p. 94.
2 specifically, 100 were "completed," 2 were "completed by discontinuation," and 50 were "completed by consolidation. 11
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In practice technical assistance was closely coordinated with the rest of America's foreign aid program.

In

many instances experts were provided to assist undertakings
already being bolstered by large grants or loans, either in
the form of dollars or U.S. owned or controlled Israel currency.

A

former official of the United States Operations

Mission in Israel, which supervised both technical assistance
and economic aid, writes of the integrated aid package as
follows:
Thus the program might include as one unit the import
of steel for irrigation pipes, a release of counterpart
funds to lay the pipes and finance expansion of crops on
newly irrigated land, and the technical assistance to u~e
the lands for crops important to Israel's self support.
Technical assistance had its genesis in President
Truman's inaugural address of January 20, 1949.

In reference

to foreign policy, the third point that he made in his speech
was that the United States must enter military alliances,
both in the North Atlantic area and in the Western Hemisphere.

His fourth point was that America "must embark on a

bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific
advances and industrial progress available f or the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. n

Truman declared

his conviction that "we should make available to peaceloving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a
3Roswell H. Whitman, "Main Principle s of American
Economic Assistance to Israel," Israel Economic Forum, VII
(Nov. 1955), 15.

1 2.3

better life. 11 4

Military alliances were intended to discour-

age the forceful spread of communism, and technical assistance
was intended to maKe communism less attractive.
The Point Four Pr0gram was authorized by the Act for
International Development June

5, 1950~

This authority per-

mitted the President to enter into bilateral programs of
technical assistance with underdeveloped countries requesting
such assistance and als o t o participate in multilateral
arrangements through international bodies.
The agency formed to execute the program, the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), was organized in
October 1950 under jurisdiction of the State Department.
Technical assistance was later administered by the Mutual
Security Administration (:MSA), then the Foreign Operations
Administration (FOA), and after that by the International
Cooperation Administration (ICA).

In 1961 it came under the

auspices of the Agency for International Development (AID) .
. Israel became eligible to receive technical assistance from the Uni ted t:·' · t es in the wake of a general agreement entered into between the two countries February 26,

1951.5

On the strength of this agreement, an American

4u.s. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States ( Was h ing t on , D.C.: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archive s a nd Records Service), Harry S.
Truman, 1949, p. 114.
5u.s. Department of State, United States Treaties
and Other International Agreements, Vol. 3, pt. 1. "Point
Four General Agreement for Techn1.cal Cooperation Between the
United States of America a nd Israel." TIAS 2401, Feb. 26,
1951, pp. 379-3 82.
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technical mission arrived in Israel in December, 1951, and
began preparations for implementing the program.

Du.ring the

ensuing decade this United States Operations Mission (USOM)
was headed in turn by Bruce McDaniel, Lincoln B. Hale, John
J. Haggerty, C. Reed Liggitt, and Henry Chalfant.
Within the broad framework provided by the original
agreement another agreement, signed May 9, 1952, outlined the
program more specifically.

This document set forth the fol-

lowing three objectives of technical assistance:
1. To promote and strengthen understanding and goodwill between the peoples of the United States of America
and Israel, and to further the secure growth of democratic ways of life;
2. To facilitate the economic development of Israel
through technical cooperation between the two governments; and
J. To stimulate and increase the interchange between
the two countries of knowledge, sk~lls and techniques in
the field of economic development.
The last named objective implied American expectations of technical benefits to the United States emerging
from the Technical Cooperation Program.

But t h e prospect of

America's ever getting very much back froP1 little Israel
appeared remote.

Awareness of the one-sided nature of Tech-

nical Cooperation prompted Foreign Minister 'Abba Eban in

1962 to write as follows of his early c onversations with
Secretary Dulles:

•

6u.s. Department of State, United States Treaties
and Other International Agreements, Vol. 3, pt. J. "Agreement for a Technical Cooperation Program Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Israel." TIAS No. 2570, Hay 9, 195 2, pp. 4258-6,5. See
Appendix F herein .
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The Secretary of State even had a way of talking
without irony about 11 American-Israel" cooperation. Since
the cooperation consisted of the United States giving and
of Israel receiving, this seemed to me an imaginative use
of the English language.7
The 1952 agreement with Israel envisioned studies and
surveys that American experts would conduct in agriculture,
public health and sanitation, elementary and vocational education, transportation, and in other areas.

U.S. teams would

help carry out mutually agreed upon projects in these several
fields and assist with the training of local personnel.
Israelis are said to have regarded this matter of A,..mericans
training their people to carry on the work independent of
foreign advisors to be the most important aspect of the
whole program. 8
Under terms of the agreement an nrsrael Representative" and a "United States Representative 11 were to participate in all phases of the program in behalf of their respective governments.
In order to work harmoniously with the American aid
mission, the govern~ent of Israel set up the Technical
Assistance Liaison Office attached to the Prime Minister's
Of'fice.

Requests from departments of the g overnment or from

Israeli private institutions were submitted to this agency.
7Abba Eban, 11 How It Began, 11 Jerusale:!n Post, S~ecial
~:0~Jement Marking the Conclusion of the Work of theni ted
States Operations Mission in Israel, July 4, 1962, p. vii.
8Ralph Goldman, "Technical Assistance,
Economic Forum, VII (Nov. 1955), 2J.

11

Israel
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It considered the necessity of bringing in outside technicians and the expense of the undertaking proposed.

If it

agreed that foreign help was needed, the liaison office then
-

determined whether to seek assistance from the United States

or f'rom the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical
Assistance.

If it were decided that American help should be

sought, the plans were submitted to USON for approval.

The

proposed project agreement indicated anticipated salaries,
cost of contract services, cost of demonstration equipment
and supplies, cost of local and overseas transportation, and
also the number of American technicians required and the
number of Israelis who would study abroad.

In practice, each

American technician worked alongside an Israeli colleague or
"counterpart" who., it was hoped, would be able to carry on
the task without further assistance when the A.~erican 1 s tour
of duty came to an end.

In many instances, after the Ameri-

can's assignment in Israel was completed, correspondence from
his former colleague served to keep him apprised of later
developments.9
The immediate vehicle for financing Technical
Cooperation projects was the "Israel-American Joint Fund,

11

and projects were customarily referred to as "Joint Fund"
projects.

Co-directors of the fund were the Israel

9Israel, "The Technical Assis tance Liaison Office., 11
State of Israel Government Yearbook 577 (1956) (Jerusalem:
The Government Printer, 1957), p. 61.
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representative, who headed the Technical Assistance Liaison
Office, and the United States representative, who headed
USOM.

Dollar costs of demonstration equi pment purchased out-

side Israel as ~ell as the cost of training Israelis abroad
under the program were counted as U.S. contributions to the
Joint Fund without being actually depo~itea.

For its part,

the government of Israel deposited to the fund the local currency cost of each project.

Such currency contributions were

independent of counterpart funds.
In addition to the agreed upon contributions, both
governments gave additional money to project costs.

Salaries

of the United States technicians, although estimated in the
project agreement, were not counted as contributions to the
Joint Fund.

Neither were salaries of their Israeli counter-

parts, nor the value of office space that most of the Americans were provided by the Israel government.
An important facet of the Technical Cooperation r~ogram in Israel and one which accounted for about 10 percent
of its budget was Participant Training .

Through this study-

abroad-educational-scheme selected individuals were given
several months training in the Un ited States or , occasionally,
in other countries.

Personnel chosen were usually employed

on projects to which they were committed to return after
completion of their tour.

The aim of this subprogram of the

technical assistance scheme was to improve the skills of
managers, technicians, and pro f ess i onal people in the hope
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that they would impart what they hB.d learned to others and
thus multiply the effects of technical assistance. 10
Candidates for foreign study were selected on the
basis of their education, technical background, career poten-

tial, and knowledge of the language spoken in the country to
which they were sent.

However, short-term observation teams

of pa~ticipants in the United States who lacked knowledge of
.
.
.
t ~~- 11
the English language were provided
with
an interpre
Ninety-eight percent of the participants from Israel lmew
English, although some of them afterwards admitted having
had some language difficulties.

A participant was allowed

to take his spouse with him at his own expense if he was
reasonably certain that doing so would not interfere with
his training.
Each participant's progra~

was

superv i sed by a pro-

gram manager, usually a s taff member o f the International
Cooperation Admin istration or of some other goverrunent
agency.

This manager arranged the participant's schedule to

fit his individual needs, frequentl y in consulta ti on wi th the
participant.

The actual training, though, was carried out

under the tutelage of American busine ss firms , farm groups,

1 0u.s. Department of State, Agency for International
Development, Training for Development: AID Participant
Trainin for Social and Economic Develo ment of Coo erati
Countries 2nd ed., 19 2, pp. 1, 9.
llu.s. Department of St ate , Agency for International
Development, The A.I.D. Participa nt Tra i ning Program--How It
Works (1962}, p. 4.
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labor orga-nizations, government departments and agencies,
and by colleges and universities.
Participant teams frequently visited a number of
industrial or agricultural installations for observation.
Their stay at each facility varied from a few hours to a day
or more.

In eome instances a single participant was assigned

to a factory or business to learn procedures that would help
him improve corresponding functions at home.

Such partici-

pant might spend a few weeks to a year in either one plant
or a number of different plants.

Some participants spent

their entire tour at an American university taking courses
related to their special field.

Others took courses for a

semester and then shifted to observation or in-service
training. 12
Illustrative Technical Assistance Projects
An analysis of the Technical Cooperation Program in
Israel is complicated by the fact that it can hardly be isolated from the total American aid effort.

Certain aspects

of its operations become understandable, however, through an
examination of representative projects.
Agricultural Research , Extension,
and Education
Agricultural research in Israel had its origin before
the establishment of the state.

In 1921 the Zionist

12rr.s. Department of State, Agency for International
Development, A Task to Share: A.I.D. Participant Trainin
Program for Foreign Nationals n.d. , p. 7.
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Organization sponsored the formation of an Agricultural
Research Station in Tel Aviv, the res p ons i bility for which
afterwards passed to the Jewish Agency.

Eleven years later

the station moved to Rehovot , where in 1940 the Hebrew University and the Jewish Agency set up a School of Agriculture.
In 1951 the Research Station was taken over by the Ministry
of Agriculture, and in 1952 the School of Agriculture was
given college status by the Hebrew University and became the
Fa·c ulty of Agricu lture .
As

It had si.x departments. 1 3

early as March , 1953, Dr. Samuel Lepkovsky, a

United Nations agricultural expert , pointed out the pressing
need for coordinating t h e c ountry's a gr icultural research.
Two USOM technicians, Ralph Besse an d For d Milam, studied the
problem in detail and published t heir appra i sal in February
of the followi ng year.

The i r repor t, entitled "Coordinating

and Developing Israel's Agricultural Research Program,"
called attent ion to the wasteful overlapping research work
being carried on by the Faculty of Agriculture, the various
departments of the Ministry of Agriculture ., and the Agriculture Research Sta tion.

Among their several r ecommendations

wa.s the suggestion that the Research Station be made a major
department of the Ministry of Agriculture and that all
1 3r. B. Johnson, Proposals and Recommendations for
the Coordina t i on of Agricultural Research and for an Organization Embracin A ricultural Research Education and Extension in srae I Report to ·t e Government of Israe
Tel ~v v:
The United States of America Opera~ions Mission to Israel,

1958), p. 1.

.
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research be done under its supervision and that research at
the Mikve Israel school, the Hebrew University, and the
Weizman Institute be coordinated with it.

They also proposed

that the Research Station be moved f rom Rehovot to Beit Dagon
and that a capable director be appointed.

And, with an eye

toward integration of still other programs, they counseled
that the Research Station should be the headquarters of the
Extension Service of the Ministry of Agriculture.14
The recommendations of Besse and Milam, coming in the
wake of Dr. Lepkovsky 1 s preliminary report on the need for a
coordinated research program, received favorable cons ideration.

Some of them were adopted during the next few n1onths.

A capable executive and scientist was appointed as director
of the Research Station, and a beginning was made toward its
removal to Beit Dagon.

Two branch experiment stations were

partly furnished with farm machinery, and irrigation works
were constructed.

Most importantly, although it is not

clear that this was the re sult of the suggestions of foreign
advisors, the government increased its budget for agricultural research fr om IL 450, 000 to IL 800 , 000 annually. 1 5
Soon after publication of the report by Besse and
Milam in June,

1954,

the International Cooperation Adminis -

tration contracted with the Research Founda.tion of the State
University of New York (SUNY) for technical assistance in
industry, public health, education, and agriculture, with
l4rbi"d., pp. 2 - 3 •

15Ibid.,

p •5
•
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particular emphasis on the promotion of a land grant college
scheme.

The agricultural project bore the title, "Agricul-

tural Research, Extension and Education."
The .American land grant college, which formed the
model for the United States' experts, was launched in America
under authority of the Morrill Act of 1862 and ca..~e to include
not only on-campus instruction but also experimental farms
and extension programs.

Through traveling specialist$, county

agents, and correspondence courses it aggressively carried
into communities everywhere agricultural, vocational, and
home-making education.
As visualized by ICA, such an integrated agricultural
college complex in Israel would perform a number of important
functions.

It would (1) have charge of research .!'unctions

of the several branches of the Ministry of Agriculture, (2)
coordinate these research activities with the work of.' the
Faculty of Agriculture of the Hebrew University, (3) develop
a home economics department of the Faculty of Agriculture,

(4) assist the government of Israel in the development and
administration of agricultural extension and home economics
in rural areas, ( 5) a·s sis t the government of Israel in
improving the quality of teaching agricultural subjects in
secondary, regional, and farm village schools, and (6) develop
adequate training programs for teachers and workers in extension and agricultural education and home economics. 16
1958.

16Project 271-11-159 ICA E-1 Form, prepared July 28,
AID file data.
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The arrangement made with the State University of New
York was one of more than sixty contracts that by 1956 the
International Cooperation Administration had made with various
American institutions of higher learning to supply qualified
people to United States Operations Missions abroad.

It was

hoped that, through the contract with SUNY, a bond would be
formed between it and the proposed Agricultural College--a
bond that would be the means of continuing technical assistance on an institution-to-institution basis after the assistance of the United States government had come to an end.
The first Chief of the SUl-.TY staff in Israe 1 was
Dean Paul B. Orvis, whose time and efforts spent advocating
the land grant college contributed much to the agricultural
institution that eventually took shape.

His proposal, how-

ever, for a state university, independent of the Hebrew
University, did not prove acceptable to the Israelis. 18
Orvis' successor as Chief of the SUNY/Israel Project
wa.s Dr. I. B. Johnson, who had had long experience as director of an Agriculture Experiment Station.

Johnson had first

gone to Israel as a research coordinator in the summer of

1956 but had been evacuated, with other USOM personnel, at

an

1 7rnternational Cooperat i on Administration, Five
of Mutual Endeavor USOM Israel (Tel Aviv: USOM7'!srael
e Israel overnment, 19
, p. 36.

18w. R. Kunsela, Development of the National and
University Institute of Agriculture 1 Report to the Government
of Israel (Tel Aviv: U.S. AID Mission to Israel, 1962),
p. 3.
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the end of October as a result of the Sina i campaign .

Some

of the technicians returned to the United St a tes at t h e t ime,
while others were given scattered assignments to o ther countries.19
Before resumption of USOM 1 s activit ies May

5,

1957,

the future of the Technical Cooperation Program was reviewed
in Washington.

It was decided that the publ i c health divi-

sion, mass communications division, and educ a ti on divis i on
should be discontinued.

It was also decided t ha t I srael wa s

making commendable progress in agricul t ur e and t ha t techni cal
assistance activities in support of agr i cultur e shoul d be re duced and greater emphasis be placed on industry.

During

this interim period SUNY 1 s role was also re def ine d and limited strictly to "the building up or strengtheni ng of the
institutions that are needed to serve a modern progr essive
agriculture, namely r esearch, extension and educa tion . "

Thus

19Evidently, during t he abs ence of the American
advisors, developments a t t he Researc h St ation di d not proceed exactly as the advisor s had pl anned . This is intima te d
by the following statement by Johnson , who, a few months
after his return to Israel, wa s appo i nted Chief of the SU:NY
program:
Prior to November, 1956, t he Plant Protection Division expressed a desire t o t ransfer i t s r e search and
extension activit ies to the Stat i on and to the Joint
Extension Service. Dur ing t he per i od of USON ' s evacuation • • • this propos al was withdrawn, it is understood,
because of pressure fr om other Departments in the
Ministry of Agriculture and be cause of certain personalities involved. Earl y in 1957, _the . Li ve s t ock Department
proposed to trans f er t heir beef cattle breedtng project
to the Station, but this pr op os al wa~ -l~ter cancelled.
[Johnson, Propo s al s and Recommendations , p. 28.]
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after the renewal of technical assistance in 1957, the
Mission's agricultural efforts, although reduced, were more
than ever focused on promoting the land grant college idea. 20
In 1957 a plan was proposed to the government of
Israel for unifying the Research Sta ti on, the Faculty of
Agriculture of the Hebrew University, and the Ex t ensi on Service.

The idea envisioned a Board of Trustees composed of

representatives of the Hebrew University, the Mi nistry of
Agriculture, and the Jewish Agenc y .

This HU-MA-JA plan, as

it was called, was approved in principl e in November at a
meeting in Jerusalem attended by representatives of the Prime
Minister's Office, the Ministry of Agriculture, the United
States Operations Mission, and State University of New York.
The proposal was then turned over to the Organization
Committee. 21

Nearly three years were to pass, though, before

formal government approval of the merger was forthcoming .
Success, in a measure, crowned the joint IsraelAmerican project in January of 1960 wh en the Minister of
Agriculture and the President of the He brew University signed
an agreement whereby the Agricultural Research Station at
20George L. Peterson, Act 1.v i ties of t he Agricu lture
Division 1952-1962 (Tel Aviv: U. S. ~I D Mi ssi on to I sra el,
1962), pp. 2, 6.
21The Organization Committee afterwar ds agreed that
a union of the Research Station and t he Fa cu lty of Agr i culture should be attained before including the Extensi on Service but that both the Extension Servic e and Home Ec onomics
Department should be incorporated as ~oon as the fir s t
merger demonstrated its practicability.
Pet e~son, Act i vities of the Agriculture Division, pp. 18-19 .
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Beit Dagon and the Faculty of Agriculture at Rehovot became
"The National and University Institute of Agriculture."
move was afterwards ratified by t he Knesset.

The

About the same

time the Hinistry of Agriculture and the Jewish Agency took
steps to form the Unified Extension System as a separate
entity.
USOM reported to Washington that the amalgamation of
the Research Station and the Faculty of Agriculture was the
achievement of the framework of its organizational scheme
for assisting Israel's agriculture . 22

It also claimed that

the creation of the Unified Extension Service was the achieve ment of one of its aspirations.

From a start of one extension

district in 1958, the state was now divided into thirteen
extension districts, ten of which by 1960 were organized and
partly staffed.

These districts and their district agricul-

tural agents were akin to counties and county a gents in the
United States.

American techi.i icians also provided training

in both agriculture and home economics to personnel of the
22According to the report of USOM:
This action brought to fruition one of USOM 1 s main
objectives in its assistance to Israel's agriculture,
namely, better organization of the resources, both human
and material, for serving the needs of the State's agriculture. As a result of this organization, duplication
of efforts by different agencies will be minimized. All
research work will be under the supervision of the director of the Research Station, all teaching will be under
the Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture, all extension
work will (ultimately) be under the director of the
Extension Services. All will be under the administrative
roof of NUIA. CProject 271-11-159 ICA E-1 Form, prepared
August 19, 1960. AID file data.J ·
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Jewish Agenc y who were serving as village instruct ors. 23
In terms of personnel and money expended on the
11

Agricultural Research, Extension and Education" endeavor,
..

by the close of fiscal year 1960 the United States had sent
to Israel twenty experts, fifteen being SUNY contract personnel, and financed the training of sixty-eight Israeli
participants abroad.
lion, over

25

American cos ts amounted to $1.S mil-

percent of which went to the purchase of

supplies and equipment.

The government of Israel, on the

other hand, had met the local currency needs of the project
through contributions of $1.7 million to the Joint Fund. 24
When the Technical Cooperation Program came to an
end in 1962, the Chief of the Agriculture Division repor t ed
that the National and University Institute of Agr iculture
was still having difficulties.

He noted that there had been

factions both in the Research Station and in the Faculty of
Agriculture of the Hebrew University, but mainly in the
latter, facti ons which in his judgment were hindering the
union.

He also pointed out that the Unified Extension Serv-

ice had made great advances throughout the country along the
lines proposed by the American advi sor s but that it had not
yet been made part of the Institute of Agriculture.

He

concluded, though, that the fact that NUIA had n~t yet

23 Ibid.
2 4Ibid.
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achieved perfection, in no way implied that American efforts
had been in vain.

His concern was that Israeli personnel

were not yet working together as a completely harmonious
team. 2 5
Transportation Development
Highways and railroads, like harbors, bridges, electrical power plants, and communications .facilities, are part
of the economic overhearl essential to the growth o.f agriculture., trade., and industry.

And when, a s in Israel's case, a

nation is .faced with rapid population growth., mus h rooming
settlements, and an unresolved war, a network of roads and
railways may be not only necessary for growth but also for
survival.

Israel's need for mobility accounted for the fact

that throughout almost the entire period under review the
United States provided technical advisors a nd e conomic aid
grants and loans to the transportat i on s e c tor.

~n fiscal

years 1952 and 1953 three separate, though related ., ta chnical
assistance projects were undertaken.

The s e were Road Con-

struction, Transporta tion Planning , and Operation and Maintenance of Israel Railroads.

In 1958 t hese were combined

under Transportation Development.
Accord i ng to one Amer ican technici an , a major problem facing road builders i n I srael was t hat , pri or to 1955,
the Public Works Department d i d not actua lly desi gn roads.
2 .5Peterson, Activities of t he Agricul ture Division,

pp. 27, 30-31.
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Roads were constructed according to traditional standards
without consideration for the bearing power of the soil,
traffic density, or maximum loads.

Neither was sufficient

attention given to the needs for adequate drainage and dense
surface mixtures.

For such reasons as these, it was very

common for roadbeds to settle soon after construction, which
necessitated disproportionately large expenditures of funds
. t enance an d repairs.
.
26
f or main
The joint Israel-American effort was instrumental in
bringing about what a USOM report calls

11

a radical revision

in methods and practices" of road building.

United States

advisors taught Israelis how to ascertain the traffic load
that different soils would sustain and were able to supply
them with the laboratory facilities (for the purchase of
which the government of Israel also contributed) that made it
possible for them to conduct such tests.

They instructed them

in the preparation of better and more economical mixes and
in more efficient construction and maintenance methods generally.

In the eyes of the American advisors these efforts

were successful, but they would have been even more success-

ful except for certa in obstacles.

One of these obst a cl es

was the fact that the Public Works Departme n t was divided
into several almost independent districts so that
26Harold Monson, Training of Israel . Highway Personnel
in Modern Road Construction Methods and Procedures, Report to
the Government of Israel (Tel Aviv: . The United States Operations Mission to Israel, 1957), p; 9.

improvements in one district were not necessarily adopted in
the others.

A further impediment to progress was the tend-

e ncy of the Israelis to invest in new or expanded roads in
preference to ma1ntaining old ones in good condition.

De-

spite these and other problems, the joint effort led to the
building of more useful roads and an estimated 30 percent
reduction in construction costs. 27
In behalf of railroading, USOM experts trained
Israelis in the installation and maintenance or air brake
equipment to replace worn-out vacuum brakes, instructed them
in the maintenance of Diesel locomotives in conne ction with
a changeover from steam engines, helped them institute an

efficient parts requisitioning system in place of previous
highly inefficient practices, and aided them in the setting
up of stock records and control procedures.

Partly as a

result of American advice, freight and passenger traffic was
able to increase its speed from 60 to 100 kilometers an hour
and to carry more freight and more passengers.
USOM reported a

34

By

1958,

percent increase in freight tonnage, a

100 percent increase in passenger traffic, and 'a

64

percent

reduction in the operating deficit. 28
Automotive maintenance was another aspect of transportation that claimed the attention of American advisors.

1958.

27 Project 271-39-243 IC.A E-1 Form, prepared July 28,

AID file data.
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Not only was vehicle transportation vital to all branches of
the economy, but the operation and repair of vehicles was an
important source of employment.

The main problem was that

the number of trucks, buses, motorcycles, taxicabs , and
passenger cars, which from 1953 to 1957 alone i nc r e as ed from
about 40,000 to 60,000 , was not matched by a corresp ond i ng
increase in the number of gara g es, tools, s pare parts, and
mechanics.

A complic a ting problem was the large number of

different makes and antiquated models in use on the highways,
many of them ten to twenty years ola. 29
Technical assistance had an impact on the efficiency
and cost of automotive maintenance.

50

Despite t h e a fore mentioned

percent increase in the number of veh icles, the import of

spare parts decreas e d.

This decrease was the result of better

spare parts forecasting , better repair work, and the production of many parts locally.

During the same period , the

introduction of preventative mainte nance , better shop organization, and improved procedures in the stoc king and requisitioning of spare parts brought about a decline from 30 percent
to 18 percent in the number of vehic le s tha t were daily in
need of repairs among the country's maj or veh i cle users.
USOM reported that fleet operations, e s pec ially bus cooperatives, had responded well t o counsel on the installation of
2 9s anru.el Barrash, Aut omot i v e Maintenance in Israe l ,
Report to the Government of Isra el (Tel Aviv : The United
States of Amer i ca Operationf! Mission to Israel, 195'7), pp.

3-4,

proper maintenance facilities and schedules.

Also American

advice had been solicited and adopted in the construction of
the "Sabra," a low cost car built mainly for export. 30
_,

By the close of fiscal year 1960, the United States
had contributed $257,000 to the joint Transportation Development project.

This sura paid .f or the service s of technical

advisors, the dollar costs of a small quantity of demonstration equipment, and the expenses of several participants
abroad.

The government of Israel met the project's local

currency costs, which formed the equivalent of

$65,ooo. 31

In addition, entirely apa rt from the Technical Assistance
Program, Special Assistance dollar gr an ts in excess of

$5 million were ma de by the United Sta tes to finance the
purchase of seven Diesel locomotives, 311 truc k s, and an
unspecified quantity of vehi cle spa re parts.3 2
As the Technical Cooperation Program drew to a close
in 1962 , a General Transportation Advisor from America was
assisting the government in the formul ation of an overall
transportation design.

1958.

USON Industry Officer, Carl R.

30Project 271-39-243 ICA E-1 Form, prepared July 28,
AID file data.

31 Total Development Budget expenditures for the improvement of transportation facilities throughout the country
from 1952 to 1960 amounted to IL 235 million. (See Table 11,
p. 98.) Of this sum, over IL 52 million were derived from
U.S. owned or controlled local currency. Project 271-39-243
ICA E-1 Form, prepared August 19, 1960. AID file data.

3 2 ±bid.
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Ferderer, indicate s, however, t h at no firm master plan had .
yet been devised b y t ha t date.

In his c oncluding report he

noted that, considering the countr y ' s rela tively small size
and population, ·the I srael gove r nment was still faced with a
large number of problems i n the field of transportation.

As

he viewed the situa tion, t he main source of difficulty lay
in "the divided responsib i l ities and authorities which exist
in this a:rea among t he vari ous Government Ministries and
political party portfolios, and due partially to lack of experienced personnel in thi s ar ea. 11 33
Besides the Genera l Tr ans p ortation Advisor, a team
of two men from the Federal Avia tion Agenc y was in Isra e l in
1962.

Their assignment was to h e l p devi se a master air

navigation p l an and a ss ist with the ins t allation of modern
equipment at the Lod airport with loan s f r om both t he Devel opment Loan Fund and the Export-Import Bank of Washington.34
Indus tr i a l Design
In order to improve the design of products made in
Isra,e l so as to ma ke them more appealing on the export market
and hence i ncreas e t he i nflow of foreign exchange, an
"Industrial Design" project was undertaken in 19.55.

Under

this project the United S tat es Operations Mission, with the
concurrence of t he government of Israel, entered into three33carl R. Ferderer, Completion of Tour ReTort 19.58(Tel Aviv: U.S . AID Mission to Israel, 1962 , p. 36.
34rbid .
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year contracts with the Boston Institute of Contemporary
Arts and with the Peter Muller-Munk Associates of Pittsburg,
Ohio.

The Boston firm was invited to set up a design insti-

tute at the Israel Institute of Technology, while the
Pittsburg firm was employed to introduce practical industrial
design to the business and industrial comnru.nity.35
As a result of the work of the Boston company, the
Israel Institute of Industrial Design was formed at the
Technion in Haifa in 1956 and soon had a library of 5,000
periodicals and books pertaining to industrial design.

The

institute's purpose was to develop a progran1 of public
information, professional stimulation, and general design
improvement.

Closely allied with this was a program of re-

quired academic course work inaugurated for architectural
students.

A Nati onal Design Council was also formed as an

advisory body both to the institute and to the government. 36
Efforts of the Pittsburg company brought about the
formation of the Israel Product Design Office.

This enter-

prise was intended as a demonstration unit to show how a
commercial venture in industrial desip;n could be launched.
The intention was that it would become self-supporting by
means of fees charged for its services to industry and soon
be turned into a normal commercial venture.
35rbid., p.

It would also

42.

36rroject 271-26-119 ICA E-1 Form, prepared
November 18., 1959. AID file data·.
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provide practical training for artists who were desirous of
becoming industrial designers.

Subsequently it would provide

employment for graduates of the Israel Inst i tute of Industrial Design. 37
The Israel Product De s ign Offic e off ered industrial
design services for more than a hundred d iffer ent it ems.
Among the achievements of its staff of s even Isra e li designers
and two American adv i sors wer e the des ign of an es pre s so coffee machine, a high fi delity speake r system, an Israeli
tractor, and Israel's f i rst super market.
about

50

By 1959 it was only

percent self-susta i ning; and after the departure of

the Muller-Munk personnel, t he organization was taken over
by a prominent Isra el connnercial art i st, Naum Maron , wh o had
studied industrial desi gn i n England a nd was pr acticing it
in Jerusalem . 3 8
Besides helping establish the Israel Institute of
Industri al De sign, the National Design Council, and the I s rae l
Product De s i gn Office, the project also sponsored produ ct
evaluation s tudies in the United States in respect to packaging , meta l gif tware, ceramics, woven and knitted textiles .
These stu di e s led to a number of changes that were intended
to increase the sales potential of I s raeli products in the
American ma r ket.

By the close of the pr oject in 1959 ,

37Ibid .
38Philip Gillon, 11:Mission Accomplished" (unpaged
manuscrip t, 1962). AID file data.
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American support had amounted to approximate ly $332,000.
Almost all of this sum was obligated for contract services.
Support from the government of Israel amounted to the local
currency equivalent of $ 212,000. 39
Tourism
From t h e start, t h e government of I s rael rec ognized
the importance of t he tou r i st industr y a s a means of i ncreasing foreign exchange earnings and so s ought to encourage
visits of travelers from abroad .

During 1949, the first year

after independence, 22,000 t ourists we n t t o the new s t ate.
By 1955, when the Government Tourist Corpora t i on wa s established, the annu al number of visitors ha d risen to 48 ,000.
Foreign exchange be nefits to t he country t h at year amounted
to $6,000,000 .

Of t his figure, 80 percent r epresented net

foreign currency income.
To as s is t developme nt of tourism, the International
Cooperation Administr a t ion sp onsored a "Tourism Survey " proj ect and obligated $55,350 f or the undert ak ing .

It employed

two American c onsulting and survey firms to assess the needs
of the industry .

The team arrived in 1955 and issued a joint

report in February 1956.
The c onsultants de clared themselves "nmch impressed"
with the p otential development of the tourist trade .

They

pointed out that world travel conditions appeared highly
39 Pr o ject 271-26-119 ICA E-1 Form, prepared
November 18 , 1959. AID file data.

U~7

favorable to tourism and that the country held many attractions for foreign visitors.

Among these attractions were a

rich historical past, new hotels, good beaches, and the
·'

speedy growth of the new state.

The team presented a pro-

posed five-year plan for the promotion of the industry.

This

plan ventured the estimate that the tourist traffic would
reach 103,000 by 1960 (a figure that was exceeded by 15,000)
and, that the projected 1960 figure would bring the economy
approximately $15,450,000 of foreign exchange, not counting
the sale of tickets by Israeli carriers and gifts by visitors
to Israeli residents.

The prBdictions were based up~:m the

assumption that a number of steps would be taken to increase
the length of time that the average tourist would spend in
the country.

Suggestions included developing such places as

Sedom and Eilat as major tourist attractions, increasing the
frequency of air transportation to points of interest within
the country, providing more recreational facilities for such
sports as golfing and fishing close to resort areas, promoting winter tourism, and working with travel agents and tour
operators to sell longer tours.

Proposals made to induce

tourists to lengthen their stay were:

(1) to provide ade-

quate hotel accommodations at such places as Tiberias,
Beersheba, and Eila t, and (2) to improve food, transportation,
and communication.
The survey team urged the newly formed Govermnent
Tourist Corporation to take strong leadership in the . overall
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planning of new hotels in reference to type, location, financing, and operating policies.

The survey revealed that more

Class A hotels were necessary to lure visitors in the higher
income brackets and that more Class B hotels also were needed.
The latter would provide less space and luxury and would not
enjoy the reputation of the deluxe hotels, but they would
serve the middle and lower-income group who seek clean and
comfortable quarters at a moderate price.4°
Under a second tourism project requested by the
Technical Assistance Department of the Prime Minister's
Office, ICA arranged for the former survey te~m to return to
Israel to reexam.ine the situation earl y in 1960 and to rec ommend further steps.

Its report was published in July.

In the wake of the 1960 study by the American survey
team, the Tourist Industry Development Corporation, which
meanwhile had been set up by the government of Israel in 1957,
published its Tourist Industry Five Year Plan.

The publica-

tion noted that, apart from the sale of citrus products,
tourism was the country's largest source of dollar income.
It predicted that there would be an average annual increase
of 10 to 15 percent in the nlllnber of tourists during the
ensuing five yea-r s and that in 1965 an estimated 180,000
40 11 Extracts from the Joint Report submitted in
February 1956 by the firms of Cresap, McCormick and Paget
and Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company in accordance with Contract No. PIO/T 71-26-120-2-50166, authorized m1.der Letter
of Commitment No. 71-2 b y the International Cooperation
Administration." AID file data.
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would visit the country.

The result of such sn increase in

tourism in 1965 would be $36 million, or six times the 1955
receipts.

It concluded that to meet the influx of tourists,

1,000 Grade A and 1,200 Grade Band 800 motel-type rooms
would be needed.
investment of IL

This expansion program would require an

56

million.

In addition, an investment of

IL 6 million would be required for tourist services, souvenir
shops, restaurants, carnps , and so on.1t-1
In a report to Wnshington dated August 19, 1960, the
United States Operations :Mission in Israel stated that although the basic problems still existed in the country's
tourist industry, such as the need for- more hotels, restaurants, and recreational facilities, the industry was making
admirable progress.

The report further indicated that, under

the continuing tourj_sm project, US0M had additional plans:
(1) to employ the services of a Hotel Training Team from an
'
American hotel school to instruct Israelis
in hotel prac-

tices; (2) to bring in a European expert for consultation
in restaurant management; (J) to enlist the services of an
American technician to make a survey and formulate a plan
for building tourist recreational facilities recommended by
Cr-esap, McCormick and Paget; and (4) to send additional
Israelis abroad for study under the Participant Training
Program.

In addition, the report pointed to a recoilli~endation

41 Tourist

Industrz Five Year Plan (Jerusalem: Tourist Industry Development Corporation, Ltd., n.d.), p. 1.
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made by the 1960 survey group that quo.lity specialty goods
be produced and sold in Israel's tourist stores.

The report

indicated that USOi I would aid this goal in connection with a
1

separate project set up to stimulate export of consumer
go ods.

It also said t}1a t USOM was studying a request by the

~overmaent of Israel for n United States lo3n of I L 15 million to the Tour ls t Indus tr y- Develop111en t Corpor8. tion for
hotel construction and antici:9ated t h at t ~'.d.s loan w,::,uld be
drawn fro:r1 the U.S. us e s account of local currency generated
by Public Law 4.80 Title I commod i ty sales.4 2
By the end of June, 1960, t achnical

ri

3s is tance dollar

costs devoted to the development of tourism included the

$55 ,.350 obligated by USOM for the first tourism survey, and
$50 ,000 for the 1959

a nd 1960 tourism project--a total of

$105,350 fron the Te ch nic a l Cooperation budg et.

Support of

the project by t h e g overnment of I sr ael equa lled ¢61,000 in
local currGncy _l+J
Te1"l'.llinal activities of the tourism pr o j e ct included
establishing four schools for t r a il1 i ns profo Rs ional tourist
trade personnel in 1961 and a fifth i n 1962 .

Als o in 1962

four A::nerican techni cal a s si.s b .:mce exDerts aid ed t h e training
of 130 student cook s, w.a iters , h ous ekeepe rs, and receptionists
at the Centra l Hot e l Sch ool, Tadmor Hotel, Herzliya.

1960.

Both

4 2 Project 271- 24- 255 I CA E-1 Form, prepared August 19,

AID file data..
43Ibid.
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technicians and kitchen equipment for the school were provided by project funds.

Also provided were participant

training scholarships for six Israelis to learn more about
tourist promotion in the United States and Europe .44
Evaluation of Participant Training45
In an effort to obtain a definitive picture of the
strengths and weaknesses of the Participant Training aspect
of the Technical Cooperation Program, the International
Cooperation Administration instituted a wor1d-wide survey in

1960 and 1961.

The first country report to be received in

Washington came from Israel in 1962.

In the meantime ICA

had been superseded by the Agency for International Development, and the report appeared under the label of the new
agency.
The Israel survey was made under the general direction of ICA, which prepared the questionnaires and instructions, but the actual contacts were made by personnel of the
Israel Institute of Applied Social Research.

The undertaking

was financed by counterpart funds.
Altogether 369 persons were interviewed who had
44-shalom Cohen, "Tourism Evolved on USOM Plan, 11
Jerusalem Post, Special Supplement Marking the Conclusion of
the Work of the United States Operations Mission in Israel,
July 4,-1 962, p. xlv.
45Based on Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, Evaluation Survey of Israel Participants in the AID
Training Program, Sponsored by the Technical Assistance Deartment of the Prime Minister's Office and the United
States AgencJ for International Development Jerusalem:
Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, 1962).

studied abroad under the program and retnrned to Israel before the close of Israel's 1960 fiscal year.

In addition,

employers or other supervisors of 258 of the participants
were interviewed.

200.

The numher of stq.:,6rvis ors involved was

Pre-testing was done in May, 1960, but the survey

proper was conducted by twenty interviewers from Ma rch to
October, 1961.
Most of the 369 participants interviewed were men who
at the time of their selection were between 30 and
of age.

49

years

The majority of them were government employees who

held second or third level jobs; two were top policy maker s.
Over two-thirds of them had had over five years of previous
experience in their work before their departure for further
training.

The greater part of the participants had been

chosen by their supervisors.

Others had been chosen by spe-

cial boards, labor uni ons, government offic es , university
officials.

Only 4 percent of them had been chosen by ICA

personnel.
Somewhat over half of those interviewed said that
they had supervised one or more pe rsons .

·Most of the rest

either could not remember or, perhaps for reasons of personal
prestige, chose not to remember whether they had performed
supervisory responsibility over other employees before leaving for .foreign study.

The survey team assumed that mo st of

the latter had not been supervisors.

As for ac ademic back-

ground, most of the participants had completed one or more

153

years of university work.

'fue high educational level, con-

sidered in conjunction with the fact that more than half of
them had been supervisors, probably implies that persons
selected for study under the program were better qualified
than the average to "sell 11 at home new ideas, concepts, and
techniques gained from their training abroad.
Supervisors' Views
Supervisors were asked to give their views on several
aspects of the program without reference to the participants
in their charge.

They were asked to indicate their satis-

faction or dissatisfaction with the procedures by which participants were selected, subject matter covered in the training program, the length of training, the practical experience
provided in the progra:-,1, and the country or countries of
training.

The big majority of supervisors voiced their

approval of all items except the country or countries of
training.

A considerable number

pleasure with this item.

(44

percent) registered dis-

Most of the dissatisfied super-

visors thought that some or all of the training should have
been in Europe.

Some of them thought tha t it should have

been in small countries closely identified with Israel's
problems.
Participants' Views
Most of the participants (81 percent) felt that before leaving Israel for study abroad they had not received

1.54

complete information concerning the training program--about
when and where they would be going, what they would be learning, the length of the program, and so on.

The responses., in

fact, revealed that many of them had received no predeparture briefing from either their sponsor i ng g over nment
ministry or their employers.

Such information as they

acquired was gleaned from other sources, i nc l ud i n g general
orientation sessions in Washington , D. C.

The part i ci pants

also reported that t h ey h a d not b een a c'l equa t el y ins tructed in
such nonprogram matters as the use of r e staurants a nd publi c
facilities, use of money, reli gious pr a ctice s , manne r s and
customs of the people.
Most of the participants ( 81 percent a gain) fou nd the
level of the program about right.

A very small number t h ought

it too advanced, while others considered it too simple.
attitudes seem to have been shaped by various factors.

The se
The

questioning disclosed, for exampl e , that those who were
familiar with the ease or difficul ty of t he program ahead of
time were definitely more inclined t o r eg i ster a h i gh de gr ee
of satisfaction with it t han were tho se wh o h ad r ece ived no
preliminary orientation.

Other factors a l so played a role i n

the degree of satisfaction exhibited t oward the program level.
For instance, persons wh o h a d devoted more t ha n t wo years t o
their field of s pecializa tion be f ore their selec t ion considered the level of the tra i n i ng "about rig,1.t" more often than
did t h ose who had spent le ss t han two years.

Also persons
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who were extended the privilege of ta 1,d ng part in the planning of their program displayed greater satisfaction with the
level of the program than did those who had no part in such
planning.
Participants whose training program had been prepared
in complete detail before their departure from Israel rated
the program very satisf actory in 69 percent of the cases.
Those particj_pants who got off to a bad start by being informed after their arrival in America that their program was
not yet ready showed less enthusiasm.
In most instances, the participants fe l t that they
had been given enough attention and ,guidance by their pr ogram
managers during their stay in the Unite d States , and twothirds of those wh o felt that way consiaered the program very
satisfactory.

On the other hand, the majority of those who

felt t hat their managers showed them little attention Gave
the program a lower rating.
Some participants felt that they were scheduled to
see and do too many things.

Others felt that their schedule

had not provided enough activities.

A third group thought

the scope of activities was either very satisfactory or else
all right.
Participants over fifty years of age showed a higher
percenta ge of highly satisfied persons than did those under
fifty years of age.

1-fuether this variation was due to age

differences or to other reasons is not clear.

One
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possibility is that the more mature group had more "pegs" of
experience upon which to hang their new knowledge and so carried away more than their juniors.
Participants for whom some social activities were
planned had a higher percentage of well satisfied persons
than those for whom no social functions were arrRnged.

Also

there were more satisfied people among t h ose who epent more
than a :tear in training than t h ose who spent l ess than a year.
A fundame ntal test of the effectiveness of the Participant Training Program is the extent to which participants
were able to transmit to others the knowledge and skills
acquired in their foreign study and the extent to which they
were able to util iz e them themselves.

A nur.1ber of questions

to the former trainees were r elated to these matters.

While

almost all of the intervi0wed J69 participants felt t ha t
they had conveyed somethin g to their ass oc iates, half of them
admitted that t hey had not passed on much of value.

95

About

percent, however, stated that they were able to apply to

their job at least part of what they ha d been taught, a.nd
most of this

95

percent believed that they were ns ing a

great deal of their acquiren learni~g.
In this connection, on a hundred-point scnle n
"utilization score 1' was arrived at for each par tic ipcnt , o.na
the level of position at the time of selection wa s correlated
with this score.

In most instances, the more readily parti-

cipants were able to apply o.t home the knowledge gained from
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their study tour abroad, the more inclined they were to rate
the program very satisfactory.

Generally speaking, the sur-

vey established a correlation between high utilization and
satisfaction.

A notable exception was the group that studied

Public Administration.

Although the great majority of them

were very well satisfied, only a little over one-third indicated that they were afterwards able to utilize effectively
the things they had learned.

In other words, they were at

once one of the best satisfied groups and one of the poorest
utilizers.

Hhereas their study abrond had brough t them into

contact with political leaders and le gisla tive bodies and
provided them interesting and desirable experiences, seemingly
the application at home of foreign public administration techniques and methods appeared impractical or politically inexpedient.

Probably also the fact that, for the most part,

participants were holders of second and third level jobs
meant that they lacked the authority or• influence to affect
substantial change.
In the overall picture, 62 percent of the former
trainees rated the entire program very satisfactory.

34 percent founc1 it moderately
4 percent considered it rather

satisfactory.

Another

The remaining

unsatisfactory; only one par-

ticipant declared it to be "not sa tisfac tor~,r at all."
Proposals Based on the Israel Survey
The survey made by the Israel In~ titute of Applied
Social Research enabled the U.S. AID representative in
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Tel Aviv (successor to the United Stntes Operations Mission)
to formulate a number of recommendations for consideration by
the home office in Hashington.

These recommendations were

included in the "Memorandum of Transmittal 11 that accompanied
the survey report.
Highlights of the suggested iinprovements are as
follows:

(1) A thorou[::;h pre - departure orientation should be

provided every particip ant .

n 1is orientation should offer a

detailed briefing on all phases of the training and include
an explanation of the level of inRtruction.

The participant

should be well satis f ied with the proposed program and should
be quizzed on the matter before embarking .

He should also

be given some information about country customs and practices.
(b) Be fore the par ticipant arrives at his ae~tinntion , the
program mana ger should make sure that h is program is thoroughl y prepared.

(3) Program ma nagers shou ld give a great

deal of personal attention to each participant.

Ui. ) 'The

participant should not be given too many things to do and
see.

(5) A cert ain minimum number of social activities

should be provided each trainee.

(6) The Agenc y for Inter-

national Development should consider the p os s ibility of extending the length of the training period.
Some Comp arisons
There was h ardly a sector of the Israel economy that
was not affected directly or incirectly by the Technical
Assistance Program, including a s i t did both pnrticipant

159
training and techni c a l a s sistanc e p er se.

The broad range

of the coordinated program, together with the emphasis given
different aspects of the program, may be comprehended, in
some measure, by noting the fields served by American
advisors and Israe l i t r a i nees indicated in Table

TABLE

14.

14

TECHNICI ANS AND PARTICI PANTS BY FIELD OF ACTIVITY

1952-1960

===========-=--===== · ·==============
Number of
Number of
Technicians

Field of Activity

. .

... ..

Particip ants

57

166

102

202

8

36

B

38

.

10

20

Housing and community development

2

6

Public administration.

7

49

Labor •

4

..

Agriculture • • • •

..
. . . . . . .

Industry and mining .
Transportation

Health and s a nitation .

.

Education .

General a n d miscellaneous .
Tot a l

•.. .

Source:

. ...•

..
1988.

8

525

Program and Economic Analysis Office, USOM/
I srael. AID file data.

aAn a ddi t ional 96 persons were sent from the United
Stat e s to s u pport the planning, administration, and operation
of the Technical Cooperation Program between 1952 and 1960.
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In the tot a l p ictu r e , industry rec eiv ed more technical assistance than did agr i culture.

This observation is

borne out b y t h e f a ct tha t while the program financed

57

con-

sultants and 166 p art i cipants for the agricultural sector,
it financed 102 c onsultants and 202 participants for
industr y .

( Table 14 . )

Althou~h expenditures by 1962, set

forth in TA ble 15 , had not caught up with 196J obligat i ons,
t hey t e ll the same story .

Whereas r-.ibout 23 perc ent of the

Technic a l Cooperctio~ budget was devoted to agriculture ,

32 percent was d e vo:;oa to industry.

American aid planners

recogniz e d t h at t he possibilities for a gricul tural 1evelopment were neces s a r il y restricted by the country 's limit0d
resources of lan d an d water and , in the export market , limited by .foreign s u rpluses of cert ain COiillriodi tie s.

Industry,

on the other hand, appeared to be less circumscribed.

Not

only was a .flourish in13 industrial sector essential to the
domestic economy but also important as a means of acquiring
.foreign exchanc;e throu gh sales abroad.
The Rise of I s raeli •rechnicsl Assistnnce and the

Decline of Americ an TecbnicalAssistance
As indicated earlier, technical assis tance accounted
for but 2 pe r cent of the price of U.S. aid to Israel .
fi gure is very much smaller than thA . e~ tirnrt tea
total U .s

.

This

1_5 percent of

aid t h.at the sarne "!dncl of a~d.fl tance comprised in

other countries during the same period .
for the l ow percenta3e

in

One o.f the roasons

Israel's case was that its
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TABLE 1 5

COMPARISON OF U.S. TECHNICAL CCOPERATIOH DOLLAR COSTS
AND GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL LOC,'\.L CURRSNCY COSTS BY
FIELD OF ACTIVITY TO ,JUNE 30, 1962
(In Thousands of Dollars and IL Dollar Equivalents)
TJ .s .

Dollar
Expenditures

G.O.I.
Expenditures

~3 ,391

$5 , 422

4,620

3,382

Transportation . . . .

675

68

Health and sanitat ion

619

293

Education

928

556

62

18

336

137

..

26

Private enter prise .

186

27

General and :riisc ellaneous

2Lµ+

217

3 ,341

92

Field of Activity

.

Agricultu re

. . .

.

Industry and mining

Housing and comnru.nity deve lopment.
Public administration
Labor.

Technical support (administr at ion)
Research Foundation State
University of 1fow York • • • • • •

Total

. . . . ..

Source:

.

.

"

. .. .

( 1 ., 1~45 ) ~:-

.

Office of U.S. AID Re
Report as of June 30,

~"Included under field s of activity above.

Financial
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immigrant population included many competent technicians and
scientists.

This reservoir of trained personnel became in-

creasingly apparent after 1956 when the government of Israel
agreed to provide technical advisors for service in Burma.
And as its Technical Assistance Program broadened in scope
from year to year, Congress found it increasingly difficul t
to justify technical assistance as an element of the U.S.
aid-to- Israel package.

In 1960, therefore, it was agreed by

both governments that the program would be terninated
June 30, 1962.

Thereafter other a!1pF.:cts of the economic aid

program were expected to continue, but •technical assistance
beyond that date would be limited to neceseary finishing
touches.

By the end of 1961, which was before Aluerican technicians had yet left the country, 400 Israeli technicians
had been sent to

42 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin

America; and 1,4-40 foreigners had gone to Israel for training.46

As American aid officials looked upon this phenomenon,

they entertained the hope ths.t many of the things that
Israelis had learned as participants in the United States or
else from U.S. experts in Israel would now be disseminated
to other areas of development.

p.

25.

46 Peterson, Activities of the Agriculture Division ,

CHAPTER VII
INVESTMENT ASSISTANCE
The Country Situation
Tremendous investment effort was one of the distinctive features of the Israel economy during the decade of the
1950's,

In relation to gross national product, this effort

placed it third on a list of seventeen nations that included
the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. 1
In constant 1959 prices, the magnitude of investment rose
from a total of IL 657 million in 1950 to IL 998 million in
1960, every sector sharing the increase,

(Table 16,)

The major investment target throughout the period
was housing, a fact which is not surprising when we consider
the vast inflow of immigrants,

The housing s ector wa s the

object of 40 percent of the na. tion • s gross investme.nt ca pi tal
in 1950, but by 1960 it had declined to 29 perc ent,

Dur ing

the same period industry received greater i nvestment emphasis
than did agriculture,

This emphasis denoted a cont i nuing

awareness on the part of Israel's leaders tha t t he
agricultural resources of the country were severely l i mi ted
1Don Patinkin, "The Israel Economy: The Firs t Decade, ••
The Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel, Fourth Report:
1957 and 1958 (Jerusalem: The Falk Project for Economic
Research in Israe l, 1961), p, 50,
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TABLE 16
GROSS INVESTMENT, 1950-1960
( IL Millions in 1959 Prices)

1950

1952

1954

1956

1958

1959

1960

Agriculture and irrigation.
Industry, mining and power
Transport
Trade and services
· Housing
•
•

.
. . . . .. .. .. .. ..
...... . .

124.8
135 .Jt
95.
38.6
262.2

130. 0
157.5
83 . 8
232.3

157.7
127.3
52.2
34.8
241.0

142.4
173.5
98.2
85.3
241.2

193.9
207.6
109.5
118.7
277.5

179.9
244 .0
127 .1
142 .0
307. 0

170.5
228.5
151.I+
158.5
289.2

........

656.6

647.8

613.0

740.6

907.2 1000 . 0

998.1

Project

Total.

. .

•

414-.2

I-'

O'

-f:'"

In Percent
Agriculture and irrigation.
Industry, mining and power
Transport
Trade and services
•
Housing •
•

.
. . . . . . . .. .
..
.....

Total percent
Source:

..... .

•

19.0
20.6
14.6
5.9
39-9

20 . 1
24.3
12.9
6.8
35.9

100.0

100.0

24.4

39.3

21.l+
22.9
12.0
13.1
30.6

18.0

8.5
5.7

19.2
23.4
13.3
11.5
32.6

12.7
14.2
30.7

22 .9
15 .1
15 . 9
29 .0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100 . 0

25.7

20.8

George L. Peterson, Activities of the Agriculture Division 1952-1962
(Tel Aviv: U.S. AID Mission to Israel, 1962).
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and that the future of the economy de pended increasingly on
industrial development.
Alex Rubner observes that a substantial portion of
the investment funds available during the first deca de of
Israel's existence was not -used to the best possible advantage.2

He says that "the chief caus e for this failure to

invest wisely is linked directly to the abundance of invest ment capital, relative to the avail able entrepreneurial
skills and tested investment projects, 11 but recognizes that
this is n·p art of a general problem affecting underdeveloped
economies. 113

As an example of improperly used investment,

he cites the wasteful handling of expensive machinery by
inexperienced persons in some of the young settlements .
Because socialist parties regarded hire d labor as an evil,
they found it hard to agree, at first, to a peri od of transition during which new laborers would be trainees.

The

Jewish Agency took pride in taking untrained and frequently
illiterate immigrants from their ship in Haifa and making
them "owners" of a farm in the Negev.

The results were

frequentl y economically wasteful in the extreme.
The enthusiasm, at times ludicrous, for investments
per se, which characterized many official actions in the
economic field during this decade, very often led to
severe distortions in the price-and-cost structure.
Public capital was provided, in the first years, for
?

-Jee also "Case Study of a Local Currency Loan
Project.," Appendix A.
3Alex Rubner, Economy of Israel (New York:

1960) , p • 37 •

Praeger .,
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undertakings which, on completion, could not employ
their modern imported machinery economically, because the
Ministry of Finance lacked the foreign currency to make
allocations for spare parts or raw materials. Reports
made on the employment of equipment, supplied through
loans of th~ U.S. Export-Import Bank, in the building
branch, all tell the same story4 of failure to utilize the
new capital goods economically.
In Israel's mixed economy, more than half of all capital for investment came from public funds incorporated in
the development budget.

These funds consisted of truces and

collections, internal loans, and local currency generated by
various forrus of assistance from abroad.

Not only did public

funds largely determine the quantity of investment, but also
the national and local governments and the Jewish Agency that
controlled these funds had a tremendous influence on the
quality or structure of investment.

For example, the deci-

sion as to which enterpriees coulc obtain loans from public
sources often determined which enterprises flourished and
which did not and, indirectly, had a bearing on which ones
were able to attract additional private ca pital and which
were not.

Also the role of government in the allocation of

foreign currency for the import of machinery and equipment-which accounted for about two-thirds of all industrial
investment 5--encouraged certain industries to the exclusion
of others and, in turn, influenced investment decisions of
4Ibid.
5Fanny Ginor, Uses of Agricultural Surpluses$ Analand Assessment of
Economic Effect of the u ••
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private investors toward the fa vored enterprises.
Although inve stment capital was also derived f r om
strictly pr i va·t e sour ces, which is to sa:y from pr iva t e s avi ngs, domest i c savings in Israel were always at a low leve l
during t he 1950' s as compared to the United States and
Europe .

Several influence s c onspired to discourage saving,

one of wh ich was hi gh taxe s tl-:..a t siphoned off most excess
fu nd s.

An other was i nflationary trends in the economy tha t

led many pe r sons to spend their money for good s and servic es
that they f eared would c os t more later.

Also the high leve l

of ca.p ital import s r educ ed t he pr essure on private business
and government alike t o save.
Not onl y were domestic savings inadequate to supply
a very large part of the investment funds needed, but attempts to attrac t private capit al from abroad were, at f i rst ,
not very succes sful.

Reasons for the reluctance of potential

investors abroad to put their money into Israeli enterpri s es
were several.

These included the fact t hat Israel's founder s

h ad a pro- s ociali s t welfare - state anti-capitalist bias, and,
at t he start, were not thoroughly converted t o the necessity
of e n t icing pr ivate foreign inves t ment on a lar ge scale.
Also the government ' s i nflu enc e on the e conomy, as manifest
in multiple exchange rates and subsidie s , tended to confuse
and discourage many prospe ctive investors abroad.

Added to

these deterre nts were the unsettled international situation
and qu estions of security, high taxes, ini'lation , and a
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limited market.

For these reasons would-be foreign investors

were at a loss to know how to assess the economy and felt
uncertain both of realizing a profit and'of withdrawing that
prof'it from the country afterwards if they so desired.
For a number of years the efforts of Israel's government to promote private domestic and foreign investments were
virtually limited to the establishment of an Investment Center
and the screening through that office of inve~tment proposals
and to the granting of tax benefits and import facilities to
approved enterprise s.

The first Law for the Encouragement of

Capital Investments, though intended to increase foreign
investment capital, was cons idered too restrictive by private
interests.

Even the 1955 amendments thereto failed to liber-

alize it sufficiently to provide a broad appeal.
Through the se veral channels of its foreign aid program, the United Stat es, directly and indirectly, supplied
the Israel economy funds for investment during the 1950 1 s.
It also took specific steps to influence the quantity and
quality of investment and sought especially to promote private enterprise .

One of these steps was the advocating and

financially aiding the formation of an industrial development
bank in Israel.
Promotion of an Industrial Development Bank
From the days of the Marshall Plan, American aid
theoreticians upheld the view that a well-nigh essential
step to the promotion of a nation's industrial growth was
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the establishment of a development bank.

Through such an

institution very large sums of public and private capital
would be assembled and made available to industry in the form
of medium and long-term loans.

American experience i n Greece,

Turkey, Italy, Formosa, Korea, the Philippines, and i n other
aid-receiving countries supported this convicti on . 6
Until 1957 loans to business and industry had been
made by a variety of institutions:

government, a few exist-

ing private banks, phila·nthropic groups., labor organizat ions ,
and various other private institutions. 7

That year an ini-

tial survey was made by a te am of American expert s under the
direction of the United States Operations Mission.

In the

wake of the group's report, the government of Israel set up
the Israel Industrial Institution Limited, later r enamed the
Industrial Development Bank Limited.

The date was October 7,

19.57.
From the American standpoint., a necessary i ngredient
in the successful operation of a development bank was that,
while it must work in harmony with the goals of its spons or ing government, it shou ld b e free to make decisions i n
economic terms rather than in politica l one s .

I n the wo r ds

of USOM Director, John J. Haggerty :

611 summary of Remarks b y J ohn J. Ha gger t y ., Direct or
USOM/Israel, at the Israel-American Fri endship League on
Tuesday, Noyember 4, 1958, 11 p . 3. AID f il e data .
?earl R. Ferderer, Com l e t i on of Tour Re
1962 (U.S. AID Mie s ion to Israe ,
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As contrasted with a government agency or department,
such a bank as a bank, mu.st be irrevocably committed to
the security of its own investment capital, together with
that degree of return on its credits and investments,
which will enable it to pay the costs of its own borrowings, and assure the continued participation of its own
shareholders in its capital structure. It follows that
a development bank must look to the profitability,
including the debt-servicing capacity, of the business
enterprises to which it extends credits or in which it
makes its own direct investments. The technical practicability and the economic soundness of the borrower
enterprise are the major criteria by which such a bank
judges whether a loan or an investment should, or should
not, be made.
'Wh er3 a development bank finds its identity of interest with that of the Government lies in the seeking out
and finding of industrial opportunities which, through
prudent investment and sound business management, can be
made productive and profitable, and which will thereby
contrigute to the viability of the national economy as a
whole.
When originally organized, however, the Israel Industrial Institution was not free to make its own decisions in
purely economic terms.

The greater part of its loan re-

sources was furnished by the government through purchases of
both voting and nonvoting share capital.

Goverrunent offi-

cials screened applications coming to the bank and, according to USOM Industry Officer Carl R. Ferderer, exercised
inf'luence in behalf of those that they favored. 9

Thus, at

the outset, the new lending organization performed about the
same functions that formerly had been carried out by the
several credit institutions that were making loans from the
Development Budget.

8 11 summary of Remarks," pp. 3-4•
9Ferderer, Completion of Tour Report, p. 16.
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As the result of an agreement signed by representatives of the two countries October 15, 1958, the American
concept of a development bank operating without government
interference came closer to realization a year after the
Bank's formation.

The agreement of that date cornraitted the

U.S. government to loan the government of Israel IL 20 million from the U.S. Uses Account, accruing from the sale of
agricultural surpluses, for the purchase of the Bank's full
authorized issue of nonvot1:!!.8_ stock. 10

This project accord

was hailed by Haggerty as "an important milestone, possibly
a major turning point, in the Israel-American program of
economic cooperation. 1111

Haggerty 1 s enthusiasm apparently

stemmed less from the magnitude of the loan, which enabled
the Israel government to acquire more than half the
IL 36 million total share capital of the Bank, 12 than from
two special conditions attached to it:

(1) The Israel gov-

ernment was to divest itself of a block of voting shares by
public sale to private investors, and (2) the Industrial
Development Bank was to operate under such loan criteria as
to be free from undue government influence.

In fulfillment

of its side of the bargain, the government of Israel offered
lOse e also Chapter V, pp , 109-110.
ll 11 summary of Remarks, 11 p. l.
12 In addition to IL 20 million in nonvoting preference shares, the Industrial Development Bank was capitalized
by issuance of IL 8 million Class A voting stock and
IL 8 million Class B nonvoting stock.

172

a portion of its voting shares for sale to banks and private
business groups at home and abroad, thus permitting their
representation on the board of directors.

Because only

26 percent of the voting stock was retained by the government, it was only entitled to four out of fifteen board of
director seats. 1 3
In spite of these measures, a USOH memorandum two
months after the October 15 agreement seems to reflect continued concern as to whether the Bank was going to be free
from government dictation.

The brief memo reports a meeting

held December 11, 1958, between USOM ana Israeli government
officials in which a "lively discussion ensued relative to
concentration of economic powers in the hands of Government
and Histadrut. 11 14

Later in the meeting one of the Israe li

representatives inquired about the prospects of ~1e I ndustrial Development Bank receiving a substantial credit from

the De velopment Loan Fund:

Mr. Haggerty stated that USOM supported such a
credit in principle but that he felt that steps should
be taken immediately both on the part of the GOI and on
the part of the III (IDBIJ which will confi:t,n the freedom .of the III from domination by the GOI.lj
Additional assistance to the Development Bank came
13Ferderer, Completion of Tour Report, pp. 16-17.
14 11 Memorandum for the Rec.~rfs: Subjects Covered in
Discussion, Thursday December 11, 1958. Israeli Participants: Dr. S. Gottlieb, Dr. Nadev Halevy , Mr. Addy Cohen.
USOM Participants: Mr. John J. Haggerty, · Mr. K. L. Maya ll. 11
AID file data.
l5Ibid.
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later, when the Export-Import Bank of Washington appointed
the Industrial Development Bank its Israel agent for the
granting of "Cooley Amendment" loans to U.S. related private
firms and placed an i nitial sum of IL 15.75 mill ion at the
disposal of the Bank for that pur pose.

Also i n response to

an application from I DBI, the Development Loan Fund approved
loans in 1959 and 1960 amounting t o $10 mill i on to enable the
Bank to supply the anti cipated .foreign exchange needs of some
(

of its borrowers for pur chase s abroad .
As we examine t h e basis upon whi ch IDBI granted loans,
we note that the applicant was expected t o show that hi s
product would contribute to t he countr y 's economic development; that he had a subs ta ntia l amount of h i s own capital
invested or read y to i nv est; tha t the enterprise exh ibited
good prospects of being able to earn enough t o repay the
capital borrowe d; tha t the prospective borrower had enough
assets i n land , buildings, machinery , equipment, or other
valuable cons ideration to form adequate security to protec t
the Ba·n k; and t ha t in all discernible ways the pr oposal was
economically s ound. 16
The average length of lo an wa s eight years and
usually bore a 7 1/2 percent interest rate (6 to 6 1/2 percent in deve lopment areas) and required a flat one-time only
commission of l perc e nt (0 . 6 perc ent in development areas } .
16A Short Memorandum on the Activities and Oper a ti on
of the I ndustr1.a1 Development Bank of Israe l Limite d (Tel
Aviv, November, 1959), pp. 4-5.
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As a protection to the Bank,

50

to 70 percent of every loan

made for a period of more than two years was linked to the
dollar or to the cost-of-living index.

After a loan was

approved and during plant construction, engineers from the
Bank visited the site periodically and appraised progress of
the work.

Then after the plant was in operation, the econ-

omic department of the Bank kept itself informed of developments through reports and balance sheets regularly submitted
by the firm in accordance with stipulations of the loan
contract. 1 7
Six month s after t h e I L 20 mi llion loan agreement
was signed, the Industrial Development Bank became officially
independent of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

It

would be a mistake, however, to a ssume t hat t h e government
did not continue to be invol ved i n t he Bank's ope rations.
For example, al though l oan applications were considered by
an economist-engi neer two-man t e am appointed by IDBI , t h ey
were also weighed by a corre s ponding te am app oi nted by the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

After evaluation by both

pairs of investiga tors, the I DBI team made its recommendation to the Credit Committee comp os ed of representatives
both of the Bank and of t he Pl anning Branch of t he Ministry
of Commerce and Indus t ry.

Here the final decision was made

on loans not exceeding I L 300 , 000 .

On larger loans, the

decision of the Cred i t Commi tte e forme d only a recommendation

l7Ibid., pp . 6-7.
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to the Central Committee, which also was composed of personnel of the Bank and the Ministry of Corr.rrnerce a nd Industry.
So by virtue of participation at the several sta ges of loan
consideration the government's role in the Bank's decisionmaking process continued to be large.

Of course, such influ-

ence was to be expected where Development Budget funds were
involved because a condition of loans from that source was
that they be made within the framework of government policy
directives.

And even though in 1958 the government divested

itself of all but 26 percent of the voting stock, the charter's requirement that amendments be made only with the consent of holders of 75 percent of the voting stock gave
government the right to veto any basic change that it deemed
unwarranted.

But in s p ite of the continuing role of the

government in the opera tions of t he Industrial Development
Bank after its reorganization, the lending i n stitution was
sufficientl y independent to challenge g overnment viewpoints
with which it did not agree.

In some instances it re duc ed

or rejected loans recom..~e nded by the government, and in other
instances it approved loans rejected by the governme nt. 18
In an airgram to ICA Washington, June 11, 1959,
Director Haggerty reported tha t the Industrial Development
Bank was, indeed, exercising some measure of unconstrained
18~blic Inter~~~ional Development Financing, a Research Pro ect of the Columbia Universit~ School of Law,
Reuort o.
Public International Develo ment Financina in
Israel, by Chaim Ben-Shachar New York: Columbia University,

1963), pp. 68-69.
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judgment.

He said:

The Institution, as its experience has matured, has
gradually assumed a more independent role in reviewing
and passing on loan applications without reference to
Government approval. It does, however, follow broad
guidelines of i~dustry priori ties set out by the Government of Israel. 9
The question that rema ined was whether private business was getting its proper share of loan funds:
Our only concern is that the privately-owned sector
which is not tied in with some GOI or Histadrut enterprise may not be made aware of the loan opportunities
that exist, whereas the GOI and Histadrut enterprises
are encouraged to submit ~pplications and may be given
priority considerations.20

By the close of calendar year 1961 the IDBI had made
762 loans totalling IL

274.4

million 21 and had received

directly or indirectly from the United States IL 95 .1 million.
As for voting shares, which amounted to IL 10.1 mill ion by
the end of December, 1961, • 31 percent was now owned by the
government, 34 percent by seven commercial banks, 30 percent
by eight financial intermediaries, and

5 percent by eleven

other groups. 22

19.59.

1 9usoM/Israel Airgram to ICA/Washincton, June 11,
AID file data.
20Ibid.

21 11 rndustrial Development Bank of Israel Ltd, rr The
Jerusalem Post Economic Annual 1962 63 (Jerusalem: The- Jerusalem Post, 19 2, p. 17 •
66-68.

22Public International Develo;ement Financing., pp.
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Assistance to Small Industry
Because small industry in Israel--which, measured by
the number of employees, connotes thirty or less--is the
backbone of the economy, it see!'ls necessary- to inquire to
what extent it enjoyed investment funds from the U.S. aid
effort.

Although available data do not indicate the pro-

portionate distribution of U,S, be11efita ']:)etween small and
large industry, ICA file information
ness was not overlooked,

hows that small busi-

Through the aforementioned Indus-

trial Development Banl!, for example, amall firms aa well as
large ones obtained local currency loana,

And

the fact that

the Development Loan Fund made dollars available to the Bank
was a boost to small enterprise, because it opened the way
to dollar loans in sums less than the $100,000 minimum
imposed on applications sent to Washington directly.

More-

over, in 1959 the sum of $5 million was loaned to the Bank
by DLF for relending to small busineaaes exolusivoly, 23

As

of June 11, 1959, USOH personnel were increasingly encouro.ged
at the potentially large role which the Induetrial Development Bank eeemod de~tined to play in the progress of both
large and small industry. 24
Two local currency loan projects also were undertaken by the Americn ns to provide credit funds for small

23see pp. 81-82,

24-usoM/larael Airgram, June 11, 1959.
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business enterprises exclusively.

These were entitled

"Equipment for Small Metalworking Shops 112 5 and "Loans to
Small Industries.:i 26

As explained by USOM:

Despite the potential contributions which these
industries could make toward the strengthening of the
domestic economy and the role which they play as a part
of Israel's total industry, small industries have found
it particularly difficult to obtain needed credit 27 acilities in view of the presently existing shortage.
Total American support by the middle of fiscal year
1959 amounted to IL 475,000 for the first project and
IL 1,700,000 for the second.

Assistance was in the form of

U.S. owned local currency made available to the government
of Israel and reloaned to the Artisans ' Bank Limited.

This

financial institution, formed in 195!~ by the government of
Israel in collaboration with four commerci al banks and the
Central Union of Artisans and Small Business, 28 was established with the expect a tion that it would be a major instrument for helping small manufacturers and workshops finance
sound investments and for helping provide them with working
capitai. 2 9
25Project 271-23-214.
26Project 271-23-248.
1958.

2 7Project 271-23-248 ICA E -1 Form, prepared July 28,
AID file data.

28capitalization of the Bank in fiscal year 1959 comprised Government of Israel (50%); Central Union of Artisans
and Small Business (26%); Bank Leumi (6%); Workers' Bank
(6%); Halvaa Vehisa.chon (6%); Taassia Industrial Bank (6~t ).
2 9 11 Artisans 1 Bank Ltd.," The Jerusal em Post Economic
Annual 1962/63, p. 154.
- - - - - - -·-
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Loans by the Bank were made for a period of not more
than five years and bore a maximum interest rate of 7 1/2 percent.

Ea:c h loan was limited to IL 10,000 and was passed on

by a joint cormnittee or the Bank, the Ministry of Finance, and
the Ministry of Comrnerce and Industry.

During the first four

yea·r s 21,000 loans were approved, and in time branches of the
Bank were opened in several are as .

As viewed by the American

aid mission, the results of the Bank's operations were
"satisfactory" even though the Bank was able to provide only
a fraction of the country's needs for smal l capital loans. 30
Encouragement of Private Invostment
Repeatedly in our examination of U.S. activities in
support of investment, especially during the latter part of
the period under review, we are made aware of American
efforts to inspire private enterprise.

This effort was

prompted partly by the Mutual Security Act of 1951 , which
stipulated that economic assistan ce should be so administered
as to encourage free enterprise.

It was prompted also by

the Development Loan Fund, inaugurated in 1957 , and by the

1957 "Cooley Amendment 11 to Public Law 480 Tit le I.

Encour -

aging private enterprise in Israel, however, was always
subordinate to the goal of helping Israel become strong
enough to stand alone in the shortest period of time, and
this was true regardless of whether U.S. aid served to
30usoM/Israel Airgram, June 11, 1959,
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strengthen the role of the government, the Histadrut, or
private enterprise.

Neverth eless, as Israel's l eaders became

more receptive to the idea and as direc t ives f r om ICA/
Washington to its overseas operations mi s sions became more
explicit, private enter prise g aine d a more prominent role in
the program.
The American desi r e to pro111ote free enterpr i se stemmed
from the convicti on tha t i t ha d been responsible f or A.~erica 1 s
own remarkable economi c su cc e ss story and the belief that, to
a very great extent, it could d o the same for any other country.

It also stemmed f r om t he id ea that nations rooted in

the same type of economic s ystem a s Amer i ca wou l d be more apt
to identify themselve s wi th the Wes tern c a pitalist world than
with the communi st world .

And within t he Hiddl e East context

the United S tates n ot onl y wa nted Israe l to be c ome p olitically
and economically viable but hoped tha t it might also provide
a demonstrati on t o its neighbors of the v i gor and value of a
free enterprise s ys tem p ol i tically l i nked with the West.
More to the point, private forei gn investment came
to be viewe d i ncre asingly by Isra e li s and Americ ans al ike as
the most plausible subs t itute for American goverrunent aid ,
as well as for Ge r man reparations that were schedule d to end
in 1964.

In addition, t h e matter of Isra e l' s government

attracting capital f rom a broad was viewed by free enter pri se
advocates as n eces sitating c erta i n internal adMini s trative
and monetary r eforms that would be for the we ll be ing of the
Israel economy generally .
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The determination of the International Cooperation
Administration to channel a significant portion of the Israel
aid funds to the private sector is set forth in the following
USOM statement in 1958:
USOM/Israel has supported and will continue to support a concentrated program designed to assist Israel in
attaining a maximum degree of economic independence over
a minimum time span. In pursuance of this objective increasing emphasis is being placed on the encouragement
of private enterprise in the allocation of MSP and PL
480 assistance, to the extent that it is felt that private enterprise offers the most appropriate and practical
means of assuring developments which will result in the
attainment of a maximum degree of economic independence.
To the accomplishment of this end USOM/ Israel has urged
and will continue to urge that MSP and PL 480 assistance,
both in terms of appropriated dollars and loc al currency
availabilities resulting therefrom and subject to U.S.
control, be utilized to the maximum extent possible by
the Government of Israel as a multinlier to induce
further private investment to emerge and operate for the
overall benefit of the country economy. The U.S. aid
program utilizes whatever leverage is possible to encourage private entrepreneurship and the emergence of 1 soundly
conceived privately-owned industrial facilities.3
The same 1:1tatement also acknowledges the opjective of
U.S. aid to strengthen Israel economically to the point where
it would not be attracted to communism.

It observes, though,

that any prospect of Israel going communist appe ared very
remote.

Once again one of the basic, albeit unproved ,

premises of American foreign aid becomes apparent:

A nation

with a prospering economy, firmly rooted in the private
enterprise system, is less susceptible to comrr1unism 1 s blandislunents than a nation in poverty.

3111USOM/Israel Program, General Statement of Activities," presumably wl"itten in August, 1958. AID file data.
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American attempts to promote private enterprise were
complicated slightly by diff'ering viewpoints as to what
properly was not included and what properly was included
under the heading of "private enterpriseu in Israel.

The

attitude of USON was that private enterprise did not include
labor-union-ovmed industries, while the government of Israel
insisted that it dict. 32

This difference of interpretation

played a role in the application submitted by the government
of Israel for its first Development Loan Fund loan in fiscal
year 1959.

Inasmuch as DLF dollars were supposed to be

reloaned to private f'irms, USOM Director Haggerty claimed
that Histaarut enterprises were ineligible to receive them.
An article in :Maariv, September 30, 1959, suggests that
Haggerty was overruled on the first DLF loan but that a narrower view would be adhered to in the future.
It seems that the authorities in Washington did not
accept Haggerty 1 s interpretation, and last year they
extended all the loans needed for the activities financed within the f'ramework o:f Government bud get .
On the other hand, this year the Treasury will propose the extension of loans to a number of private Israel
industrial firms.33
Increasing interest in private investment by the
government of Israel in the lntter part of the decade, toge ther with growing emphasis in Congress on the utilizing
32The problem that t~ese conflicting positions presented to USOM clePical pe rs onnel is touched upon in
Appendix A, p. 220.

3Jy_ On, "'Good Forecast• for Economi c .~id, 11 :Ma0£h1 ,
September 30, 1959. AID file data.
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of foreign aid to promote private enterprise, paved the way
for a technical assistance project specifically addressed to
the "Encouragement of Private Investment."

Its purpose was

to encourage private investment (in the American sense) in
all sectors of the economy and to attract more foreign capital by promo t i ng a favora ble i nvestment clim3t e .

Agriculture

and the economic overh e ad or infra s tructure were considered
the primary do~~in of pu blic capital, so the main stress by
American aid planners for private investment was on industry.
The Mission embarked upon an ambitious project in

1959 to achieve the following six goals:
1.

Assist in the planning and formation of one or

more demonstration i ndu strial districts.

This would include

a study of the feasibility of proposed sites, evaluation of
the kinds of i ndustries best adapted to these sites, plans
for pla·n t facil it i es, and c ommi t ments with pros pe ctive
occupants.
2.

Make pre inve stment e ngineering and economi c

feasibilit y studies of s pecific i nvestment opp or tunit i es as
an incentive to investors.

3.

Establish a business credit rating s ervice on

the order of Dun and Bradstreet with a r el a ted Moody or a
Standard and Poor t ype fi nancial r e porting service.

4.

Assist in the formation of a national securities

law, a securities commis sion, and various tax reforms to
stimulate investment.

A special target was the promotion of
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a healthy stock exchange.

5.

Assist the government of Israel in taking steps

to encourage prLvate savings throu 6hout the country for use
as investment c,i-pital.

6.

Develop a publicity program pertaining to invest-

ment laws and opportunities for private investment in
Israei. 34
In practice the project resulted in t h ree subprojects:
One involved assistance to the Central Union of Artisans and
Small Business in order to improve marketing, production, and
financing practices of its membership.

A second was a feasi-

bility survey of the potential of the electronics industry.
A third was a study of the role of the Industrial Development Bank of Israel.

This latter study stimulated a great

deal of interest in economic and financial circles and served
to bring into focus the need for more working capital for
industrial expansion. 35

It was best received by those par-

ties who favored a more liberal credit policy to promote
industry and exports.
During 1959 and 1960, $200,000 were obligated by ICA
for the "Encouragement of Private Investment 11 project.

Half

of this amount was from Technical Cooperation funds for the
survey and contract activities required, and half was in the
34Project 271-91-267 ICA E-1 Form, prepared
November 30, 1959. AID file data.
35Ferderer, Completion of Tour Report, p. 21.
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form of an outright Special Assistance grant for the establishment of industrial centers.

Israel's contribution

through the Joint Fund equalled only $1, 000 in local currency,
leading to the conclusion that government enthusiasm for the
project per se was somewhat less than that evinced by its
American sponsors.3 6
From a comparison of project goals with project accomplishments, it is apparent that expectations exceeded realiza tion.

Nevertheless, the project must be counted among the

several influences toward private investment at work in the
Israel economy at the close of the period under consideration.
An Improved Climate for Private Investment
It is worthy of note that Carl Ferderer reports that
there was a marked change of official attitude in Israel
toward private investment between his arrival there in 19.58
and his departure in 1962.

He says:

' ••

.,

1·. ··~

The climate for private investment in Israel has very
notice ably improved during this period. Goverilrtlent
authorities are much more liberal in their attitude
toward private capital and have been rather succ essful
in many instances in having major projects financed.
The Government has willingly divested itself of equity
ownerships in major enterprises by selling its interest
to private investors. rhe liberali zation of loans for
industrial expansion to the purely private sector has
also been evident.31
1

The decade's most significant step in the promotion
of private investme nt came in 1959.

In August of that

36Projec t 271-91-267 ICA E-1 Form:
37Ferderer, Completion of .Tour Report, p. 2.
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year--a month after publication by the Ministry of Commerce
and Industry of its "Prognosis for Israel's Industrial
Development, 1960-1965"--the Knesset passed a much liberalized

Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investment.

This legislation inaugurated far-re a ch ing conces sions for
approved enterprises in the form of income tax benefi ts,
limited exemption from property taxes, exemp tion from customs
duties and purchase taxes, and permiss i on for nonresidents to
transfer all profits abroad in the currenc y ori gi na lly invested.

There were other benefits , but t hes e were s ome of

the more significant ones.

In the wake of the ne w l aw, a

special Investment Authority was formed by the Ministry of
Cormnerce and Industry and by the Ministry of Finance.

Rep-

resentatives of the Authori ty be gan work with prospective
investors to provide them with necessary information and to
help them make con t a c ts and enter negotiations with proper
government department s , and even to assi s t them in the
selection of plant sites . 38

The gover nment also i nst ituted

a securities com.mi ssion, and a number of Israe l fi r ms had
public stock off erings, which was a stimulus t o the stock
exchange.

A Dun and Bradstre et branch office was es t ab -

lished in 1961.
Consist ent with t he obje ct ives of the new law,
' Israel's leaders commenced serious soli c itat ion of private

38s ee "Israel's ' Third Arm 1 Conc e pt,

,Appendix B.

Janua r y , 1960 ,"
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investment funds from abroad.

Motivation for this drive was

the growing realization that the country could not expect the
continuous availability of German reparations, of external
aid programs, and of long-term loans repayable in local currency.

Soaring debts gave a dditional impe t us t o the search

for private foreign investment capital as a means of accumulating foreign exchange to pay off principal and inte rest.
As an indic ation of the impact made by the more
aggressive efforts of the government to promote investment,
the total approvals of proposed foreign investment s in 1960
jumped from the 1959 level of $39 mi llion to $106 million.3 9
Because the potential availability of foreign capital
increased so much, the government now began to be quite
selective in the acceptance of investment offers.

39Louis Williams, "Investment Guide, 11 The Jerusalem
Post Economic Annual 1962/63, p. 47.

CHAPTER VIII
" LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS
Israel's economic development from 1949 to 1960 was
largely the product of the imagination, initiative, skill, ·
health, and determination of its people and the plentiful
supply of labor provided by immigration.

To these may be

added the notable honesty of its government leade r s and large
capital imports from abroad.

U.S. economic and technical aid,

however, might have helped Israel to achieve still greater
development except for certain restrictions inherent in the
Israeli temperament, experience, and social philosophy and
except for certain other restrictions that limited Americans.
Israeli Limitations and Restrictions
Inadequate Planning
Inadequate pre-planning was a frequent complaint made
by American aid personnel of their Israeli colleagues.

One

USOM advisor, in a report to the government of Israel, speaks
of this limitation as follows:
This ch aracteristic of desire to be doing probably
created the greatest problem for the technician. Each
was so eager to be in action that decisions were too
readily made and as readil changed with subsequent loss
of time, money and effort.

1

1Velma G. Huston, Extension Work in Home Economics in
Israel Re ort to the Government of Israel (Tel Aviv: USAID
Mission to Israel, 19 2, p.
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In the opini on of USOM Director, C. Reed Liggit, t he
lack of planning on the technicia n's level also was a shortcoming of the Technical Assistance Lia i son Offi ce .

I n cor-

respondence to h is superior i n Washingt on in the s pr ing of
1960, Liggit lament s:
The existence over the years since 1952 of this
specially constitut ed unit under the jurisdiction of t he
Prime Minis t er's Office shoul d guarant e e effective preplanning and impl ementation in TC ( Technic a l Cooperation].
Re gretably, for a vari e t y of reasons, it doe sn ' t.
As you well k now, the Israelis since inc ept ion of
official U.S. aid t o Isr ael have been i n clined to consider
TC allotments as ""f ros t ing on the cake , 11 a buil t - in factor
in a conventional a i d pa c ka ge . As a c onseque nce there has
been a succession of imper manent personnel associ ated with
the Technical Assistance Department who, a lthough. eager to
see a full utilization of TC funds, once a llot ted, have
shown only cursory interest i n essentinl pre- planning of
multi-year project type a cti vities, • • •
Our Program Office has cons istently urged u pon the
Israelis a fuller participation in the process of program
and project formulation. It h a s been made abundantly
clear that the penalty of a USOM unilate rally evolved TC
forward projection, without a ctive GOI participation, is
ales~ defensible progr am and pr obab ly a smalle r allotment.
Insuff icient pl anning was a weakness that extende d
beyond the Technical Assistance Liaison Office.
shortcoming of the Israel government.

It was a

The pr oblem was re -

lated to the pr essures and uncertaintie s of the international
situation, but there were other explana tions.

The diverse

origins and experiences of the population and the fragmented
politic al structure of the nation contributed to poor
21etter to Mr. Leland Barrows, Regional Director ,
Office Ne ar East South Asia, Interna t ional Coopera t ion Administrat ion, Washington, D. C., from c. Reed Liggit , Direc t or ,
USOM, Tel Aviv, Israel , April 5, 1960. AID file data .

190

planning.

Also there were few trained economists and social

scientists in the population; and no well-trained civil service with esprit de corps had yet evolved.

Administrators, in

most cases, were politicians themselves who had come to their
positions with preconceived viewpoints · and commitments.

In

some instances several ministries had jurisdiction over the
same problem or segments of the same problem, and proposed
changes sometimes aroused personal antagonisms.
Still another reason i'or inadequate economic planning
by Israel's leaders was that, dat i ng from the pre-State
period, the estimates of economists h a d so often been outstripped by accomplishments of the people that their frequently pessimistic predictions were sometimes viewed with
disdain.

Moreover, so much was ac h ieved through short-range

planning that a long-term approach to economic problems seemed
unnecessary.

Besides, economis ts were usu ally rega rded as

having little appreciation f or t he soc i al welfare a ims to
which the government wa s deeply committe d .
Undoubtedly the main reason for little economic planning during the decade of the 1950 1 s wa s simply t hat the
government was n ot f a ced with the nece s s i ty of doing much
planning.

Various forms of external assistance always seemed

to be ava·ilable when ne eded to pr ovide the foreign exchange
to cover the import surplus, and t he local currency
generated by t h is as si st ance sust a i n ed a thriving development
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program.3
In the latter part of the period, the United States
Operations Mission became more insistent on detailed information on projects proposed by the government of Israel for
U.S. financing, regardless of whether they were to be aided
by technical assistance dollars, U.S. owned local currency,
or by Israel owned counterpart funds.

Compliance with such

requests proved time consuming and burdensome to the staffs
of ministries concerned, but American officials believed that
the procedure was leading to better executed projects and,
possibly, to a better quality of economic planning generally.4
By the same token, one of the motives behind the U.S. encouragement of free enterprise was the belief that the quest for
private capital from abroad would serve to upgrade planning
and, in the process, lead to much needed domestic currency
and administrative reforms.
3For an excellent treatment of the problem of inadequate government planning, see Benjamin Akzin nnd Yehezkel
Dror, Israel: High-Pressure Planning, National Planning
Series (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966).
4nr. Ben-Shachar, Assistant Professor of Finance at
the Hebrew University, offers what might be termed the
Israeli view that the increasingly stringent USOM controls
failed to influence development budget activities to any real
extent. In fact, since projects disapproved by the Americans
could be financed from other sources, the constant search for
projects to be approved was a bureaucratic burden. Public
International Develo ment Financin
a Research Pro ect of
the Columbia Universit School of Law Re ort No.
Public
nternational Develo ment Financi
in Israel, by Chaim
Ben-Shachar New York: Columbia University, 1963), p. 32.
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It is not clear to what extent official U.S. attitudes
influenced the change, but the government of Israel was doing
what .A mericans considered a better brand of economic thinking
and planning at the close of the period than it was in the
early hectic years.

It passed the Law for the Encouragement

of Capital Investment, established the Investment Authority
and a Securities Connnission, undertook a campaign to attract
private capital through investment clubs in the United States,
and began to plan seriously the elimination of artificial exchange rates and subsidies and the devaluation of its currency
as a means of making Israeli products more competitive in the
world market.

The government also was considering the estab-

lishment of a central planning commission, which actually took
shape in February, 1962, in the form of the Economic Planning
Authority.
Resistance to Suggestions
1vherever U .s. economi c aid and technical assistance
have been extended around the globe, An1ericans have discovered
that it has been very :much easier for them to dispense advice
than it has been for other people to acce pt i t.

And, without

a doubt, if the situation were re versed, Americans would find
it difficult to believe that the counsel of advisors from
abroad could be s uperior to their own.
was no exception to the rule.

The Israel experience

Israelis were not always pre-

pared to admit that foreigners might know how to proceed
better than they did.

Some of them, particularly at first,
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felt that .Americans, at best, were meddlesome interlopers
and, at worst, were bent on exploitation.

The Three-Monthly

Economic Review even suggests that Israel may not always have
wanted or needed foreign advisors but might have believed
that by giving an aid-dispensing organization a stake in a
project the chances of obtaining foreign credits would be
improved.5
Illustrative of Israeli resistance to advice from the
overseas visitors in their midst, the January,

1954,

USOM

report speaks of the wall of indifference that the first technicians in range management encountered:
The simplicity of so many of the problems made it
possible to offer constructive suggestions almost immediately. However, the suggestions offered seemed to meet a
certain passive resistance and were met with a general
reluctance to either recognize the soundness og our
advice or to admit that any advice was needed.
The report claims, though, that after the counsel of
American experts had time to prove its worth, the original
indifference was superseded by "a clamor for technical
advice."
In similar vein, the same Operations Report indicates
that early recommendations by USOM technicians to the government of Israel were carefully shielded from pubJ.ic scrutiny.
It refers to a two hour address by the Minister of
5Three-Monthly Economic Revieii,_ Israel (London:
Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., June,1957), p. 9.

The

60perations Report for January 1954 (Tel Aviv: The
United States Operations Mission to Israel, 1954), p. 15.
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Agriculture to the Knesset, in the course of wh ich he distributed copies of an appraisal by an American expert.

"This, 11

it says, "was quite a change from for.mer procedure of' treating
reports of foreign experts as •top secret,

1

and conse quently

they have not been made public nor even distributed to the
Knesset. 11 7

Incidentally, the Minister's speech was greeted

with immediate cri t icism from one member of the Knesset who
insisted that Ameri c an economic policy was aimed

11

at the

creation in Israel of a colonial economy, primitive agriculture, and destitute farmers.n 8

Such an attac k up on America's

forei gn aid progra m, howeve r, was rare in Israel.
Unlike the experience of America n advisors in range
m.anage11ent, who witnessed initia l resistance give way to a
great demand for their services, U. S . minine consultants got
to the point wh ere they f el t t h at they were almos t in the way.
To be precise, experts in marble quarry ing fou nd e ncourag ing
response to the i r suggestion s, but their compatriots in the
areas of underground and open-p i t mining and in metallurg ical
research be l ieved that most of their advice was fall i ng on
deaf ears.

In 1959 the Miss ion re p orted t o Washing ton t h at

the latter advisors "h ad not f ound the receptivit y expec t ed
of professional mini ng pe opl e" and proposed t h e c e s s ation of
f urther ass i stance in t hese field s.9

-

7Ib i d • ,

P•
..

8.

8Ibid. , p . 9 .

9Project 271-21-035 I CA E-1 Forin , pr e pared November
18, 1959. AID file data.
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While recognizing that the overall reception accorded
American mining men had proved disappointing, Carl R. Ferderer,
USOM Industry Officer, explains:
This was 'partially due to the fact that a great deal
of know-how had been introduced into the country in
earlier years, in part through U.S. technical assistance.
It became apparent that the advice of U.S. experts in
later stages, when most of the mineral resources were
known and in many instances already being developed, was
somewhat superfluous. The caliber of Israeli 3ompetence
in this area was rather high already in 1959.l
Christopher Ryan, Chief of the Mineral Resources
Branch of the Industry, Mining and Transportation Division of
USOM, presents another point of view:
The newness of mineral production to the people of
Israel is undoubtedly res ponsible for lack of progress in
certain areas. Hand in hand with this goes the desire of
the people to find out for themselves rather than to
place implicit tru!t in the dictum of specialists brought
here to help them.
Not only did Israelis frequently display a lack of
interest in .American suggestions, but in those areas where
the use of local currency accumulations required both Israeli
and American concurrence, they did not appreciate having their
judgment questioned.

An industrial expansion loan project,

funded from U.S. owned Israel pounds, provides an example of

11christopher W. Ryan, Israel Minerals (Tel Aviv:
The United States Operations Mission to Israel, 1960),
P•

V.
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this attitude.

Over IL 10 million in project money were

available to the Israel government in 1958 for lending to
industrial applicants.

Since each loan had to be approved

also by USOM, representatives of both governments were in
f reque nt consultation.

Americans felt that the Israel offi-

c i als wished concurrence without careful consideration of the
merits of each loan request.

In addition, as USOM Industrial

Economist Arthur Fraz.er explains:
Moreover such counsel as USOM could provide under the
circumstances, and the doubts it expressed about specific
loan proposals, seemed almost inevitably to be ~aken as a
challenge rather than constructive assistance. 1
Again--and perhaps especially--this inclination to act
independently o~ American viewpo~nts was displayed in reference to the utilization of count e r part funds.

These funds,

it will be recalled, were gener ated by U.S. dollar grants and,
though wholly owned by the goverrm1ent of Israel, could only
be used for pur p oses agre e abl e to t he Unit e d States governmen t .

When employed for loans to Israeli enterprises, coun-

t e r part repayments were made to what was la.belled Account
"C. 11

In 1960 a USOM audit of Account "C" brouBht to light a

number of variations between USOM specific ations pertaining
to periods of loans, terms of interest , and r eporting requirements, and procedures actually followed by GOI. 13

Since no

12Arthu r W. Frazer, "Analysis of Loans Made by the
Government of Israel from Funds Made Available by USOM Under
Pro ject [2] 71-23-237 • 11 See Appendix A.
1 3 11 usm1/I Preliminary Audit Review of Special Account
' C.' " Audit 61-6, October 27, 1960. AID file data. See
Appe ndix G.
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intimation of dishonesty was implied in the matter, the
proper inference seems simply to be that the Israelis considered themselves to be quite as competent as the American
foreigners to determine how to loan and otherwise handle
their own money.

However correct may be this inference and

however justified may have been the attitude that it con-

notes, the government of Israel was still violating details
of terms agreed upon with USOM, which again illustrates their
resistance to American counsel.
As a footnote to the foregoing, in 1969 the writer
was privileged to interview former USOM Controller, John
DeWilde, one of the co-signers of the auditor's report.

Con-

versation ranged over a number of aspects of the U.S. aid
program.

Far from being critical of the Israelis, the writer

found Mr. DeWilde to be lavish in his praise.

He said, "I

found them to be a proud people, a people who had their own
ideas, a fiercely independent people who simply wanted to do
things their own way."
Nevertheless, the desire of Israelis to do things
their own way was one of the problems that the United States
frequently found frustrating.

And while it is not always

possible to transfer the methods of a more advanced economy
to a less advanced economy, the writ er believes that Israel
would have gained greater benefits than it did from the U.S.
assistance offered if Israelis had been more willing to
follow the guidance of the American experts.
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Excessive Costs
Throughout the period under consideration, Israel remained a high cost nation.

This fact plagued the Israel

economy constantly and limited the potential of its imported
economic aid.

Excessive costs stemmed from construction

equipment, borrowed capital, tariffs on imported goods, and a
purchase tax that averaged
goods alike.

15

percent on domestic and imported

Transportation and distribution costs were high,

the former frequentl y because of the location of many industries in out-of-the-way areas and the latter because of monopolistic and inefficient practices.

Poor management and the

high price of power added to other costs that were passed on
by the producer to the consumer.

The result was that con-

sumers were required to devote a large part of their income
to basic necessities and to taxes, leaving little or nothing
for savings that might be channeled to investment.
The most perplexing aspect of production prices to
the end of the period was the high cost of labor in relation
to its productivity.

With few exceptions, the output of man

per hour--whether due to inadequate mechanization, insufficient job training, or other causes--was lower than in
Europe, even though wa ges g enerall y were as high or higher.
Probably the chief continuing reason for excessive costs was
the prevailing labor philosophy t h at emphasized the right of
employees to various social benefits, which served to boost
actual wages 30 to

40

percent above base pay.

Employers were
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obligated to provide pension funds, severance pay or bonus,
sickness insurance, convalescence pay, and so on.

The cost

of commodities supplied for export was so high that they
could not compete on the international market without subsidies derived from tax funds.

All of these factors added

up to excessive costs, demands for higher wages, and to still
higher production costs.

Israel had a high standard of

living, but the economy had not matured to the point where
it could support that standard.
American Limitations and Restrictions
Washington Policy
The United States Operations Mission in Israel was
given considerable latitude in the formulation of programs.
Nevertheless, it was obliged to function within a framework
of regulations laid down by Congress and the International
Cooperation Administr a tion, of which it wa s a part.

These

rules customarily applied to all aid receiving nations
alike and usually involved what was regarded as the best
interests of the United States.

One such pol icy p r evented

help being given to projects which in the long run would
increase exports or decrease import s of commodities in
world surplus.

USOM experts were pe rmitted to f urnish data

on the status and trend of the world market for commodities
and, if requested, to give advice on the wisdom of increasing the production of a particul ar commodity for
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export.14

They could not, however, offer assistance on spe-

cific projects aimed at increasing production of surplus commodities; neither could counterpart funds or U.S. owned local
currency be released for such purposes.

Thus the American

aid program offered little encouragement to the production of
such items as rice, sugar, wheat, vegetable oils, citru s
fruits, cotton, coff ee, a nd tobacco. 15
This policy of not aiding the production of surplus
agricultural comrnodities, while justifiable from the standpoint of the American taxpayer, businessman, and farmer,
inevitably called for exp l anation and clarific a tion on the
part of Israelis who wan ted to see t h eir countr y become selfsufficient.

Israelis found it diff i cu lt to understand how a

rich nation like the United S ta t e s could r efuse to promote
production of a few c ommodi t i e s t ha t it or othe r nations of
the "free world " ha ppened to h ave in abu ndanc e.

To the aver-

age Israeli the seriousness of America's pr oblem of having
too much was not to be comp ared to t he s er i ous ness of his
country's problem of having too little.

However, since

Israelis were able to get as s ista nce a l so from o t h er nations,
including the Unite d Nat i ons, it is doubtful tha t U. S . policy
14ICATO Circular All7, September 19, 1959, p. 2.
file data.

AID

1 5Token assist ance was provided f or a time through a
small project called "Cotton Produ ction (Fiber Crops)" and
another call ed "Cotton Ginning (Fi b er Proce s sing)." These
were superseded by "Field and Hort i cultural Crop s."
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in this regard impeded their country's optimum development to
any measurable extent.
American policy also discouraged the granting of fellowships under the Participant Training Program for study in
countries other than the United States.

This restriction may

have enhanced the Program's political value, but it certainly
limited its economic value.

The mass production demonstra-

tion of America's great industries, for instance, probably
offered little of practical value to visitors from a nation
of small shops and limited markets.

Understandably,

Americans wanted Israelis and others to become acquainted
with their country, its people and institutions, its agricultural methods and industrial techniques, its exportable
services and supplies.

Some Israelis, however, would have

been able to take back more useful ideas than they did if
they had been able to study in a country whose problems and
solutions were more readily applicable to their own country's
situation.
In the evaluation Survey of the Participant Training
Program, discussed in Chapter VI, a considerable n umber of
supervisors of returning participants r egis:te red the opinion
that training would have been more sat isfactor~ if some or
all of it had been in a country o ther than the United States.
Afterwards, however, when the U. S. aid office in Israel submitted to Washington a list of recommendations based on the
survey, the suggestion implied by the sup ervisors' a p praisal
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was conspicuously missing from its proposals. 16

Presumably

aid officials felt that in this public relations type program
Israel's economic benefit should not be the only consideration or else were sensitive to the fact that their Washington
headquarters and Congress felt that way.

In either event,

U.S. policy appears to have restrained the full economic potential of this subprogram of the Technical Assistance/Cooperation
Program in Israel.
Faulty Communication
U.S. aid to Israel was restricted by faulty communication among the several agencies dispensing assistance.
This problem is illustrated by the following complaint from
USOM's acting director, Henry Chalfant, in an airgram to
Washington in the fall of 1960:
There is a serious lack of Country Team participation
in the programs being considered and the studies made by
U.S. and international lending agencies. We have difficulty in obtaining information in respect to economic
studies and proposals being considered by these agencies
including the Eximbank, the DLF and the World Bank (IBRD).
The work of these agencies has a direct bearing on the
planning and execution of ICA local currency programs in
Israel. It would be helpful if ICA/W could arrange for
the participation of USOM in the consideration of the
proposals that affect it. At least it is desirable to
provide USOM with information about them. For example
the IBRD economic report on Israel has remained classified and unavailable to USOM. Presumably U.S. support to
the extent of one third of the budget of the IBRD could
pave the way for a requirement to receive copies of country studies and reports of pertinence to USOM's functions
in the country. The only present source of such information is through the Israel Government and the press.17
16see p. 1.58.
1960.

17usOM/Israel Airgram to ICA/Washington, October 21 ,
AID file data.
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Not only did Chalfant indicate that mission personnel
were frequently in the dark as to plans and activities of
other institutions involved in the task of helping Israel,
but he felt that his own ICA Washington headquarters sometimes also failed to keep them as wel l informed as they
needed to be in order to do their job properl y.

At least

in one important matter he believed that t hey were poorly
informed.

This matter pertained to the accumulat i on of large

balances of local currency in the U.S. Uses a ccounts, balances that exceeded any foreseeable American needs .
states:

Chalfant

"There is a serious lack of informat i on available to

the Country Team with res pect to Washington p lans for use of
these funds. 1118
Inexperience .
U.S. aid to Israel wa s also restricted by American
inexperience.

Americans had the mon ey, but they did not

always have the answe r s.

I n evit ably , the largely unprec e-

dented effort to rais e t he e c onomi c l evel of a devel oping
nation involved a great deal of tri al and error .
technicians made mist ake s .

The U.S.

They sometimes also voiced deep

differences of' opinion among themse l ves as to how development
could best be p romote d .
The Israel Pr oduct Des i gn Of f ice, mentione d i n
Chapter VI, is a good example of limited experience.

As one

of the creations of a technical assistance project in Industrial Design, it was set up to demonstrat e how to start
18Ibid.
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and conduct a successful (government financed) industrial
design company.

In other words, USOM here went beyond its

customary practice of providing equipment and advice and
found itself managing a business.

Three years later, while

the firm was still only half-way self-sustaining, it was
turned over to a private operator.
According to Philip Gillon of the Jerusalem Post, the
Design Office was by no means a failure, but it ran counter
to USO:M purposes and aims in becoming a commercial firm and
so was organized on a questionable ideological basis. 19
Although Carl Ferderer sugg ests that the reason for its difficulties was that the industrial community was not yet prepared to sustain the industrial design firm, he seems to
agree with Gillon.

Ferderer states:

A basic wealmess of the . . . industrial design project was that it demonstrated at Government subs idy how a
typical U.S. industrial design practice works, whereas it
could have concentrated more effort in the direction of
training and indoctrinating many Israeli cornme~8ial artists and designers in the techniques involved.
Inexperience may also be said to have been an i ngredient of opposing views privately expressed by American aid
personnel.

An insight into one such "behind-the-scenes" con-

troversy is revealed in a 1958 office memorandum .

The U.S.

embassy, which customarily reviewed USON decisions, had prepared a dispatch, throu gh its economic section, setting forth
19Philip Gillon, "Mission Accomplished .''
manuscript, 1962. AID file data.
2°Ferderer, Completion of Tour Report, p .

Unpaged

42.
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the principles employed in evaluating "Cooley Amendment"
local currency loan applications.

In the course of the ex-

planation, it had affirmed that there were several unusual
factors that ruled out the criterion of profit as the guide
for what would be best for Israel's economic development.

To

this viewpoint the USOM industry section took exception as
indicated by the following extract from the memo:
To assist and foster enterprises which have little or
no prospect for "profit" is to continue the present drain
on the economy in the form of Government subsidies, promiscuous loans, and other manipulations which are financed
either by contributions from abroad, by direct taxation,
or by indirect taxation which eventually and surely falls
back on the consumer through increased prices and resultant inflationary pressures. Therefore, one of our primary
tasks is to make certain that this futile kind of bootstrap assistance comes to an end as speedily as possible
and channeling our assistance only to those enterprises
which show greatest chance of selfsupport (profit) is one
of the best ways we can be of assistance. There is no
avoidance of this basic economic principle that a country
to be self-supporting must be made up in balance
selfsupporting institutions and commercial endeavors.

~i

T'ne USOM industry section and the embassy economic
section also appear to have disagreed strongly over the relative importance of aiding export industries versus industries
manufacturing for domestic consumption.

The embassy point of

view was that the solution to Israel's balance of payments
problem lay almost entirely in incre asing exports.

The USOM

point of view, on the other hand, was that unless exports
were profitable they probably were not worth aiding at all.
2lusoM Office Memorandum from Arthur w. Frazer,
Industrial Economist, to Mr. Victor H. Skiles, Acting Director,
July 9, 1958. AID file data.
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"There is no point, 11 the memorandum fairly shouts,

11

in pro-

viding assistance to a concern which for every dollar's worth
of goods it exports must turn to the Government for a subsidy
which is in turn financed by contributions from abroad and so
forth."

In particular, the author of the USOM critique

objected to the dispatch affirming that manufacturing
strictly for domestic consumption "would be a classic example
of everyone taking in everyone else's wash."
This statement loses sight of the fact that America
became the industrial giant that it is with the highest
standard of living in the world preponderantly by producing for domestic consumption. Obviously, I do not
overlook the essential role of international trade both
in providing as imports those things which are not indigenously available or cannot be produced locally, or as
exp or ts those products which the c o~_mtry is best suited
to supply to world markets.

. . In. .other
. . .words,
. . . ..
the

. . . .

.... ..

. . .

... .

principal attack on the problem
of the foreign exchange deficit and the general inability
of Israel to support its requirements should be the promotion or fostering an industry wnich will take care,
first and foremost of domestic needs and secondly directing attention to export possibilities only where it has
s~me econo,~c advantage or the prospects for economic
auvantage.
.
Whether or not the embassy's dispatch was modified in

the light of this stern rebuttal would be intere st i ng to know.
The relevant fact for our purpose, though, is t ha t Americans
associated with the U.S. economic as s is tance program, like
Americans in other walks of lif e , represented a diversity of
economic philosophies, know-how, and exper ie nce.

These

finite limitations, here loosely grouped together under the
22 Ibid.

207

label of inexperience, coupled with the aforementioned limitations of overall Washington policy and of inadequate interagency and intra-agency communication, are samples of the
restrictions tha t framed and limited the American aid effort.
In thus noting these shortcomings, the writer is
impelled to confess that the more thoroughly he has examine d
the role of United States economic policy toward Israel the
more impressed he has been with the apparent sincerity and
perception of U.S. personnel connected with the program.
Rather than finding them to be mere dispensers and overseers
of indiscriminate handouts, the writer--judging by their
reports, letters, and memoranda--fou.nd them to be very much
concerned and surprisingly sophisticated as to ends and means
and methods and priorities.

And whi l e the fact that American

officials did not always s e e eye to eye with each other was a
restriction on aid when viewed from the st andpoint of the
ideal of omniscienc e , the ir conflicting i deas may h ave been
signs of a maturing forei gn aid phi l osophy.

CILt\.PTER IX
REFLECTIONS

AND

CONCLUSIONS

Relation of the Program to the
U.S. Balance of Payments
The flow of American dollars abroad in the late

1950 1 s, by way of military expenditures, tourist expenditures,
foreign aid expenditures, and private investments, created a
troublesome problem for the United States.

In the fall of

1960, a presidential directive placed the International
Cooperation Administration under the necessity of prohibiting
use of aid funds for the procurement of commodities and services outside the United States.

The ruling, however, had

little bearing on the Israel program.

To understand why this

was so requires a reexarnina tion of the manner in which U .s.
dollars were utilized.
In the early part of the decade a considerable portion
of Mutual Security Program grants to the government of Israel
was used for the purchase in dollars of commodities from
countries other than the United States.

From 1957 forward,

however, grants were extended solely for the purchase of
American farm surpluses, which meant that the program no
longer contributed to the dollar drain.

Similarly, Mutual

Security loans and -Development Loan Fund loans were given and
employed almost exclusively for the purchase of U.S. goods.
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Export-Import Bank dollar loans were also extended
for the purchase of American co:mmodities; since t h ey were
repayable in dollars, both as to principal and interest, they
had a positive impact on the balance of payments.
The Inf'ormational Media Guaranty likewise presented
no external dollar demand on the economy since it involved
only the dollar reimbursement of American firms f or local
currency accruing to their credit for publications purchased
by Israeli firms.
At the close of the period virtually the only claim
on U.S. dollar reserves that the total aid-to-Isra el program
was creating was being fostered by the small Technical
Cooperation Program.

Th is claim was limited to USOM com-

mitments to meet the contract costs of certain advisory personnel from Europe and of a handful of Israeli participants
in Europe.

Thus, the presidential direct i ve to ICA to

eliminate the purchase of commodities and serv i ces outside
the United States had little relationsh i p to Isr nel.

U. S .

assistance to that country had reached a point where dollar
expenditures for non-U.S. services and supplie s h a d almost
totally disappeared.

Hence, the effect of t he Israel program

on .America's balance of p ayments situa tion was negligible.
Rela.tion of the Program
to U.S. Purposes
Israel emerged on the world scene as a sovereign
state at a time when the United States and Soviet Russia were
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engaged in a "cold war," and one of the focal points of
economic and political maneuvering in that war was the Middle
East.

Americmpolicy became committed to the position that

U.S. national interest was inextricably linked to Israel's
success, and this position had the constant backing of both
parties in Congress.

Govermnent leaders believed t ha t a weak

Israel would present a temp tation to its Arab nei ghbors that
could lead to op en confli~t and the direct or indirect
involvement of Soviet Russia.

Russian intrusion in the

troubled Middle East could le ad, in turn, to its control of
the area's oil resources and a far-reaching u ps e t in t h e balance of East-1,rest military p ower.
World War III.

It could very uell le a d to

America was faced with the choice of extending

to Israel little or no aid, thus letting it wade alone through
a lengthy and hi ghl y vulnerable period of we akness and instability, or e lse of hel p ing it to gain economic and political
viability as rapidly as p ossible.

Although e ither alterna t ive

was fraught with grave ris k s, the less ha zardous course in the

1950 1 s appeared to b e the latter.

And b ecause Israel gained

military aid from other quart ers, the America n government was
able to limit its ass i stance a lmos t ex clusivel y t o e conomi c
aid.
With in the frarnework of a polic y a imed p rin cipally at
the preservation of U . S . military and conn~e r cia l i nterests in
the Middle Eas t, the Unit ed S t a t e s government s ought to a ch ieve
several i n terrelated goals .

It s ought to maintnin t he
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political stability of the Israeli government and its prowestern orientation, although there never was any recognizable
threat of communist penetration or subversion.

Specifically,

it sought to help Israel gain economic independence, which
in the .American view meant independence from all sources of
unearned external assistance other than from contributions
and loans supplied by world Jewry and from normal commercial
credit.

And in connection with helping Israel gain economic

independence, it was the further goal of .4.rnerican aid to
create conditions favorable
to the development of private
.,.,.free enterprise.

From the American standpoint, almost any

form of collectivist endeavor was bound to be less productive
than private business and therefore bound to contribute less
to the goal of economic deliverance.

Free enterprise was not

only more efficient than collectivist enterprise, but it held
forth the prospect of attracting foreign exchange in the form
of investment capital from abroad, which resources would pave
the way for a cessation of U.S . government aid.
In support of the above mentioned goals, some of the
more limited aims of U.S. aid were the encouragement of
investment in agriculture and industry and increased productivity to the end that domestic consumption needs could be
met and more foreign exchange could become available to the
economy through more exports.

Other aims were the develop-

ment of transportation facilities and water resources and
the exploitation of minerals offering prospects for industrial utilization and for export.
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The question as to whether aid to Israel from 1949 to
1960 fulfilled U.S. purposes boils down to:

(a)

whether it

served to reduce the danger to U.S. interests (Israel's existence being one of those interests) in the Middle East and the
consequent threat of war, and (b) whether it served to help
Israel along the road to economic independence.
In respect to reducing the danger to U.S. interests,
it is now plain to see that economic aid did not create a
secure Middle East.

It is altogether possible that American

aid, being associated in Arab eyes with Israel's growing
military power and a skyrocketing population, added to the
area's insecurity.

On the other hand, it is possible that

tensions would have been greater without American aid.

The

Arab states, backed by Soviet Russia, might have misjudged
America's resolution to uphold the Tripartite Agreement,
which guaranteed Israel's borders, and may have undertaken
hostile action in the absence of the U.S. economic aid
investment.

There is also the strong possibility that the

history of the Middle East would have been different in no
major particular if there had been no U.S. A.ssistance, which
comprised only a fraction of Israel 's capital imports anyway.
Arab fear of Israel's intentions was a useful tool of Arab
nationalism and may very well have been played upon by
interested parties despite America's noninvolvement in the
economy.

But these are matters of conjecture.

All that can

be said with comparative confidence is that although U.S.
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aid to Israel and her neighbors did not reduce tensions in
the Middle East and thus eliminate the danger to

u.s.

interests, it helped to buy time in which Israel and her
neighbors, as well as Soviet Russia and the United States,
might seek to arrive at a solution to their differences,
In respect to helping Israel along the road to
economic independence, there can be little question but what
U.S. aid made a positive contribution.

It provided 20 per-

cent of the country's capital imports from 19l}9 to 1960,
This 20 percent generated local currency that was invested
in virtually every sector of the economy and, in the latter
part of the period, it accounted for 10 percent of the
annual increase in the gross national product.
The economic contribution of U.S. assistance cannot
be comprehended in percentages alone, however, but must be
viewed in terms of immigrant refugees whom it helped to
feed and clothe and house and employ, in terms of the sick
and otherwise afflicted persons provided for by agricultural
commodities channeled by the American government through
voluntary agencies, in terms of foreign obligations that
American dollars helped to ease, and in terms of private
investment capital that Israel's economy was the more
readily able to attract by virtue of this dollar aid,

Its

contribution must also be viewed in the light of economically
productive ideas advanced by American experts, in the light

214

of insights acquired by Israelis trained abroad, and in the
light of aid-built railways, pipelines, bridges, and electric
power facilities that laid the groundwork for further expansion of the entire economy.

And although by the end of the

period it had become apparent that economic development takes
a great deal 01· time, it seemed also apparent that Israel was
moving toward the goal of self-sustaining development.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
CASE STUDY OF A LOCAL CURRENCY LOAN PROJECT
FOR INDUSTRIAL EXPANSIONl
Under Section 1O4(g) of Public Law 4eo Title I, U.S.
owned local currency was made available to the government of
Israel in the form of loans for various projects during the
latter half of the 1950 1 s. Among these was a loan program,
called "Industrial Expansion," that was launched in 1957.
To obtain a loan from the g overnment of Israe l out of
Industrial Expansion funds, interested business men were required to submit an application to the Ministry 0 1' Commerce
and Industry. Officials there and representatives of the
Ministry of Finance and of banking institutions all considered the application to determine whether the proposed use
of funds by the applicant would contribute substantially to
the country's economic develo pment. If the committee concluded that the applicant's business would make a contribution,
the application was forwarded with a favorable recommendation
through the Ministry of Finance to the united States Operations Mission for review and possible approval. At the same
time a cop y of the loan applic a tion was also sent to some
Israeli bank, which bank was at liberty to make the loan
out of its own resources if it chose to do so. If USOM
ap9roval were forthcoming, however, the bank could make the
loan out of project funds. For their p art, American aid
authorities sought to evaluate the merits of the applicant's
request in terms of financial soundness and also from the
standpoint of overall econorriic benefit to the state of
Israel.
If they decided both of these in the affirmative, a
letter was sent to the Ministry of Finance indicating approval. If they indicated disapproval , although they seldom did,

lBased, except as otherwise indi cat ed , on a study by
USOM Industri al Economist Arthur W. Frazer, entitled "Analysis
of Loans Hade by the Government of Israel fro111 Funds Made
Available by USOM Under Pro jec t [2J 71-23-237. 11 This study
was submitted as a memorandum to Director John J. Haggerty of
the United St a tes Oper ations Mission/Is rael, February 14,
1959. AID file data.
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the government of Israel would withdraw the application and
submit another one.2
Industrial Expansion loans, at first, came under very
little American control, the utilization of funds being left
almost entirely to the discretion of the governrnent of
Israel. The United States Operations Mission was free to
object to monetary uses in violation of project agreements to
which the f'unds were loaned, but it seldom could get detailed
reports on the individual companies to which the funds were
loaned. The result was that American authorities seldom
knew exactly how the money was being used. During the latter
part of fiscal year 1957 and during fiscal year 1958, however, USOM began to insist upon the preparation and submission of detailed information. To provide the data now
requested was looked upon by the Israeli govermnent as a very
great inconvenience. In fact, the resistance of the government to the innovations was sufficiently strong t hat the
United States Mission resigned itself to little more than a
consultation role. Consequently, althou gh accountancy procedures began to be a little less casual than they had been
earlier, the required information was still inadequate as a
basis for determining whether the loans were contributing as
much as they could to the industrial development of the
country.
In February 1959, under the direction of Industrial
Economist, Arthur Frazer, the Program and Econor.tlc Analysis
Division of USOM undertook an analysis of 102 loan proposals
that had been submitted for consideration under the Industrial
Expansion project in the fiscal year 1958. The proposals
totaled IL 13,632,600, which exceeded the IL 12,965,000
available for lending under the project. Disapprovals, however, amounted to IL 2,876,000, and approvals to IL 10,756,600.
Excluded from consideration in the Frazer analysis was one
rejected loan that, if included, would account for more than
half the total amount of the approved loans. This request
was proposed by the Israel government in behalf of Naza reth
Textile Mills in the amount of IL 6,000, 000 . After USOM
disapproval, a series of discussions ensued to persuade the
Americans to change their decision. In time , the Industrial
Development Bank of Israel, which had earlier also refused
to extend the loan, agreed to grant it after receiving a
government guarantee of the total amount.

211 Loan Program, 11 a memorandum to ICA/::Jashington
Auditor, George A. Harrison, from Kenneth L. Mayall, Assistant Director, Program and Economic Ana l ysis Division USOM,
dated August 27, 1958. AID file data.
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Loans Classified by Industry Categories
The analysis of the 102 loans made clear that there
was no close correlation between the use of funds set forth
in the Project Proposal and Agreement and the way in which
they were actually employed. Evidently both the Israel
government and USOM regarded the proposed use of such funds
as purely illustrative and not binding in detail. For
example, although the Project Proposal and Asreement suggested that the building materials industry receive
IL 350,000 of project funds, the amount actually approved
for it was IL 1,142,500. GOI and USOM also agreed that the
food industry would benefit by IL 1,500,000 in loans and
afterwards approved IL 2,326,500. In contrast, despite the
fact that the agreement had earmarked IL 150,000 for the
ceramics industry, nothing was approved for t hat sector.
Table 17 shows that IL 8,726,000 , comp rising 81 percent of the IL 10,756 , 600 loans extended by the government
of Israel from project funds, helped promote procuction of
food and beverages, textile products, building materials,
metal products, and chemical products. T:C1e significant thing
here is that these five industries represented some of the
most advanced se~nents of the Israel economy and so were less
in need of development than were others. The report characterizes this as an ''overemphasis 11 and "a reflection of the
lack of careful evaluation of other possibilities of industrial development, which would be uncovered during an
industrial development planning process. 11
A comparison of loans granted by the government of
Israel under the Industrial Expansion project with loans extended by the government out of its own Development Program
from November 1955 to March 1958 indicates that these same
five industries received 80 percent of the IL 82.4 million
lent by the government during that period. Virtually the
same pattern held true for loans made by the I ndu strial Development Bank of Israel during t h e first six month s of its
existence, for the Bank extended to these five groups of
enterprises 76.5 percent of all money t h at it loaned.

The pouring of capital into f ive i ndustries that were
already advanced while neglecting t o assis t oth er and more
needy enterprises appears to h ave l acked econ omic justification. And t h e fact that three of t hese--food and bevera ges,
textile products, and building materials--were mainly consumer industries added to the error. It i gn ored the principle that economic developme nt is more ap t to follow investment in basic industries and in industr ie s manufacturing
producer goods than it is to follow inves t~ent in predominantly consumer i ndustries.
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TABLE 17
LOANS CLASSIFIED BY I:NDUSTRY CATEGORIES
Disapproved
or Returned

Approved
Loans

.
.
.

Food and beverages
Textile products •
Building materials
Metal products • . .
Chemical products
Tobacco and tobacco
products
Rubber products
Wood products
Transportation and
storage
Construction
Nonmetallic
mineral products
. .
Clothing
Paper.
. . .
Transportation
equipment
Household
furnishings
•
Industrial
products .

...
.
...
..

..
..
..
.. ..

.

Total.

.. . .
. .
..
..
....

.......

Percent of total

No.

Amount

21
13
8
17
7

1,624,600
1,142,500
1,668,000
1,965,000

2
2
2

237,000
170,000

6

3

18.5,000
278,000

3

1

150,000

2

100,000

.

2,326,500

No.

.Amount

5

1,140,000
150,000
1,100,000

1
3

..

325,000

1

58,ooo

2

375,000

2

102,000

1

50 , 000

90

10,756,6 00
78.9

.

12

4 86,000

..
..
..
• .
.•
..

2, 876,000
20.1

The Fra z er memorandum notices t h at although the
United States Operations Miss ion turned down the r equest of
the government of I srael for an IL 6,000,000 loan to the
Nazareth Textile Mills, it agr e ed to the lending of
IL 3,600,000 to the t extile industry. Frazer calls t h is decision "esp ecially ill considered," for the economy was suffering from an overproduction of t ex tiles. Fur t h e r more, no
large-scale effort was being made to broaden existing markets
and find new ones to absorb the output. Frazer i ndi cates,
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however, that the sum of IL 3,600,000 anticipated for textiles
was afterwards scaled down to IL 1,624,600 in loans actually
approved.
Loans Classified by Character of Ownership
Table 18 provides a surnrnary of the sectors to which
loans were channeled by the government of Israel. USOM personnel, whose task it was to transfer data reported by the
Israelis to forms used by the United State~ found part of
such data difficult to decipher. Tneir inability to understand resulted from the different interpretations of ttprivate
enterprise" used by the Ministry of Finance and the United
States Mission. ~1e Ministry of Finance i nsisted that
industry was private so long as it was not directly owned by
either local or natio na l government and so included in their
report kibbutzim, cooperatives, the Jewish Agency, and Chevrat
Ovdim. The American view was that it included onlv industries
owned by individuals and corporations and assume d that the
Israeli's broad definition was mot i vate d by the t h ought t ha t
it would invite less criticism domestically anc also a less
critical attitude on the part of U.S. aid of f icials in respect
to future loan funds. In Table 18, therefore, allowance is
made for both the GOI and USOM classifications by indicating
"private enterprises II in quotation marks ancl then listing as
subcategories: individual and corporation, cooperatives and
kibbutzim, Chevrat Ovdim, and mixed.
Of the 90 loans approved by USOM under the Industrial
Expansion project, none was made to--nor were any applications submitted by--industries owned by the government of
Israel. Six were approved for public and semipublic enterprises, which, however, accounted for only 2.4. percent of
funds loaned and were mainly used to finance construction of
buildings for small manufacturing endeavors.
Table 18 also indicates that 58 of the approved loans,
comprising two-thirds of the total nurnber, were made available
to private enterprise in the American sens e of the term. The
remaining one-third of the loans approved, 32 in all, went to
the labor economy and to public and semipublic institutions.
This preponderance of loans to private industry, the USOM
analysis suggests, did not, in itself , i ntimate a shifting
trend in GOI development emphasis. It seems fairly apparent
that government authorities were merely channeling applications from private businesses to the United State s Mission
for consideration under the Industrial Expansion project
because they believed American aid representatives preferred
to promote private enterprise.
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TABLE 18
LOANS CLASSIFIED BY CHARACTER OF OWNERSHIP

Approved
Loans
"Private enterprises "
Individual and
corporation
Cooperatives and
kibbutzim
Chevrat Ovdim.
Mixed •

.
..
....
Government . . .

.
.
..
.

No.

Amount

No.

Amount

.
.
.
.
.

58

7,174,100

3

480,000

16
8

6

1,296,000
1,100,000

2

1,643,500
1,450,000
230,000

.

..

......

6

259,000

90

10,756,600

Public and semipublic
Total

Disapproved
or Returned

...• ...

•

3

• •
•

..

•

•

12

.

2,876,000

Twelve loan proposals were disapproved or else returned to the government of Israel. Three of these were applications for sizeable amounts originating with Chevrat Ovdim,
the Histadrut holding company. Six were from cooperatives and
kibbutzim, several of which were Tnuva cooperatives affiliated
with Histadrut. Whether affiliation with Histadrut was a
factor in the foregoing disapprovals and returns the USOM ·
report does not say.
Loans Classified by Size (Capitalization)
of Enterprises
Table 19 lists the Israel government's loan proposals
by amount of capitalization of the enterprises seeking loans.
The USO:M study admits the possibility of inaccuracy., since in
some cases the capitalization had to do with the capital invested by the parent organization while the loan was for a
particular plant. In other cases, information furnished had
to do only with the capital invested in the specific operation
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where the loan was to be used. Nevertheless, taking into
consideration these variations in data, a rather clear picture
emerges.
TABLE 19
LOANS CLASSIFIED BY SIZE (CAPITALIZATION)

OF ENTERPRISES

Approved
Loans

No.

Existing Elants
Under IL 50,000 . • .
IL 50,000 - 100,000 .
IL 100,000 - 200,000.
IL 200,000 - 500,000 •
Over IL 500,000 . • •

14

Total

Amount

Disapproved
or Returned
No.

Amount

9

273,000

1

100,000

13
15

14

795.,000
2,315,600
1.,948,000

l
l

2,356,500

5

150,000
150,000
1,690,000

65

7,688,100

8

2,090,000

653,000

156,000

1,167,000

•
1
1

550,000
150,000

2

400,000

•

•

New plants
Under IL 50,000 • • •
IL 50,000 - 100,000.
IL 100,000 - 200,000 .
IL 200,000 - 500,000.
Over IL 500,000 • • •

6
9
2
1

... ...

25

3,068 , _500

4

786,000

Grand total all plants

90

10,756,600

12

2,876,000

Total

. .

7

548, 500

230,000

..

Of the 90 loans to both old and new plants, 55 were
for firms with over IL 100.,000 capitalization., which in Israel
means middle size to large enterprises. Fifteen of the approved loan reqµests represented companies with a capitalization of more than IL 500.,000. Since the backbone of an
economic complex is small business, it appears that this loan
project failed to attract some of its potentially best customers. As the USOM memorandum observes, small businesses in
Israel did not have the organized influence enjoyed by big
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firms, most of which 11 are owned entirely or in part by government, the Histadrut, the kibbutzim, or other nonprivate organizations which can and do bring effective political pressure
to bear in fulfillment of t heir needs."
Funds were also made available for the renovation and
modernization of equipment, the consolidation of debts, and
the diversion of such funds for working capital. Whereas
something might be said in favor of loans being granted for
renovation of equipment--although even this is less vital to
an economy t han establishing new plant ca pacity--lit tle justification can be given for loans for debt consolidation and
working capital.
Loans Classified by Location of Enterprises
Table 20 of the USOM study shows the geographic distribution of enterprises for which the government of Israel
proposed loans and the average size of such loans.

TABLE 20
LOANS CLASSIFI&) BY LOCATION OF ENTERPRISES

Approved
Loans

. . ... .. .

.
Tel Aviv area
Haifa area
Jerusalem area
Galilee area
. •
Nazareth area
Little Triangle area

...
. .

South:
Ashkelon area
Beersheba area
.
Eilat area

Amount

39

4 ,534,100
1,495,000
957,000
1,023,000

10
8
10

No.

Amount

2
5

715,000
1,255,000

../

406,000

,.
.

..
.. ..

2

155,000

2

351, 000

6
9

1
1

200,000
30 0,000

12

2,876,000

...
.. . .

4

653, 500
1,008,000
580,000

.......

90

10,756,600

.

Total

No.

Disapproved
or Returned
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The most revealing aspect of this tabulation is that
the Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem areas accounted for about
two-thirds of the loans approved--57 of the 90--as also for
two-thirds of the amount loaned.
The surprising thing is, though, that despite tax
concessions by the government of Israel, special land advantages , and loan guarantees for industrial ventures in the
"development areas," such areas were almost by-passed in government loan proposals. It stands to reason, of course, that
since most of the loans went to existing industries instead
of to new industries, they necessarily went to the three major
population centers because that is where most existing industries were located. Nevertheless, the phenomenon seems to
reflect inconsistency of professed aims and actual performance.
Loans Classified by Export Activities
One of Israel's primary economic goals during the
decade of the 1950 1 s was the promotion and encouragement of
industries with high export potential. In order to garner
foreign funds of other countries for purchases abroad, the
government of Israel aimed to aid those firms that would be
the most efficient earners of foreie;n exchange. A look a,t
Table 21, though , acain raises the question of consistency
between aim and action, for 79 of the 102 loan proposals by
GOI were in behalf of nonexport industries, here meaning
industries that had made no exports durinr, the year preceding
their loan application as well as new plants that reported no
anticipated exports.
TABLE 21

LOANS CLASSIFIED BY EXPORT ACTIVITI'SS
Approved
Loans
Nonexport industries
Exports reEorted:
Less than $10,000 . •
10,000 - 50,000 •
50,000 - 100,000.
100,000 - 1,000,000
Over $1,000,000

I

Total. • • . . .

Disapproved
or Returned

No.

Amount

no.

Amount

69

7,729,600

10

2,061,000

i

1

200,000

1

615,000

1

567,000
980,000
40,000
1,340,000
100,000

90

10,756,600

12

2,876,000

1

7

.

.
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Conclusions
The USOM study raises the question as to whether consultations connected with the Industrial Expansion project in
1958 had any influence on the economic thinking of the government. It concludes that the influence was limited:
In terms of the broad objectives announced by the
Government of Israel, and agreed to by USOM, the undertaken counsel and review achieved relativel y little, as
shown throu ghout this analysis.
However, in terms oi' broad objectives too much could
not be seriously expected because of the limitations
upon judgment, t h e resistance by the GOI to counsel, and
the inability of US OM to bring about t h e establishment
of an effective organization within GOI for industrial
development planning .
Consequently t h e review i n USOM was aimed at only
one facet--to mak e certa in in so f ar as possible under
the circumstances that the i ndi vidual enterDrises for
which the loans were prop os ed h ad economic j u stification
and provided r easona ble assurance t h at such f unds were
not being wasted . Even in t h is limi t e d respect, USOM
was able to ac h i eve no more t ha n partial success.
Obviously, the US OM did n ot have facilities to ma ke a
careful and thorough apprais a l, except in a few i nd ividual
instances. Nor did we have the information for an adequate des kside job. Consequ e ntl y USOH was sometimes
talked out of a judgment without, it would seem, adequate
regard to whe ther ou r j u dgment was good or bad.
Moreover su ch counsel as USOM could provide under t h e
circumstanc e s, and the doubts it expressed about specific
loan proposals, seemed almost inevitably to be taken as
a challenge r a t he r than constructive assistance.
On t h e positive s ide of the ledg er, t he USOM cri tique
insists that the revi ew of loan proposals accom.plishe d one
important thing : It defin it e l y established that t h e U.S. aid
agency was vitally conc erned t h at loan fu nds f r om United
States owned or co ntroll ed local currency should be used in
ways that were econorni cally sound and justifiabl e , and that
"it is likely t h at s ome of this conce r n rubbed off." Also
the exchange of views he l pe d t he two departme nts involved-the Ministry of Fi nance a nd the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry--recognize that t he government wa s n ot gaining sufficient information fr om a pplicants to ma k e a c a reful
economic evaluation. I t is possibl ~ t ha t such r ev iew,
therefore, generated a mor e critic a l Israe l i atti t ud e toward
loan programs. Several sugges ted gui 0elines f or future
policy toward developmen t pro jec ts are offer e d by t h e Frazer
memorandum. These may be s umma riz e d as f ollows:
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1. The proposed utilization of funds set forth in
the Project Proposal and Agreement should emphasize aid to
new and w~derdeveloped industries, not well established businesses which can expand within their own means. Also special
care should be taken to guard against "overzealous USOM
technicians whose suggestions n1ay be naturally inclined
toward prejudice in favor of the industry which they represent. This quite clearly occurred in the current PPA. 11
2. The Project Pro posal and Agreement s h ould stipulate that some majority percent of project funds go to new
enterprises instead of to exis t ing ones.

3. The Project Proposal and Agreement probably
should specify that only a certain fraction of funds go to
firms in the areas of Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusn l em. Unless
economic f a ctors dj_ c t ate otherwise, loan fund s shou ld be used
to encourage enterprises in so-called development areas.

4. The Project Prop osal and Agree ment s h ou ld specify
that a certain portion of loan funds go to small business, or
else a separa te proj e c t sh ould be establi she d for that
purpose.
5. The Project Proposal and Agreement should not be
concerned with the question of whether a loan applicant is
engaged in export.
6. Priva te enterpr i se should be encouraged in preference to labor-owned enterpri s es.

APPENDIX B
I SRAEL'S "THIRD ARM" CONCEPT, JANUARY, 19601
I

The ,fol l owing is submitted as background information
on the recently launched "Third Arm" activities designed to
encourage private foreign capital investment in the development of industry and tourism in Israel. The presentation
and analysis, supplemented by tables and appendices, is comprised of three parts, viz.,
I.
II.

De s cri9tion of the "Third Arm" Program.
Summary of Ministry of Commerce and Industry
Projections of Development of Israel Industry, .

1960-1965.
III.
I.

Comments on Investment in Israel.
Description of the "Third Arm" rrogram

The Minister of Commerce and Industry, Pinhas Sapir,
upon his return to Israel at the end of May 1959 from a trip
to South America, released a public document in which he
described a plan for creating a "Third Arm" for the encouragement of capital investment designed to spur industrial
development in Israel.
Mr. Sapir's plan was based on the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's earli er announced projections for
Israel's industrial development, the needs of tourism, and
projections of the probable magnitude of the country's
foreign currency deficit in 1965.
In order to c a rry out the pr ogram for industrial
development as envisaged by Minis te r Sapir, a Working Committee of 14 members was a ppointed comprised of the
following:

1960.

1usoM/Israel Airgrrun to ICA/Washington, February 12,
AID file data. Tables and appendices are not included

herein.
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Co-Chairmen:
Members:

Messrs. P. Sapir and L. Eshkol

Messrs. M.
M.
A.
H.

Tsur, Y.Arnon, T. Kollek,
Zagagi, z. Dinstein, A. Gilat,
Ariely, N. Vidan, M. Bartur,
Jaffe, A. Goldberg, Y. Dagon

The "Third Arm" activities at present are directed
by The Investment Authority, headed by Dr. Zvi Dinstein
{Assistant Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Finance
and, simultaneously, Controller of Foreign Exchange). With
Dr. Dinstein there is an Executive Board consisting of the
Ministers of Finance and of Commerce and Industry, their
Directors-General,and other senior officials as yet undesignated. Immediately subordinate to Dinstein, as an active
working member of the Investment Authority, will be Mr.
A. Ariely, currently Deputy Chief of Inland Revenue, Ministry
of Finance. Mr. Amos Melamed has been appointed as General
Secretary of the Investment Authority.
The Israe.l Investment Center will continue to serv.ice
and· certify ttapproved enterprises" under the Investment Act,
operating under the guidance of the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry. In aadition to the Investment Center, an Investment Services Unit will supply inf'ormation concerning investment opportunities as well as general and specific information. The Unit is headed by Amos Melamed. .I'he Investors
Liaison Bure·au will continue to act as a .field office in a
minor capacit y. ,
'
1

A Secur':ities ,Commission, although not yet chartered,
has been ~ppointe4 to ~ct as a legal re gulatory body.
I '

It . was als.o decided to establish a Public Council,
the primary P,Urposel9f which will be the supervision of the
diverse ac'ti vi ties ne ces'sary f ·o r attracting investors to
develop· 'industry ,a nd tour ism in Israe 1 . The Public Council
will have ·a small executive committee which will work with
the Investment Authority.
The Working Committee reported ly has been meeting
once a week since mid-June 1959 and has set for itself four
major areas of inquiry, viz., (1) legal and i nstitutional
framework necessary for the attraction of foreign capital
investments; (,2) improvement of exis ting institu tions and
activities for the attracti on of investors; (3) a stepped-up
tempo of activity abroad to attract investors; (4) unification of planning programs within the Government of Israel
for the inducement of forei gn inve stment.
The following actions have thus far been agreed upon
by the Work~ng Committee:
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(a) Israel's Law for the Encouragement of Capital
Investment was to be revised in several important respects.
The revised liberalized version of the Law actually was
approved in the closing session of the Third Knesset,
August 1959.
(b) The Minister of Finance will recommend new income tax relief measures for beneficiaries of dividends
earned from securities registered on the Tel Aviv Stock
Exchange which have been approved by the Securitie s Commission.
(c) The Government of Israel will not interfere with
activities of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange but will lend general encouragement thereto in order that the Exchange will
become a source for mobilization of both local and foreign
investment capital. The Government of Israel, in consultation with the directorate of the Te:I. Aviv Stock Exchange,
will help to improve its operation and also will encourage
ties with other world stock markets in order that the Exchange will become a strong medium for public trading and
investment in e~uity capital shares.
( d) The Securities Com111ission will examine the
prospectuses and balance sheets of companies desiring to sell
securities. The Securities Commission will have 12 members
when fully operative, half of whom will be Government of
Israel representatives and the other half representing private business, banking and financial interests. Decisions
will be made by two.:.thirds majority of the Commission's membership. It is reported that the Securities Comiuission will
be headed by M. Zagagi, Deputy Director General of the
Ministry of Finance. Zagagi 1 s immediately subordinate working members on the Commission will be Dr. A. Zelheimer,
Director General of Bank Leumi, and, probably , Zvi Dinstein.
{e) A business rating service is scheduled to be
established under the sponsorship of the Industrial Development Bank of Israel {IDBI), Bank Leumi, Workers' Bank,
Discount Bank, Israel Bank of Agriculture and the Investors
Liaison Bureau.
{f) Vocational courses for workers and administrators
will be established in the general field of investment.
(g) Efficiency and advisory experts will be retained
under contract to assist in the promotion and betterment of
Israel's industrial productivity.
(h) The Investors Liaison Bureau (currently headed
by H. Jaffe) will supply information, both in brochure form
and over-the-desk, to potential investors and will assist
such potential investors in general investment problems.
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(i) National, regional and local comraittees will be
established abroad for the encouragement of investments in
Israel.
(j) Activities of the Israel Investment Center (which
currently maintains overseas offices in New York and Buenos
Aires) will be substantially expanded with at least 8 new
sub-offices to be commissioned throughout the United States
during March, 1960.

(k) An action program designed to . interest international tourists to invest in Israel will be inaugurated
during the upcoming travel season.
The· preparation of pre-investment studies reportedly
will be a responsibility of the Ministry of CoI11T11erce and
Industry, which has indicated an intention to prepare JO new
plans for release during the first quarter of calendar year
1960 in addition to 12 plans which already have been publicized. The preparation of more detailed feasibility studies
reportedly will be jointly shared by a special planning unit
operating within the Ministry of CoI11J.~erce and Industry (or,
alternatively, as a part of the Investment Authority) and by
the prospective investor on his own initiative.
II.

Summary of Ministry of Commerce and Industry

Pro'ections of Develo ment of Israel
Industr
19 0-19
It is assurned that in 1965 Israel will suffer from
the loss of $180 million which currently comprises a very
substantial part of Israel's annual capital in.flow, according
to the following breakdown:
Reparations . . • . . .
Restitutions . • . • .
Israel Bond Conversions

i65

s8_5 million

million
30 million

Further, according to Minister Sapir 1 s projection, Israel's
population is expected to increase from 2 million in 1958 to
2.5 million in 1965. As a result of this 500,000 anticipated
increase in population,which will be composed in large
measure of adult immigrants, it is reasonable to believe that
roughly one-third of the 500,000 anticipated increase, or
about 170,000 persons will be added to Israel's labor force
(i.e. additive to the' current civilian labor force which
numbers about 650,000). Thus, assuming Minister Sapir's
population growth projection to be valid, it will be neces·sary to_ someh9w provide gainful employment for this significantly expanded labor force, with proper recognition given
to the planned dispersal of population to development areas.
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The capacity of Agriculture to absorb new labor is
limited. It is recognized that the principal agricultural
development in the past and prospects for the future have
been and will be the result of accelerated mechanization and
increases in productivity.

Services also have reached a saturation ~e vel and,
as a consequence, most of the additional developments for
Industry can be met by the existing Services structure.
In the past three years, according to Minister Sapir,
Industry has absorbed about 27,000 new employe es, a nd during
the current year it is anticipate d that Industry will absorb
about 9,000 more, thus continuing the average annual absorption rate. The major areas for new employment in the inw1ediate future appear to be in Industry nnd allie d cra fts.
In 1958 the value of Israel 1 o industrial pr oduc tion
amounted to IL 1,715 million, of which IL 1, 540 milli on were
consumed domestically and IL 176 million were diverted for
export.
Industrial production increased very significantly
during the period 1955-1958, yielding an average 11% increase
per annum in fixed prices. It is anticipated t hat the rate
of increase of industrial production during the next five
year period will be roughly 10% per annum in fixed prices;
and, on the basis of this assumption, the value of industrial
production in 1965 should reach at least IL 3,000 million.
Assuming again a population increase of about 25fo
during the next six years and an average annual i n crease of
2;& in cost of living, t he local consumption of Israel 's
total industrial production will reach IL 2,300 million in
1965, as compared with IL 1, 540 million in 1958.

The export of industrial products will increase
accordingly from IL 176 million in 1958 to IL 727 million in
1965. The deficit in Israel ' s Balance of Payments will decrease, as a result, from $333 mil li on in 1958 to $155 million in 1965.
Obviously industrial develop!l'l.ent within I srael on
such a scale will call for very subs tantial ca pi tal investments. Indeed, in order to meet the industrial production
goals, Israel will need IL 1,130 million of investment in
fixed assets and an addit ional IL 475 million of working
cap•i tal for fina ncing local consumption and exp ort. Total
investment neede d thus will reach IL 1,605 million. Propose d
sources for fina ncing the investmep.ts, according to Minister
Sapir., are:
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IL 500 million--from Israel's Development Budget;
IL 200 million--from reserve funds, bonds and banks;
IL 900 million--from local and foreign investments.
(Approximately 50~ of which, it is
anticipated, will derive from earnings and reinvestments on the part
of currently active companies.)
III.

Comments on Investment in Israel

Since inception of the State of Israel the Government
has, in pursuit of unrequited capital transfers, either wittingly or unwittingly created abroad an impression that Israel
is an anti-capitalist minded country whose raison d'etre has
been a spirit of personal sacrifice and rugged pioneering,
coupled with social benefits which are concomitants of a
welfare state. The very success of Israel's appeal has
enabled the State to sponsor the erection of large scale
enterprises without adequate prior consideration having been
given to the capacity of these State conceived and State
sponsored and/or financed enterprises to survive as economic
units.
This appeal to the emotions of world Jewry through
the "First Arm" (United Jewish Appeal), and through the
11 Second Armn
(Bond Drive), undeniablJ has yielded very substantial capital inflow, the utilization of which has been
subjected to rigid control by the Government of Israel. It
is interesting to note that Germ.an reparations and U.S.
official assistance, almost equally important during recent
years in terms of overall magnitude in relation to Israel's
total capital inflow from unrequited sources, somehow seem
to have been overlooked by Israel's very capable Council of
Economic Ministers as falling within the definition of
"Arms."
There is no doubt whatsoever that these two elements, even though not classified as "Arms," have been very
important legs without which Israel would have found it difficult indeed to have progressed to a point where the "Third
Arm 11 concept now may become meaningful.
While acknowledging that among the most serious problems thwarting industrial development in Israel has been a
precarious military security situation in the general Middle
East area, which heretofore has been an investment deterrent
of unmeasurable magnitude, perhaps the more crucial bind has
been in the form of controls, shortage of working capital
and profitability. Other allied considerations have been
income tax levies and the ease with which non-residents
could invest in Government of Israel bond emissions as contrasted to the difficulties encountered in making a direct
investment.

233

The announced commercialization of Governmentcontrolled development enterprises in Israel, in conjunction
with the "Third Arm" concept, constitutes a notable revolution in investment possibilities both for local and foreign
private investors. The offer of stock of Governmentcontrolled development corporations, Government encouragement
of Tel Aviv Stock Exchange activities, nnd Government
encouragement to the listing of Israeli private enterprise
shares on foreign boards are positive forward steps.
It would thus appear that the Government of Israel in
launching the current private investment drive anticipates
that through solicitation of middle class investors some
IL 300-400 million in capital investment credits can be
mobilized within the next 3-4 years. Particularly influential or major investors will be sought out personally by
Messrs. Sapir, Eshkol, Dinstein, Tsur, Manor and Horn.
In its current drive to promote private cap ital investment in Israel, the Government of Israel apparently has
reached some sort of agreement with the Israel Bonds Drive
organization to use their administration for launching
"Third Arm" activities in the United States, Canada, Latin
America, Europe and the Union of South Africa. It would of
course be desirable from a purely business point of view to
disassociate the private investment capital mobilization
drive from the Israel Bonds sales appeal and, hence, the
Israel Bonds Drive organization. Emphasis on the purely
business aspects of private investment capital opportunities
in Israel might yield a better long-run pay-off.
Israel's new Law for the Encouragement of Capital
investment has been an important forward step, an essential
prerequisite to a meaningful and sincere "Third Arm" campaign.
An interesting innovation for the attraction of foreign capital has be e n the recent establish.ment in Detroit of
an "Israel Investment Club.u Membership consists of a small
number of fairly substantial financiers and businessmen who
will meet once a month for the purpose of reviewing investment opportunities in Israel. The "Club" reportedly consists
of 20 members who have n1ade initial deposits of $1,000 each
with the 11 Club 11 treasurer, and are committed to make additional deposits of $ 100 monthly. At such time as at least
$30,000 is reflected on the 11 Club 11 treasurer's books, an
investment will be selected. According to Nr . Shimon Horn,
who directs activities of the Israel Investment Center in
New York, it is anticip ated that perhaps as many as 500 such
clubs can be est ablishe d in cities throughout the U.S. during
the next year or two, and that each club will averag e 2-3
investments of $30 ,000-50,000 annually.
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Among internationally prominent promoters and chairmen of new investment groups are:
Sam Rothberg (U.S.)
Sam Bronfman (Canada)
Isaac Wolfson (Gr. Br .)
Baron de Rothschild (Gr. Br.)
By way of illustration, "Anglo-Israel Securities
Ltd. 11 recently was activated in London. Financial institutions behind the new company include the Roth schilds,
Warburgs, Samuel Montagu and Peter Samuel. Chairman of the
Board is M. P. Sir Henry d 1 Avigdor Goldsmidt. Directors
are Edmond de Rothschild, Peter Samuel, Charles Seligman,
Lord Swayaling and M. P. Harold Lieber. An encouraging
aspect of the "Anglo-Israel Securities Ltd." philosophy is
its soft emphasis on sentimentality and its heavy emphasis
on financial profitability.
Among senior Israeli officials with whom USOM has
regular contact, there has developed a general acknowledgement of the necessity for improved productivity, easing of
iJ.nport-export licensing problems, relaxation of exchange controls and the necessity for channeling domestic savings in
increasing measure into investment. Significant progress has
been made in each of these separate areas during recent
months as well as in managerial efficiency, costing, quali ty
control, etc. Simultaneously, there has evolved a belief
that Jews abroad, part i cul arly t n ose residing in the United
States, are prepared to listen to the GOI's rationale for
investment in Israel on a bu s iness basis as a substitute for
the heretofore prevalent emotional appeal. Thus it is the
intention of the "Third Armtr to "sell" both the American
middle class investor as well as to certain American group s
wishing to set up subs i diari e s the idea t hat Israel is the
logic al place for such investment. Active :'selling " soon
will begin in such diverse areas of industri al activity as
f orgings, glass, optic als, weaving , carbon b lack , pharmaceuticals , pigments, possibly paints, s peci alized chemicals,
minerals. Israelis with whom USOM has di scu s se d this program
appear to be both enthusiastic concern ing inauguration of the
new policy and confident a s to its pr ospects for winning
through.
Thus, changing attitudes among prominent members of
world Jewry may be in large measure res p onsible for emergence of the "Third A.rm 11 concept as a new dLnension in t h ought
for financing Israel's industrial developme n t needs and hopefully could lead to a h ighly beneficial socio-economic end
result.

APPENDIX C
TEXT OF NOTE PRESENTED BY THE AMBASSADOR OF
ISRAEL, ABBA S. EBAN, TO THE SECRE'f-?-RY
OF STATE-·-REQ,UEST FOR GRANT-IN-AIDJ.

1. The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments
to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to
submit herewith a request by the Government of Israel for
financial assistance by grant-in-aid from the United States
of America, to the extent of $150,000,000 for the period
.July 1, 1951, to .June 30, 11952.
2. After estimating its potential sources of foreign
exchange for that period, and notwithstanding the remarkable
efforts and sacrifices which the people of Israel are making
toward the attainment of economic stability, the Government
of Israel still faces the prospect of a considerable dollar
deficienc y . If this shortage cannot be made good, it will
become impossible to maintain living standards even at their
present reduced level, while Israel's industrial and agricultural development is liable to become impeded , or even paralyzed, thr ough lack of continuous supplies of raw materials
and capital goods. On the other hand, the availability of
adequate dollar exchange would enable Israel to advance
rapidly toward increased productivity and economic equilibrium during the coming few years of heavy immigration.

3. The Govern...~ent of Israel has observed the historic role of the United States aid programs in enabling many
other friendly countries, in similar emergencies, to achieve
rapid economic recovery. It also recalls with gra titude the
many acts testifying to the special ties of friendship between the peoples of the United States and Israel. In that
spirit the Government of Israel now calls attention to its
economic problems, many of which g o far beyond the normal
scope of national responsibility.

4. Immediately upon the proclamation of its independence and while still struggling against heavy odds for
lu. s . Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs ,
The Mutual Security Program, Hearings on H.B. 5020 and H.R.
5113, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1~, pp. 651-655.
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sheer physical survival, Israel set itself to discharge the
primary mission for which it was established. Waves of immigration have converged upon Israel from all parts of the
world, especially from Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe,
and from Islamic countries in West Asia and North Africa.
The Jews remaining in Central and Eastern Europe are but the
pathetic remnants of once prosperous communities whose manpower and institutions were ruthlessly consumed by murderous
persecution unparalleled in the annals of history. Their
desire to abandon the scene of their people's agony and martyrdom is overpowering. It is reinforced by their inborn
preference for a life of democratic freedom in a society
which upholds as the chief focus of national pride the very
Jewish traditions and associations which had been the target
of such brutal persecution in Europe. On the other hand, in
many parts of the Moslem world Jewish minorities have lived
for centuries under an inter1nittent and precarious tolerance,
punctuated by periods of disorder and oppression. In recent
generations the rise of a strong national consciousness
throughout this area has imparted to Jewish minorities a
sharpened sense of separateness and insecurity. At the same
time, the echoes of Israel's achievement have awakened a
messianic urge for redemption, which makes Jewish minorities
in Arab countries increasingly unwilling to sustain a lot so
stoically borne by their ancestors for centuries past, as
long as it seemed inexorable. An independent state which
makes the absorption and rehabilitation of Jewish i:ro:rnigrants
the central purpose of its life has become a compelling magnet to all Jews who lack freedom and dignity in their present
abodes. This is one of the spontaneous and irresistible
movements of mass migration which have revolutionized the
history of peoples. In recent months the threat of world
conflict has added a fresh incentive to Jewish immigration-a desperate urge to find shelter before the storm breaks,
and while liberty of movement still remains.

5. While the rate ann scale of immigration to Israel
are largely determined by conditions in Europe and the Moslem
world, Israel's resolve to accept immigrants without restriction is animated by a sense of inescapable responsibility.
The people of Isra el are themselves, for the most part,
i:ro:rnigrants--survivors of pogroms and persecution; they lmow
well that to refuse entry to their kinsmen now may mean the
renunciation of that crucial opportunity forever. Indeed,
some countries have actually established official deadlines
before which all prospective emigrants must leave. It is
inconceivable that Israel can incur the moral responsibility
for whatever might befall Jews who seek adlnission to Israel
and are denied it. Jewish communities throughout the world,
and especially in the United States, have spent much effort
and sacrifice on Israel's behalf, in the clear expectation
that they were thus establishing a permanent haven for all
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oppressed and insecure Jews in need of a home. It is noteworthy that President Trwnan's reco:mm.endation in 1946 for the
transfer of Jewish displaced persons from Europe to Palestine
marked the beginning of the United States specific interest
in the search for a solution to this problem. Thus, every
circumstance of humanitarian concern and moral principle compels Israel, with the fervent approval of its own public and
of Jewish opinion everywhere, to uphold and maintain freedom
of immigration. Moreover, from the viewpoint of Israel's
own interest, even if heavy immigration is accounted an economic liability in the short term, it must certainly in the
long run be regarded as an asset, since it will enhance
Israel's self-reliance, its economic strength, and its creative capacity.

6. The conditions which g overn the scale of immigration to Israel can we ll be illustrated by reference to the
Jews of Iraq. When the Government of Iraq allowed Iraqi Jews
to register for emigration, it was thought by many observers
that no more than 30,000 would exercise that option. In
fact, about 105,000 out of a total 130,000 Jews registered
for emigration and made plans to leave for Israel. On receiving permission to leave the country, an Iraqi Jew loses
his citizenship, whereupon it becomes urgent to effect hi s
emigration without delay. In recent months, the Government
of Israel has been exhorted by the Governments of the United
States and by the United Kingdom to rnake every effort to
speed up the evacuation of Iraqi Jews. The Government of
Israel, in pursuance of its own policy, has increased the
monthly rate threefold in full knowledge of the resulting
aggravation of its financial problems.

7. As a result of this immigration, the dominant
feature in the life of Israel is the spectacular increase
of its population. On May 14, 1948, the Jewish population
of Palestine was 650,000. Between that date and the end of
1950, 511,000 immigrants have entered the country, representing a 78-percent increase in the over-all population total.
About half a million new immigrants are expected to arrive
within the next 3 or 1+ years. By the end of 1951, Israel
will have trebled its population mainly by irmnigration.
This rate of population increase has no pre cedent; manifestly
it calls for a financial effor t on an unusual scale.
8. In receiving these im.~igrants Israel has solved
problems which would otherwise fall on international agencies
and on other governments, For example, the admis sion to
Israel of nearly all Jews from displaced persons camps in
the American zone of Germany has directly liberated the
United States Treas ury from a considerable and continuous
expenditure. For many years the European r efugee problem
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had baffled the resources and capacity of the refugee organizations established under the auspices of the League of
Nations and the United Nations. Israel has absorbed large
numbers of refugees who were the objects of this international
concern, without even having received any reparation from
Germany for the wholesale spoilation and destruction of Jewish
property in Europe. Moreover, by absorbing Jewish communities
which were living in conditions of insecurity or discrimination, Israel has eliminated potential points of friction and
instability in more than one area of the world.

9. The difficulty of financing the absorption of
this enormous population increase has been aggravated still
further by Israel's defense burdens. At its very inception,
Israel was forced to mobilize all its resources in fighting,
alone and unaided, its battle of survival against overwhelming odds. The aggressive onslaught of the Arab States was
successfully repelled; yet their persistent refusal to conclude a final peace settlement continues to strain the resources of Israel by necessitating heavy defense expenditure,
on which also the mounting international tension has an
inevitable bearing.
10. In addition to the burdens imposed by innnigration and defence, the Government of Israel has undertaken to
make its due contribution toward the solution of the Arab
refugee problem in the Near Ea st. It has declared its willingness to support the reintegration fund to be established
by the United Nations by paying into it funds accruing from
compensation for abandoned Arab lands, on the understanding
that such funds will be used for the permanent resettlement
of Arab refugees in conditions which would conform with
their own welfare and with the ultimate stability of the
Near East. Under this arrangement, which has been publicly
announced in the United Nations, Israel is probably assuming
a heavier financi al commitment in the Arab refugee problem
than any other single member Government, notwithstanding the
fact that the problem itself was actually created in the
course of a deliberate attempt to destroy Israel's existence,
as a result of which Israel sustained heavy and widespread
material damage.
11. A country which increases its population by
80 percent in 2 1/2 years, while simultaneously sustaining a
heavy burden for its defense and preparing to make a substantial financial contribution toward the solution of the
Arab refugee problem, cannot obviously develop its productive
resources to the exte n t required by these vast burdens without massive outside assistance. Israel, however, has itself
made a maximal effort to solve the economic problems with
which it has been confronted. This effort has been made in
two directions. On the one hand,the standard of living of
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the population has been drastically reduced. On the other
hand, every possible means has been adopted to increase production in both agriculture and industry, with impressive
results. Whereas the population increased by 80 percent in
2 1/2 years, agricultural production rose during the same
period by 70 to 80 percent and industrial production by 40
to 50 percent. It is clear, therefore, that IsrRel is seeking supplementary external aid only after having imposed
upon itself heavy sacrifice and considerable self-denial.
12. The magnitude of the effort which Israel has
put forth for its own economic development is illustrated by
the achievement of net new investment of approximately the
equivalent of $190,000,000 in the calendar year 1949, and of
approximately $275,000,000 in 1950. This new investment was
equivalent to more than 25 percent of Israel's total national
income in 1949, and to more than 30 percent of the national
income in 1950. Yet, Israel now proposes further to raise
its annual investrn:~pl; target to the equivalent of approximately $500,000,000. There is no choice; no lesser target
would be compatible with the full productive employment of
Israel's people. But it is obvious that the gap in the balance of payments, whiph is the most striking expression of
Israel's economic difficulties, cannot be closed by its own
exertions in the immedi a te future.
13. Since heavy immigration seems certain to continue for the next 3 or 4 years, the consequent dislocation
of Israel's economy i s bound to persist for that period.
The very measures which Israe l is adopting to add to its
productive capacity are liable, in the sh ort run, to increase
the disturbance in the balance of payments. The required
diversion of Israel's own resources from production for current consumption to inve stment work will crea te inflationary
pressure on scarce suppli e s of con sm11.pt ion goods. Israel is
grateful for the great contribution to her long-term productive facilities which is being made through the credits of
$135,000,000 received from t h e United St a tes Ex port- I mport
Bank. Israel also places gre a t relianc e f or her economic
development on the resources for procuc tive pur p oses which
will be sought through the sale of bonds t o the public in
the United States of America. The se imp orts for specific
investment purposes, however, ne e d t o be s upplemented by a
diversion of I srael's own produc tive capacity from consumption needs to the producti on of ca pit al goods. The grantin-aid from the Government of the United States, for which
the Government of Israel i s herewith applying, would bridge
this gap in the ava i l abi lity of consumption goods until the
increased production of Isra e l , which will be the consequence
of the capital imports, can catch up with t he needs of the
population and assure economic stability. This American aid,
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extended over a brief period of time, can lead to the achievement of Israel's economic equilibrium, in full conformity with
the concept of -economic recovery which has inspired the aid
programs of the United States since their inception.

14.

Most prominent among the purposes for which
grant-in-aid assistance is requested is one most directly
connected with immigration: If the immigrants are to be employed productively, they must have houses near their places
of work. The house to be provided is of the simplest character, having an average total cost of approximately IL 750,
the equivalent of $2,100. At the present time, many tens of
thousands of immigrants are in huts and tents. The average
housing rate of the population of Israel is three persons
per room, while a large part of the population lives at the
standard of five persons per room. To alleviate this shortage, it is proposed to build approximately 70,000 housing
units in the year July 1, 1951-June 30, 1952, to accommodate
roughly 250,000 persons. The total cost would be approximately $150,000,000--and Israel is reconciled to the need
for meeting by far the larger part of this total cost from
its own resources. A grant-in-aid of approximately
$30,000,000 is neeaed to meet foreign exchange costs of
materials, imported fixtures, and construction machinery.
Israel's own investment in the program would be four times
as great as the requested grant-in-aid.
15. Grant-in-aid assistance in the form of supplies
needed specifically to restrain the stress of the ini'lationary pressures is requested in the amount of $105,000,000.
As mentioned above, in the year July l, 1951-June JO, 1952,
Israel will be attempting to raise her total investment
towards the target of an annual rate of approximately
$500,000,000. Even under a system of austerity, Israel will
require, in the year July l, 1951-June 30, 1952, at the price
levels which prevail today, about $225,000,000 of imports
apart from imports for specific investment purposes.
16. An additional grant-in-aid of approximately
$15,000,000 is requested for the insurance and shipping costs
connected with the delivery of the above commodities in
Israel. This amount has been estimated on the assumption
that the affected commodities would be purchased not only in
the United States but also in other friendly countries, from
which shipping costs might in some cases be lower than from
the United States.
17. The specific uses of the requested grant-in-aid
might then be outlined as in the following table:

APPROXIMATE LIST OF PURCHASF.S TO BE FINANCED
1ilTH REQ,UESTED GRANT-IN-AID

A. Materials, fixtures, and equipment required
to be imported for the construction of
70,000 housing units
•••...•..••

$ 30,000,000

B. Supplies required to restrain the

ini'lationary pressure of the investment
and defense programs:

...
. .
.
..
...
.
..

( a ) Wheat
$ 25,000,000
•
(b) Fodders
.
• 15,000,000
( C) Oilseeds
. .
10,000,000
(d) Fertilizers and
. . .
seeds
10,000,000
(e) Cotton, other fibers,
and textile materials 10,000,000
(f) Leather, hides,
chemicals, and
minor materials
10,000,000
(g) Petroleum
• 2~1,000z000

...
.....

·. C. Shipping and insurance services •
Total

. . . . . .

..

.

..

. . . . . . . . . . . .

105,000,000
l5zOOOzOOO
$1.50,000,000

18. The close link between economic stability and
political freedom is becoming increasingly understood in all
parts of the world. The future of Israel's social and political system is an issue of direct consequence to the cause of
world democracy. Israel has established a parliamentary
democracy in an area where democratic ideals a nd principles
have not yet struck deep roots. While many coun tries have
recently achieved institutional freedo m, not all have simultaneously fought with any marked effect aga ins t the traditional social and economic inertia which condemns countless
multitudes to a life of squalor and miser y- . Unless democracy
proves its capacity both to insure pol itical freedom and to
realize a vision of society ba s ed on expanding horizons of
material welfare and cultural progress, it will find itself
hard-pressed in its struggle to compete against feudal traditionalism on the one hand and modern negations of political
democracy on th~ other. The success of Israel's efforts to
combine political freedom with economic progress will certainly affect the prestige of democracy in the crucial area
of which Israel is a part. Israel's experience and achievement in soil conservation, land development, irrigation,

technological research, industrial progress, as well as in
cooperative organization and social freedom, are intimately
relevant to the most acute problems which afflict such wide
areas of the Near East with conditions of backwardness and
dearth. Thus, any strengthening of Israel's efforts to
achieve a high degree of development must be regarded as a
contribution to the progress and stability of the entire
Near East. For, despite the transient political conflicts
which now divide it, the Near East cannot in the long run
fail to be affected by progressive examples. In this respect,
too, aid to Israel would fully conform with the principles
which have determined the United States• aid programs.

19. On June 20, 1922, the Congress of the United
States of America unanimously recorded its sympathy for the
"aspirations of the Jewish people to rebuild their ancient
homeland." On December 19, 1945, the Congress, in a concurrent resolution, advocated the establishment of a democratic
commonwealth in Palestine "to the end that the country should
be opened for free entry of Jews." In a resolution of greeting on the anniversary of Israel's independence in May 1950,
the United States Senate paid tribute to the emergence of
Israel as an objectLve in which the American people had indicated their sympathetic interest for many years. In the last
three decades successive Presidents of the United States have
ass ociated the American people, by close bonds of syrn.pathy
and support, with the rebirth of Israel as a modern embodiment of an ancient tradition which bequeathed to the world
some of the basic moral ideals on which western civilization
is founded. At every decisive stage in Israel's recent development, the efforts and sacrifices of Israel's people, and of
Jewish communities working for Israel's welfare, have received
notable support from the President, the Governraent, and the
Congress of the United States of America. American representatives in the United Nations have carried this policy
into the highest international forum. Israel will always
feel the most profound gratitude for the memorable steps
taken by President Trum.an and the Government of the United
States in favor of the reestablishment of an independent
Israel, its official recognition, and its formal ad.~ission
to the world community . In seeking the support of the United
States for its arduous task of economic development and consolidation, and for its unprecedented efforts in providing
homes for so many within so short a time, the Government of
Israel is advocating the maintenance and extension of a traditional relationship firmly established in the hearts of
both peoples.

APPENDIX D
DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC LAW 480 TI "rLE III FOOD
SURPLUSES UNDER HADASSAH PROJ'.2CT "416 11 l
The Hadassah Council in Israel
Jerusalem, P.O.B. 1078
Ref. AL/2

January 29th, 1960

Mr. John J. Haggerty
Director U.S. Operation [sJ Mission

u.s.o.M.

Tel-Aviv
Dear Mr. Haggerty,

It is with a sense of genuine gratitude and privilege
that I forward to you the enclosed report of our Chairman,
Mrs. Esther Grunwald, on Hadassah's Project "416."
Hadassah hails America's share in maintaining the nutrition standard of the needy in Israel. The high protein character of the surplus foods you offered for distribution constituted a very much lacking protective margin for the health
of Israel's under-privileged children and otherwise undernourished people.
As no doubt you know, Hadassah's motto is, "The healing
of my people." For close to ,50 years our central p rogram has
been directed to this end. Hence Hadassah, as an all American
organizati on, feels especially proud of its Government's share
in helping them fulfil their high purpose.
As Chairman of the Hadassah Council in Israel, I extend
to you and your colleagues sincerest appreciation for cooperating with us so fully and sincerel.y in the American spirit
of brotherhood.
Gratefully yours,
Julia A. Dushkin
Mrs. A.H. Dushkin, Chairman
HADASSAH COUNCIL IN ISRAEL

enc.
1 AID file data.
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Hadassah Project

"416"

Before proceeding to give a short report on the
activities o:r the Hadassah Project 11 416 11 since its inception,
I would like to use this opportunity to express deep appreciation :for the ready cooperation and understanding the
Project always met a.t the hands of those gentlemen of the
United States Operations Mission in Tel Aviv with whom we had
close contact: In particular I wish to mention Mr. George
Peterson, Mr. Christian Jensen and Mr. S. Norfolk. I also
wish to thank the officials of the Ministry of Finance and
Ministry of Trade & Industry of the Israel Government who
were always ready to advise on our problems and to help in
any way possible.
In the spring of 1955 negotiations were started in
the USA for the distribution by Hadassah of American Surplus
Foods in Israel, and the negotiations culminated in an
arrangement between the USA Government and Hadassah on the
basis of Hadassah's Plan of Operations dated September 7th,
1955. Mrs. Denise Tourover of Washington represented the
interests of Hanassah in all these negot i ations and visited
Israel in the autumn of that year to co:nple te arrangements
locally and with the u.s.o.M. in Tel A.viv, since Mrs. Rose
Viteles who was to serve as Hadassah Representative in Israel
in respect of this Project was in the USA at the time,
Messrs. Robert R. Nathan Associates of Was h ington, served as
liaison between the USJ. Government Departments and Hadassah
in the USA from the first days of negotiations, on technical
matters, and later arranged all shipments to Israel. Messrs.
Nathan Associates have been most helpful throughout the
period of our activities and we use this opportunity also to
extend our thanks to them.
Mrs. Tourover during her visit to Israel left with
the u.s.o.M. office in Tel Aviv a copy of Hadassah 1 s Plan of
Operations which the Director, Dr. Rugh, forwarded to Washington on September 16th, 1955, with a copy of a letter from
Mr. Z. Dinstein giving the Israel Government' s approval to
the scheme. In accordance with the terms of t he Plan,
Hadassah was to receive every possible a ssistance from the
Israel Government, including the wa ivi ng of 011stoms duties on
surplus commodities imported by the Had a ssah Project. An
Advisory Committee was set up i nc luding representatives of the
various Government Departments- -Finance, Social Welfare and
Trade & Industry, as well as r e presentative s of the Jewish
Agency Settlement and Absorption Department s , Youth Aliyah,
and the Nutrition Department of t h e Government Education
Department. This Committee served us faith f u lly and well,
and we are grateful to the members wh o gave u s t h e time we
demanded.
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A small office was set up in the premises of the
Hadassah Council in Israel, and the first request for supplies was submitted by Hadassah in New York on the basis of
lists prepared by the Ministry of Social Service in respect
of 281,000 needy persons.
Hadassah was empowered under the Plan of Operations
to make a pro rata charge to the recipient bodies--but not to
the actual beneficiaries of the food--to cover all expenses
of handling, administration and distribution. Since large
sums were required at that date for the payment of ocean
freight, the Israel Government advanced a sum of IL. 50,000
as a Revolving Fund until sufficient sums were in hand to
serve as working capital.
The first shipment, butter and cheese, was dispatched
from the USA in January 1956 and the first distribution of
these commodities was made in February 1956. As from that
date, in accordance with the arrangements made, U.S.O.M. in
Tel Aviv received the following reports:
a) A monthly stock report;
b) A detailed monthly list of withdrawal certificates
issued;
c) A scheme giving the proposal for t~e next month's
allocations;
d) A fuller stock report at the end of every 3 months
for the whole period com..-rnencing with the first
shipment onwards.
In addition, from January 1959 a holf yearly report
was submitted on Form PD/(?J the first nubmitted was for the
period July 1st to December 31, 1958.
Since the Project was a temporary one, terminable at
any time, Hadassah decided not to open warehouses but made
arrangements instead with Messrs. Hamashbir Hamercazi to act
as warehousemen and distributors of the butter and cheese,
on their behalf, for a trial period. The rate paid to them
was to cover all expenses for storing, insurance while in
stores, distribution and reporting, and in the case of the
small institutions and villages, Hamashbir Hamercazi would
also make delivery as such places could not make their own
arrangements for transportation . Hamashbir Hamercaz·i had
the necessary connections and apparatus for such delivery,
particularly to the immigrant villages.
The Cold Stores held the butter and cheese in the
name of Hadassah Project "416" and issued quantities from
time to time to Hamashbir Hamercazi against orders from the
Project. After the trial period expired, the services of
Hamashbir Hamercazi were retained and they also warehoused

and distributed to the recipient bodies rice, beans and milk
powder as they arrived, against Withdrawal Certificates
issued monthly by the Hadassah Project. After the first
year's experience a new method of reporting was introduced
whereby Hamashbir Hamercazi warehouses each had to submit a
report monthly showing quantities held at the beginning of
the month, connnodities received and detailed information on
withdrawals. The reports bore the signatures of the recipients and Hadassah received with the reports the first copy
of the Withdrawal Certificate it had issued to these
recipients.
Hadassah not only distributed very much needed commodities for indigent people in institutions, but undertook
a piece of educational work by showing the new immigrants how
to use butter and cheese as spreads on bread. The Nutrition
Department of the Government Education Department assisted by
giving Food Demonstrations and issuing recipes.
The Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid,
International Cooperation Administration in Washington,agreed
to pay the ocean freight on all shipments of surplus foods as
from April 1957, since the Israel Government undertook to pay
all inland transportation costs from Port to Warehouses, in
addition to waiving customs dues on such commodities. The
Government of Israel paid approximately IL.24,000 for inland
transportation from April 1957 to the date of Ha-dassah's last
shipment received in May 1959. Special reports on shipments
had to be submitted to the Voluntary Aid Committee within
three months of shipment. This assistance resulted in the
reduction of overhead expenses in the Project and the pro
rata charge to recipient bodies was therefore considerably
reduced.
Mrs. Julia Dushkin became Hadassah Representative in
Israel when Mrs. Rose Viteles left for the USA in May 1957
where the latter became the National Board liaison officer
with Hadassah Project 11 416 11 in Israel ancl continued in this
capacity until her death in July 1959. When Mrs. Dushkin
became Chairman of the Hadassah Council in Israel later in
the year, Mrs. Esther Grunwald was appointed Hadassah Representative and served until the winding up of the Project in
January 1960.
In May 1957 milk powder was received for the first
time and Hadassah again undertook an educational piece of
work in teaching new immigrants from Oriental and even
European countries in the use of this conunodity. For over a
year the Project was in the happy position of distributing
four connnodities--cheese, rice, beans and milk powder--sent
by the USA Government a.s 11 A Gift from the People of the
United States of America" for the needy. Most of the institutions had very small food budgets and the addition of
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these commodities free--except for the small pro rata charge
mentioned to cover Hadassah 1 s expenses--meant that they were
able to purchase more vegetables than they would have otherwise done.
Since the USA Government was expanding the distribution of Surplus Foods throughout the world, they decided on
the introduction of special forms for estimates of requirements which had to be in Washington early in the spring of
each year for the following fiscal year. Before submitting .
such estimates to u.s.o.M. in Tel Aviv for their countersignature, Hadassah had to obtain the approval of the Ministry
of Finance both to the commodities and the quantities requested.
In accordance with the Plan of Operations Hadassah was
fully responsible for the commodities it received up to the
point of distribution to the recipient bodies at the warehouses. At the request of both u.s.o.M. and the Israel Gove r nment , Hadas~ah in the summer of 1958 increased the number
of its Inspectors to enable closer checks to be made at the
premises of the recipients as to the proper use of the commodities and the stocks at their disposal. This, however,
involved an increase in the pro rate charge as the additional
expense was substantial.
At the same time the definition of 11 needy 11 came under
dis cus s ion and after talks with representatives of u .s.o.M.,
Ministries of Finance and of Social Welfare, who again all
showed much understanding, and gave much thought to the problem, it was agreed that the definition of 11 needy 11 appearing
in Hadassah's original Plan of Operations, i.e. those persons
unabl e to pay for their own maintenance, should continue to
s er ve as the basis for future estimates and for the distribution of the commodities received.
For the fiscal year 1959 Hadassah Project received
milk powder and cheese only. However, when a consignment of
cheese arrived in October 1958, we also got the news that it
would probably be the last shipment of that comraodity for the
fiscal year 1959. About the middle of 1959 a decision was
taken by u.s.o.M. and the Israel Government that Hadassah discontinue distributions to the Jewish Age ncy villages and
immigrant settlements (kibbutzim) ;-ti- this meant considerable
curtailment of the program of Hadassah Project. From information received later it became clear also that only milk powder
would be available for di stribution in 1960. Hadassah,
*According to u.s.o.M. Director, John J. Haggerty,
"That decision was taken b7t the Government of Israel without
consultation with u.s.o.M.'

therefore, considered the feasibility of continuing its
special apparatus for the distribution of only milk powder
to a very much reduced number. As u.s.o.M. required the same
measure of inspection and supervision, it would hove meant
increasing the pro rata charge considerably for those continuing to receive the connnodity. After much consideration and
consultation with the necessary authorities, Hadassah most
reluctantly decided to wind up the Project in December 1959
when the cheese stocks would be exhausted.
A quan tity of mil k powder was still held at 31st
December 1959 and with the approval of u.s.o.M. it was distributed as stock to a few institutions in January 1960 (16
tons) with the balance of 502 tons going to CARE and MALBEN
to enable the latter to fulfill their own programs for 1960
as they had, in the meantime, been advised that they would
not be receiving t he i r full milk powder requirements from
the USA.
I am attaching a table showing the quantities shipped
from January 1956 and distributions throughout the whole
period, a.s well as the value of the commodities in accordance
with the Bills of Lading, but it ml.lBt be pointed out that the
real value of these commodities was very much higher. I am
also attaching lists giving categories of recipients and the
quantities they received during the whole period, as well as
the numbers of persons in the different categories.
Hadassah in distributing the Surplus Foods so generously contributed by the Government of the United States of
Alllerica may, I feel, look back with satisfaction to another
service well done for that sector of the population which so
greatly benefited from the Surplus Foods.
In conclusion I would like to use this opportunity
to express deep gratitude and thanks to Mrs. Amelia Finebloom
who was appointed Administrator of the Project in March 1957
and conducted the work with her customary effi cie ncy, devotion and dedication to a task.
Esther B. Grunwa ld
Esthe r B. Grunwald
Hada ssah Representative &
Chairman
HADASSAH PROJECT "416 11
January 1960

APPENDIX E
ISRAEL: SURPLUS AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIF.Sl
Agreement, with agreed minute and memorandum of understanding,
signed at Washington November 7, 1957;
Entered into force November 7, 1957.

AGRICUL'IURAL COMMODITIES AGREEMENT BE~HEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AUD THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL UNDER TITLE I
OF THE AGRICUL'IURAL TRADE DEVELOP:MEJ.'ITT
AND ASSISTANCE ACT
The Government of the United States of America and
the Government of Israel:
Recognizing the desirability of expanding trade in
agricultural commodities between their two countries and
with other friendly nations in a manner which would not displace usual marketings of the United States of Ainerica in
these connnodities, or unduly disrupt world prices of agricultural commodities;
Considering that the purchase for Israel pounds of
surplus agricultural commodities produced in the United
States of America will assist in achieving such an expansion
of trade;
Considering that the Israel pounds accruing from
such purchases will be utilized in a manner beneficial to
both countries;
Desiring to set forth the understandings which will
govern the sales of surplus agricultural commodities to the
Government of Israel pursuant to Title I of the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act, as amended, and the

lu.s.

Department of State, United States Treaties
Other International A reements, Vol. 8, pt. 2. TIAS No.
, November 7, 19 , pp. 220 -12.
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measures which the two Governments will take individually
and collectively in furthering the expansion of trade in such
c ommodi ties ;
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Sales for Israel Pounds
1. Subject to the issuance by tne Government of the
United States of America and acceptance by the Government of
Israel of purchase authorizations, the Government of the
United States of America undertakes to finance the sale to
purchasers authorti ed--by the Government of Israel, for Israel
pounds, of the following agricultural commodities determined
to be surplus pursuant to Title I of the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act in the amount indicated:
Commodity

Atnount
(Million)

Wheat
Corn and Grain Sorghuma • !Vegetable Oil
Tallow
Butter
Cheese
Non-fat Dry Hilk
Dry Hhole Milk
Prunes
Cotton
Tobacco
Ocean Transportation
(Estimated 50 percent)

$ 9.30

TOTAL

$35 . 00

8.70

1.70

.40

6.90

1.30

2.20
.20
.10

.80

.15

3.25

Purchase authorizations will be issued not later than
90 calendar days after the effective date of this agreement.
They will include provisions r elating to the sale and delivery
of commodities, the time and c i rcumstances of deposit of the
Israel pounds accruing from such sale and other relevant
matters.

-31-Amended February 4, 1958, to read "and barley. 11

I

I

Article II
Uses of Israel Pounds
1. The .two Governments agree that the Israel pounds
accruing to the Government of the United States of America
as a. consequence of the sales made pursuant to this agreement
will be used by the Government of the United States of
America, in such manner and in order of priority as the Government of the United States of America shall determine, for
the following purposes, in the amounts shown:
(a) To help develop new markets for United States
agricultural commodities, for international educational
exchange, for financing the translation, publication and
distribution of books and periodicals, and for other
expenditures by the Government of the United States of
America under Subsections 104(a), 104(d), 104(f) and
104(i) of the Act, the Israel pound equivalent of
$5.25 million.

.

"·/

\

(b) For loans to be made by the Export-Import Bank
of Washington under Subsection 104(e) of the Act and for
administrative expenses of the Export-Import Bank in
Israel incident thereto, the Israel pound equivalent of
$8.75 million, but not more than 25 per cent of the currencies received under the agreement. Su ch loans will
be made to United States business firms and branches,
subsidiaries, or 'a.ffi·lia tes of su ch firms in Israel for
business development and trade expan sion in Israel and
to United States firms, and Israeli fi r ms; f or the establishment of facilities for aiding in t h e utilization,
distribution or otherwise increasing the consumption of
and markets for United States agricultural products. It
is understood that su ch loans will be mutually agreeable
to the Export-Import Bank of Washington and t he Government of Israel. The Minister of Finance, or his designate, will act on the behalf of the Gov ernment of Israel
in this matter. In the event the Israel pounds set aside
for loans under Subsection 104(e ) of sa id Act are not
advanced within three years from the date of this agreement because Export-Import Bank of Washington has not
approved loans or because proposed loans have not been
mutually agreeable to Export-Import Bank of Washington
and the Minister of Finance, the Government of the United
States of Amer i ca may use the Israel pounds f or any purpose authorized by Section 104 of the Act .
(c) For a loan to t he Government of Israel to pro mote the economic development of Israe l under Subsecti on
104(g) of the Act, the pound equivalent of $ 21 million

the terms and conditions of which will be included i n a
supplemental agreement between the two Governments. It
is understood that the loan will be denominated in dollars, with payment of principal and interest to be made
in United States dollars, or, at the option of the Government of I.srael, in pounds, such payments in pounds to
be made at the applicable exchange rate as defined in
the loan agreement, in effect on the date of the payment.
It is further understood that loan funds shall be disbursed only after prior agreement as to the uses of such
loan funds. These and other provisions will be set forth
in the loan agreement and any agreement supplemental
thereto. In the event the Israel pounds set aside for
loans to the Government of Israel are not advanced within
three years from the date of this agreement as a result
of failure of the two Governments to reach agreement on
the use of the Israel pounds for loan purposes, the
Government of the United States of America may use the
Israel pounds for any other purpose authorized by Section
104 of the Act.
2. In the event the total of Israel pounds accruing
to the Government of the United States of America as a consequence of sales made pursuant to this agreement is less
than the pound equivalent of $35 million, the amount available for the loan to the Government of Israel under Subsection
104(g) would be reduced by the amount of such difference; in
the event the total pound deposit exceeds the equivalent of
$35 million, 60 per cent would be available for the loan, and
the balance for such use under Section 104 as determined by
the United States Government.
Article III
Deposit of Israel Pounds
The deposit of Israel pounds to the acc ount of the
Government of the United States of Americ a i n payment for the
commodities and for ocean transportati on cos t s financed by
the Government of the United States of America (except excess
costs resulting from the requirement t ha t United States flag
vessels be used) shall be made at the rate of exchange for
United States dollars general ly applicable to import transactions (excluding imports granted a preferential rate) in
effect on the dates of dollar disbursement by United States
banks, or by the Government of the United States of .America,
as provided in the purchase authorizations.
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Article IV
General Undertakings

1. The Government of Israel agrees that it will take
all possible measures to prevent the resale or transshipment
to other countries, or the use for other than domestic purposes (except where such resale, transshipment or use is
specifically approved by the Government of the United States
of America), of the surplus agricu ltural commod ities purchased pursuant to the provisions of this agree~ent, and to
assure that the purchase of such commodi t ies ooes not result
in increased availability of these or like commodities to
nations unfriendl y to the United Statee of Ame rica.
2. The two Governments agree t ha t they will take
reasonable precaution to assure that sales or purchases of
surplus agricultural commodities pursuant to this Agreement
will not unduly disrupt world prices of agricultural commodities, displace usual marlcetings of the United States of
America in these commodities, or materially impair trade relations among the countries of the free world.

3. In carrying out this Agreement the two Governments will seek to assure conditions of commerce permitting
private traders to function effectively and will use their
best endeavors to develop and expand continuous market demand for agricultural co1mnodities.

4. The Government of Israel agrees to furnish, upon
request of the Government of the Un ited States of America,
information on the progress of the program, particularly
with respect to arrivals and condition of commodities and the
provision for the ma inte nance of usual ma r lrn tings and information relating to exports of the same or like co:rnrnodities.
Article V
Consultation
The two Governments will, upon the request of either
of them, consult re ga r ding any matte r r el at ing to the application of this Agreeme nt or to the opera tion of arrangements
carried out purs uant to this Agreement.
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Article VI
Entry into Force
This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective representatives,
duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the present
Agreement.
Done in duplicate at Washington, D.C. this seventh
day of November,

1957.

FOR THE GCVERN1'1ENT OF THE

UNITE:D STATES OF AMERICA
William M. Rountree
FOR THE GOVERm-m:N'T OF

ISRAEL
Abba Eban
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AGREED MINUTE BETWEEN THE NfilOTIATORS FOR THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE NEGOTIATORS
FOR ISR.!\.EL RELATIVE TO THE AGRICULTURAL
COMMODITIES AGREEMENT, SIGNED
NOVEMBER 7, 1957
The United States representatives secured the following understandings from the representatives of Israel:
1.

Usual Marketings

Wheat. The amount of $9.3 million (about 150,000
M.T.) has been agreed to under Title I, Public Law 480, on
condition that Israel provide assurance it will import
245,000 M.T. during the United States fiscal year 1958 from
free world sources of which at least 125,000 M.T. will be
imported as usual marketings for dollars from the United
States, and on the further condition that exports of wheat
by the Government of Israel during FY 1958 consist onlI of
durum wheat and be limited to no more than 10,000 M.T.''"
Further, it is understood that the Government of Israel will
procure with other funds an amount of wheat equivalent to
that exported over and above the amount agreed to be procured
as usual marketings (i.e. 245,000 M.T.).
Corn and Grain Sor ums. The $8.7 million (about
190,000 M.T. has been agreed to under Title I, Public Law
480, on condition, as heretofore agreed upon, that Israel
provide assurance it will import 20,000 M.T. during FY 1958
as usual marketings for dollars.
Tallow. The $0.l+ million (about 2 ,000 M.T.) has been
agreed to under Title I, Public Law 480,on condition that
Israel provide assurance it will import a minimum of 900 M.T.
as usual marketings for dollars from the United States during FY 1958.
Vegetable Oil. The $1.7 million (about 5,000 M.T.)
has been agreed to under Title I, Public Law 480, on condition that Israel provide assurance it 1;ill import from the
United States as usual marketings for dollars during FY 1958
an amount of oil seeds or oils having an oil equivalent of
8,000 tons.
Prunes. The $ 0.1 million (about 500 M.T.) has been
agreed to under Title I, Public Law 480, on condition that
*Amended February 4, 1958, to read

11

22,000 M.T."
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Israel provide assurance it will import a nunimum of 150 M.T .
as usual marketings for dollars from the United States during
FY 1958.
Cotton. The $0.8 million (about 5,000 bales) has
been agreed to under Title I, Public Law 480, on condition
that Israel provide assurance it will import 10,000 bales
during FY 1958 as usual marketing for dollars.
Tobacco. The $0.15 million (about 90 metric tons)
has been agreed to under Title I, Public Law 480, on condition that Isra·e l provide assurance it will import $1.50 ,000
worth of tobacco during FY 19.58 as usual marketings for
dollars.
2.

Currency Uses

It is understood that, in view of the agricultural
surplus problem in the United States, careful attention will
need be given to the inadvisability of using economic development loan funds under section lOL~ ( g) for projects either
in the field of governmental or private i nvestment which
would reduce export outlets for United States agricultural
commodities. This applies to any project whether or not
related to proj ects financed by the Export-Import Bank of
Washington, the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, or the International Finance Corporation. Projects for such purposes as expansion or improvement of livestock production, storage, processing and distribution facilities; development of forestry resources; or other purposes
which would not have the effect of reducing export outlets
for United States agricultural commodities would be considered on an individual basis.

3.

The representatives of the two Governments agree d that
in connection with agricultural market development activities
in other countries the Government of Israel will provide the
equivalent of $300,000 worth of Israel pounds in European
currencies or other currencies to be agreed upon or facilities for the conversion thereof. It i s al so understood that
the Government of the United States of America may utilize
Israel pounds to procure in Isra el goods and services needed
in connection with agricultural market development projects
and activities in other countries. Furthermore, the representatives of the two Governments a greed that t he Government
of the United States of America may utilize the equivalent
of $100,000 worth of Israel pounds in Israel to pay for international travel between the United States and Israel, including connecting travel. In this connection the Un ited States
representatives agreed that preference will be given to use
of Israeli flag lines.
Done at Washington, D.C. this 7th day of Novomber,1957.
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MEMORANOOM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE GOVERlTI1ENT OF
ISRAEL

In arriving at mutual agreement concerning loans
eligible under Subsection 104(e) the Minister of Finance, or
his designate, will act for the Government of Israel, and
the President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, or
his designate, will act for the Export-Import Bank of Washington.
As soon as practicable after receipt of an application which the Export-Import Bank is prepared to consider,
the Export-Import Bank will notify the Ministry of Finance
of the identity of the applicant, the nature of the proposed
business, the amount of the application and the general purposes for which the loan proceeds would be expended.
When the Export-Import Ban1c approves or declines an
application, it will notify the Ministry of Finance.
Within sixty days after the receipt of notice that
Export-Import Bank has approved an application, the Ministry
of Finance will indicate to Export-Import Bank whether or
not the Ministry of Finance approves the proposed loan.
Unless within the sixty-day period the Export-Import Bank
has received such a communication from the Ministry of
Finance, it shall be understood that the Ministry of Finance
has no objection to the proposed loan.
In approving a loan, the Export-Import Bank will (1)
fix an interest rate similar to that prevailing in Israel on
comparable loans; and {2) establish maturities similar to
those of Export-Import Bank dollar loans to private enterprises.
To t h e extent necessary additional proceoure will be
negotiated between Export-Import Ba!1k and the Hinis try of
Finance.
Done at Washington, D.C. this seventh day of
November 1957.
A.E.

W.R.

APPENDIX F

ISRAEL TECHNICAL COOPERATION1
Agreement signed at Tel Aviv May 9, 1952; entered
into force May 9, 1952.
AGREEMENT FOR A TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAM BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND TIIB GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL
The Government of the United States of America and
the Government of Israel
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Pursuant to the General Agreement for Technical Cooperation, signed on behalf of the two Governments at Hakirya
on February 26, 1951, a technical cooperation program shall
be initiated in Israel. The obli gations assumed herein by
the Government of Israel will be performed by it through a
representative to be designated by it. The obligations
assumed herein by the Government of the United States of
America will be performed by it through the Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State, an agency
of the Government of the United States of America {hereinafter referred to as the "Administration"). The Ad.ministration, on behalf of the Government of the United States of
America, and the representative,on behalf of the Government
of Israel, shall participate jointly in all phases of the
planning and administr ation of the coopera tive program. This
agreement and all activities carried out pursuant to it shall
be governed by the terms and conditions of the said General
Agreement for Technical Cooperation.

lu.s. Department of State, United States Treaties
and Other International A~reements, Vol. 3, pt. 3. TIAS No.

2570, May 9, 1952, pp. 42 8-65.
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Article II
It is agreed that the objectives of this cooperative
program are:
1. To promote and strengthen understanding and good
will between the peoples of the United States of America and
Israel, and to further the secure growth of democratic ways
of life;
2. To facilitate the economic development of Israel
through technical cooperation between the two governments;
and

3. To stimulate and increase the interchange between
the two countries of knowledge, skills and techniques in the
field of economic de ve lopment.
Article I I I
It is agreed that this cooperative program will
include:
1. The furnishing by the Administration of a field
party of specialists (hereinafter referred to as the
"Technical Mission") to collaborate in carrying out the
cooperative program.
2. The development and carrying out of activities
of the following type
a. Studies and surveys of the needs of Israel in
the fields of agricultural development, public health and
sanitation, elementary and vocational education, b a sic transportation, and other activities related to the economic development of Israel; analysis of the resources availab le to
meet these needs; and the formulation and cont i nuous adaptation of a program adequate to enable it to meet su ch needs;
_ b. The initiation and administrati on of projects in
the field of technical cooperation for economic development
pur suant to written operational agreements between the CoDirectors of the Joint Fund herein provided for, which may
include activities of the foll owing t ypes: agricultural
devel9pment including irriga t ion, reforestation and soil conservation; expansion of diversified farmin g , citriculture and
fishing; food stora ge and processing; expan s i on and effective
operation of bas ic trans portation fac i lities; h ous ing ; establishment and effective operation of commu ni ty facilities for
health and education; fostering of vocational training and
the acquisition of technical skills; fosterin g exploration
and industrial engineering re l ated to the use of Israel's
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natural resources; and such other projects in the field of
technical cooperation for economic development a,s they may
hereafter mutually agree upon;
c.

Related training activities.
Article IV

The Technical Mission shall be of such size and composition as the Administration shall deem advisable, and
shall be under the direction of the Administration's Director
of Technical Cooperation, who shall be the immediate representative in Israel of the Administration in connection with
the program covered by this Agreement. The Director of Technical Cooperation and the other members of the Technical '
Mission shall be selected and appointed by the Government of
the United States of America but shall be acceptable to the
Government of Israel.
Article V
There shall be established an agency of the Government of Israel to be known as the "Israel-American Joint
Fund" (hereinafter referred to as the "Joint Fund") for the
use of which there shall be established one or more special
bank accounts in banks satisfactory to the representative of
the Government of Israel and the Director of Technical Cooperation. All funds deposited to the credit of the Joint
Fund under the terms of this Agreement shall be available
only for the purposes of this Agreement . The representative
of the Government of Israel and the Director of Technical
Cooperation shall serve as Co-Directors of the Joint Fund.
Article VI
1. Each project, co~stituting a part of this cooperative program, shall be embodied in a written operational
agreement which shall be agreed upon and signed by the
Co-Directors, shall define the kind of work to be done , shall
determine the allocations of funds required therefor, and may
contain such other appropriate matters as the parties may
desire to include. Upon substantial completion of any project, a Completion Memorandum shall be drawn up and signed by
the Co-Directors, which shall provide a record of the work
done, the objectives sought to be achieved, the financial
contributions made, the problems encountered and solved, and
related basic data.
2.

The selection of specialists, technicians and
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others to be sent to the United States of America or elsewhere at the expense of the Joint Fund pursuant to this program, as well as the training activities in which they shall
participate, shall be determined jointly by the Co-Directors.

3. The general policies and administrative procedures that are to govern the cooperative program, the carrying out of projects, and the operations of the Joint Fund,
such as the disbursement of and accounting for funds, the
incurrence of obli gations of the Joint Fund, the purchase,
inventory, disposition and end use control of property, the
appointment and discharge of officers and other personnel
paid out of the Joint Fund, the terms and conditions of their
employment, and all other admi n istrative matters, shall be
determined jointly by the Co-Directors.

4. The Government of Isra e l will mn ke
the Government of t h e United S tates of Ame rica
tunity to ascertain the uses mad e of the f unds
pursuant to para graphs 2 and 3 of Article VIII
Agreement.

avai lable to
full oppormade available
of this

Article VII
It is agreed that t h e projects to be undertaken in
accordance with this Agreement may include cooperation with
national, municipal, and oth er local governmental agencies
in Israel as well as with organizations of a public or private character, and international organizations of which the
United States of Amer i c a an d I s rael are members. By agreement between the Co-Directors, contributions of funds, property, services or facilities by eith er or both parties, or
by third parties, may be accepted and deposited for the ac count of' the Joint Fund for use in effectuating the cooperative program, in addition to the funds, property, s ervi ces
and facilities contributed by the two Governments under this
Agreement. These c ontributions may includ e tr an sfers of
such portions of the Israel pound funds de posi t ed i n the
special account created pursuant to para graph (4) of the note
on behalf of the Government of the United S t ates of America
dated February 27, 1952, accepted on behalf of the Government
of Israel on Febr uary 27, 1952, as the Government of the
United States of America ma y approve .
Ar ticle VIII
The parties hereto shall contribute a nd make available, to the extent provided below, funds for use in carrying out the program during the period covered by this Agreement, as follows:
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1. The Government of the United States of America
during the period from the date of signing of this Agreement
through June 30, 1952 , shall ma ke available the funds necessary to pay the salaries and other administra tive expenses
of the Technical Mission which the Government of the United
States of America may incur in connection with this program
except as made available by the Government of Israel under
Article X. These funds shall be administered by the Administration and shall not be deposited to the credit of the Joint
Fund.
2. In addition, for the period from the date of signing of this Agreement through June 30, 1952, the Government
of the United States of America shall make available to the
Joint Fund a maximum of $800 ,000 (eight hundred thousand dollars), in currency of the United States of America, for
agreed projects. The two Governments agree that the dollar
contributions of the Government of the United States of
America will be needed for commitment outside Israel. Therefore, the entire amount of such contribution shall be retained
by the Administration for com..mitment and expenditure pursuant
to request by both Co-Directors of the Joint Fund in accordance with the terms of the agreed projects. All commitments
made by the Administration pursuant to such request shall be
credited as contributions made by the Govern..ment of the
United States of America to the Joint Fund.

3. The Government of Israel, for the period from
the date of the signing of this Agreement through June 30,
1952, will de posit into the Joint Fund an amount of Israel
currency at least sufficient to cover all local currency
expenses of the project covered by this Agreement. In ar...y
event, however, ths local currency deposits by the Government of Israel shall not be less than the Israel currenc y
equivalent of the amounts of dollar commitments which the
Government of the United States of America notifies the
Government of Israel from time to time have been made pursuant to the requests of the Co-Directors of the Joint Fund .
The exchange rate to be used in computing the amount of such
equivalent contribution in Israel currenc y shall be the par
value for the Israel pound agreed with the International
Monetary Fund in effect at the time of each deposit, provided
that this par value is the single rate app licable to the
purchase of dollars for commercial transactions in Israel.
If there is no such agreed par value or if there are two or
more effective rates that are not unlawful for the purchase
of dollars, the rates used shall be the effective rates
(including the amount of any exchange tax, surcharge, bonus,
or value of any exchange certificate) which , at the time of
deposit, are applicable to the purchase of dollars for the
respective purposes for which the dollars made available
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herein are to be used. The Government of Israel agrees to
deposit additional sums of Israel currency into the Joint
Fund, to the maximum extent feasible with the financial resources of that Government as required for additional projects within the scope of this cooperative program.

4. Subject to the provisions of Paragraph 2 of
Article VIII of this Agreement, no f unds shall be withdrawn
from the Joint Fund for any purpose except by issuance of a
suitable withdrawal document signed by both the Co-Directors
of the Joint Fund. The Co-Directors shall include, in the
deposit agreement to be made with the Bank, a provision that
the Bank shall be obligated to repay to the Joint Fund any
monies which it shall pay out from the Joint Fund on the
basis of any document other than a withdrawal document that
has been signed by both the Co-Directors.
5. The parties hereto may later agree in writing
upon the amount of funds that each will contribute and make
available each year in succeeding years for which United
States a.id may be provided for use in carrying out the
program.
Article IX
Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the balances of all funds deposited to the credit of the Joint Fund
shall continue to be available for the cooperative program
during the existence of this Agreement, without regard to
annual periods or fiscal years of either of the Governments.
All materials, equipment and supplies acquired from the
assets of the Joint Fund shall become the property of the
Joint Fund and shall be used in the furtherance of this
Agreement. Any such materials, equipment and supplies remaining at the termination of this cooperative program shall
be at the dispo~ition of the Government of Israel.
Article X
The Government of Israel, in addition to the cash
contribution provided for in Paragraph 3 of Article VIII
hereof, may, at its own expense, pursuant to agreement between the Co-Directors:
1. Appoint specialists and other necessary personnel
to collaborate with the Technical Mission;
2. Make available such office space, office equipment and furnishings, and such other facilities, materials,
equipment, supplies, and services as it can conveniently
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provide for the cooperative program covered by this Agreement;

3. Make available the general a-ssistance of the
other governmental agencies of the Government of Israel for
carrying out the cooperative program.
Article XI
Interest received on funds of the Joint Fund and any
other increment of assets of the Joint Fund, of whatever
nature or source, shall be devoted to the carrying out of the
program and shall not be credited against the contributions
of the Government of the United States of America or of the
Government of Israel.
Article XII
Subject to the provisions of Article VIII, that port i on of the contribution made available by each country to
the Joint Fund remaining unobligated at the termination of
t his Agreement, will be returned to the respective government s in the currency in which the contribution was made
u nle ss o therwise provided by ·written agreement between the
t wo Gov ernments.
Article XIII

1. 'The Governnent of Israel agrees to extend to the
J oint Fund , and to 311 personnel employed by the Joint Fund,
a ll r ights and privileges which are enjoyed , under its laws,
by agencies of the Government of Israel or by their personnel.
Such r ights and privile ges shall include, to the extent that
they are available to oth13r agencies of the Government of
Israel , but s ha ll not be limited to: free postal, t elegraph,
and telephone service; passes on railroad s administe red by
the Government of Israel! the ri ght to rebates or preferential rates allowed by domestic comp8.nies of ma ritime or river
naviga tion, air travel, telephone , t elegraph , or other services; as well as exe111p tion from excises, imposts and stamp
taxes.
2. Tne rig..~ts and privileges referred to in
Paragraph 1 of this Article XIII, pertaining to connnunications, trans portation and exemp tion from excises, imposts,
and stamp taxes sha ll also accrue to the Administra tion and
personnel of the Government of the United States of America
with respect to oparations which are related to, and property which is to be used for, the cooperative program.
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Article XIV
In the event that either Government is unable to contribute funds required for the Joint Fund for any period after
June 30, 1952, the Joint Fund shall continue to operate with
such funds as remain unexpended, such contribut ions as the
other Government may contribute to the Joint Fund, and contributions received from third parties pursuant to Article

VII.
Article X:-1
The Govern."Tlent of Isra e l will so de posit, segregate,
or assure title to all f u nds allocated to or derived from
any program of assistance underta ken b y the United States
Government so that such funds shall not be subject to garnishment, attachment, seizure, or other le gal process by any
person, firm, agency, corporation, organization, or government when in the opinion of the Government of the United
States of America such legal process would interfere with the
attainment of the objectives of the program of assistance.
Article XVI
The parties hereto declare their recognition that
the Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department
of State., being an a gency of the United States of America,
wholly directed and controlled by the Government of the
United States of America, is entitled to share fully in all
the privileges and immunities, including immunity from suit
in the courts of Israel., which are enjoyed by the Government
of the United States of America.
Article XVII
Any right, privilege, power or duty conferred by
this Agreement upon either of the Co-Dire c tor s may be delegated by either of them to any of h is respe c ti ve assistants,
provided that each such delegation be sati sfactory to the
other. Such delegation s hall not limit t he ri ght of the
Co-Directors to refer any ma tte r dire c t ly to one an other for
discussion and decision.
Article XVII I
The Government of Isra e l will ende avor to obtain the
enactment of such le g isla tion and take such executive action
as may be required to carry out the terms of this Agreement.
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Article XIX
This Agreement may be referred to as the "Joint Fund
Program Agreement." It shall enter into force on the date
on which it is si gned and shall remain in force until three
months after either government shall have given notice in
writing to the other of the intention to terminate it, provided, however, that the obligations of the two Governments
under this Agreement for the period after June 30, 1952,
shall be subject to the availability of appropriations to
both parties for the purposes of the program and to further
agreement of the parties pursuant to Article VIII,
Paragraph 5 hereof.
Done in duplicate at Tel Aviv this 9th day of May,

1952.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF IS RAEL
M.

Sharett
(seal)

FOR THE GOV3:RNMENT OF THE
UNIT~D STATES OF AMERICA
Monnett B. Davis
(seal)

APPENDIX G
USOM/I PRELIMINARY AUDIT 1
REVIEW OF SPECIAL ACCOUNT

ncn

-

AUDIT 61-6

Purpose and Scope
The basic agreement on the Release and Utilization of
Counterpart Funds for loan purposes provides that repayments
to the GOI of principal and interest on counterpart loans be
deposited in a special account to be known as Account II C".
In February, 1958, the Ministry of Finance of the GOI submitted to USOM/I five tables purporting to show complete financial data on loans originating from Counterpart funds released
by USOM/I , and the amounts of deposits made or to be made to
Acc ount "C" in repayment of principal and interest on these
loans (Attachment I).
In order to ascertain the propriety of these deposits,
this audit was made to determine the extent of GOI compliance
with the basic Agreement and Annexes on the release and Utilization of Counterpart Funds for loans. This preliminary review of Account 11 C11 represents partial accomplishment of the
annual review required by M.O. 704.6.
Procedures Governing the Release of Loan F~ds
The Agreement required that the GOI submit to USOM a
request for the release of counterpart funds for recommended
loan projects. The details of each project were to be included in the request, and the Director indic ate d his approval
by signing this authorization which permitt ed release and
utilization of count e rpart funds. This procedure was followed consistently.
General Criteri a fo r A£proving Loans
The Agreement s pe cifies that loans be made only for
new projects which would contribute to the e conomic
1 AID file data.
cluded herein.

Tables and attachments are not in-
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development, economic stability and self-sufficiency of
Israel, that borrowers selected be good credit risks, and
that loans be effected on a non-discriminator v basis. As
nearly as can be ascertained, the GOI o~serve~ these criteria
in granting loan approvals.
Administration of Approved Loans
The Agreement specifies that loans be administered by
certain designated banks or government agencies. This procedure was carried out by GOI in full accordance with the
Agreement.
Period of Loans
The Agreement provides that the period of any loan
will not exceed seven years, unless it is subsequently agreed
by the GOI and ICA that a certain loan or loans may exceed
such period. The only subsequent agreements of record are
the individual project authorizations for release of funds.
Therefore, these authorizations would govern in this connection. As may be seen from Attachment II, the period of repayment to Account "C" in many cases exceeds seven years and is
greater than the loan period specified in the project release
authorization. This indicates that loans were made for
periods exceeding those specified in the authorizations, because repayments of principal to Ac count "err, except in the
case of agricultural loans, were to be made in installments
during the same number of years as the period of the loan.
In the case of agricultural loans, other than short-term crop
loans , repayments of principal were to conm1ence during the
s e cond year after deposit of loan funds, and were to be repaid
to the GOI within a period one year longer than the period of
the loan to the borrower. In the case of short-term crop
loans, the loan fund was established for five years, during
which no repayments were due, and at the end of five years
the entire loan was to be repaid.
It will be noted further that in many instances--ten
projects specific ally--it was agreed that loan terins would be
11'in accordance with the agreement between the Accountant
General and the Bank. 11 A letter requesting details of this
agreement was addressed by the Controller to the Ministry of
Finance September 16, 1957, but no reply was received. In
several other project release authorizations, as indicated in
Attachment II, loan terms were to be "in accordance with the
existing agreement between the Account ant General and the
Bank," or were to be ne go ti ated by the Accountant General and
the borrower. The Mission has no record of the details of
such Agreements.
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No verification could be made of the ext ent of compliance with the requirements for date of commencement of
repayments as the Mission has no record of the dates of
deposits on which this would be based.
Recommendation No. 1
a.

Tne GOI shoul d submit full p articulars justifying the
extension of loan terms which are not in accordance
with the underlying agreements and/or auth orizations.

b.

The GOI shoul d forward the information requested in
USOM Controller's letter of Sept ember 16, 1957 , together with pertinent existing agreements bet,reen the
Accountant General and the Banks, and also the results of negotiations with borrowers in those cases
described .

c.

It is further recommended that the USOM be furnished
by the GOI with the dates of deposits li s ted in
Table III of Attachment I.
Terms of Interest

The Mission has no record of the interest rates
char ged by banks or other institutions which administered
these l oans , so no determination could be raade of the extent
of c ompl iance with the r at es specified in the agreement.
However, the Agreement provides that interest paid to
the GOI by these institutions in connection with repayments
o:f principal which were to be deposited in Account 11 C'1 , was
to be calculated at the following rates:
Agricultural loans -

3½%

Industrial loans administered by banks -

4½%

Municipalities , ot her self-governing communities,
public utilit ie s andyrivate institutions serving
public interests - 4% to 5%
It may be noted fr om Table II I of Attachment I that
the rate of interest use d in ca lculating re payme nt was less
than that stipulated above in the cas e of four projects. On
the other ha nd, a rate of interest h i gher than t hat stipulated was used f or several project s in a ll cate gories.
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Recommendation No. 2
The GOI should submit full details justifying the use
of interest rates which are different from t~ose specified in
the basic Agreements for repayments to the GOI.
No verification was made of the accuracy of interest
computations, as Mission records do not show dates of deposits
upon which such calculations are based. (See Paragraph 3 of
Recommendation No. 1.)
Loans Converted to Equity or Grant
This subject was not covered in the Agreements, but
is pertinent to this review.
Table I of Attachment I contains a reference to an
amount of IL.i~6, 716,000 which is not included in the repayment forecast and which is described as "Investment in
Shares. 11 Table III details the items comprising this total.
The items consist of loans to Mekoroth Go., Ltd.,
Palestine Electric Corp., El-Al Co., Phosphate Co., Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd., the Dead Sea Works and the Israel
Mining Corp. At the time, the GOI advised that they planned
to request USOM to consider araending several Project Agreements already .financed to provide for investment in certain
semi-government enterprises in lieu of making loans. The
USOM subsequently received such a request, and in the case of
Mekoroth Co., Ltd., IL.31,400,050 and Palestine Electric Corp.,
IL.7,410,000, the Mission obtained ICA/W approval to convert
loans to non-voting Government equity. However, no approval
was given to convert the other loans, totalling IL. 8 ,1~92, 000.
An item of IL.513,050 is described in Tab le I as
"Loan to Drought Victims which converted into G1"a nt - part of
Project 41-63-766." Mission files contain no record of
authority for such action. This, incidentally , i s one of four
projects (also 41-63-701, 41-63-666 and 41-63-851) for which
USOM/I Controller has repeatedly reque ste d certain details
called for in the ori ginal authoriz ati ons . The first such
request was contained in a letter t o the Ministry of Finance
dated July 18, 1957. No re ply h a s been received.
Recommendation No.
a.

3

The loans to El-Al Airlines Ltd., Phosphate Co.,
Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd., Dead Sea Potash Works
and the Israel Mining Corp., totalling IL. 8 ,492,000,
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should be scheduled for repayment in accordance with
the original project terms. This will, of course,
necessitate revision of the tables originally submitted, and since many discrepancies were found in
these tables during the course of this review, it is
further recommended that the 5 tables submitted in
1958 be revised and corrected where required, and a
new report be submitted to USOM/I.
b.

The GOI should furnish full particulars relating to
the loan of IL.513,050 to "Drought Victims 11 under
project 41-63-766.

c.

The GOI should furnish the information required in
the authorizations for Projects 41-63-766, 41-63-701,
41-6J-666 and 41-63-851, as requested previously by
USOM/I Controller.
Reporting Requirements

The Agreement provides that each project plan should
include details of the types of periodic reports and statements to be submitted. Such details were not found in the
project plans furni shed to the Mission. Therefore, the general reporting requirements for counterpart projects would
apply, which provide that there be three types of reports
for each project.
[lJ The first re por t required is a monthly Progress
Report. Such reports were submitted, but not on a monthly
basis. Apparently only at the time of submission of a request
for the release of additional funds was a progress report prepared. Hence, for rn.any projects there is no Progress report
indicating 100% completion .
[2] The second requirement is for a comprehensive
final report including copies of all official inspection
reports, to be submitted on completion of a project . Such
reports were never submitted.

[3J Finally, the Ministry of Finance is required to
issue to the Mission a certificate stating that the grantin-aid dollars and local currency were used for the specific
purposes set out in the project plan • . These certifications
were prepared for all counterpart projects.
Recormnendation No.

4

Although the GOI did not fully comply with the progress reporting requirements, it does not appear that the
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preparation of the reports at this time would serve any constructive purpose.
However , it is recommended that the GOI comply with
the requirement for a comprehensive final report on each of
these counterpart loan projects, as loan repayments will be
a matter of current interest for several years hence.
Other Observations
Table I of Attachrnen t I schedules an i tern. of
IL.10,000 as "Loan to :Mor Factory in Liquidation - Part of
Project 41-72-951." The list of ::)Orrowers under this project which was furnished to Controller's Off ice does not show
a l oan to "Mor Factory." Furtherr'1ore, it appears that no
information relative to an uncollectible loan has ever been
furnished to USOM/I.
Table I also schedules an amount of IL.46,550 as "Not
Released and Not Executed. 11 Subsequently IL. J+J,550 of this
sum was released or the original project amount was adjusted.
However , Mission has no information relative to disposition
of the remaining amount of IL.J,000 in project 41-72-679.
Recormnendation No.

5

GOI should submit detailed information relative to
the two items (l} the Mor Factory, and (2) the balance of
IL.J,000 in project 41- 72-679.
Signed (S gd.) Charles W. Stroeher Oct 27 1960
CHARLES W. STROEHER, AUDITOR DATE
Approved (Sgd.) John E . De~iJilde Oct 28 1960
JOHN E. DEWILDE, COJJTROLLER
DATE
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